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Canada has the third largest proven oil reserves in the world and these are predominantly located 
in the province of Alberta in the form of oil sands. Despite having large oil resources and the 
ability to profit substantially from oil royalties, Alberta levies lower royalties on oil corporations 
than other comparable jurisdictions. Even when oil prices were extraordinarily high in the post-
2000s, over the last decade, researchers argue Alberta was inefficient in maximizing revenues 
from the oil industry (Campbell, 2013; Shrivastava and Stefanick, 2015). This is a critical 
problem given that the natural resources sector, particularly the oil sands, is a primary stream of 
provincial government revenue. Focusing on ideational, interest-based, and institutional factors 
(the three “I”s) that influenced provincial policy under both successive Progressive Conservative 
(PC) (2007) and New Democratic Party (NDP) (2015) governments, this study examines the 
underlying reasons for Alberta’s unwillingness to raise royalties and profit accordingly from oil 
exploitation during the two landmark royalty review processes of 2007 and 2015-16. This study 
also uses resource curse and petrostate theories to illuminate collections of “I”s specific to oil 
contexts and Doris Fuchs’ corporate power framework to map the various ways the dominant 
interest-group, oil corporations, exerted influence on the royalty review process and ensuing 
policy. I find that oil sands royalty stasis in Alberta can be explained by constellations of 
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Canada has the third largest proven oil reserves in the world and these are predominantly located 
in the province of Alberta in the form of oil sands. Oil (or tar) sands, a mixture of clay, sands, 
and water in the texture of asphalt, are expensive to extract and refine. They are also difficult and 
risky to transport, even when they are in “dilbit” form.1 Given the unconventional nature of these 
reserves, they have only been accounted for in the global tally since 2004, when the U.S.’ Energy 
Information Agency and the Oil and Gas Journal officially recognized Alberta’s oil sands, thus 
sparking American interest in Alberta’s potential (Woynillowicz et al. 2005). Further, rising 
demand for oil between 1995 and 2007 drove its price to four times the average in the previous 
decade, making exploitation highly profitable. Combined with technological advancements in 
extraction, transportation, and refining that boosted oil sands activity, the high price of oil 
propelled Canada to the top of the world’s oil producers—behind Venezuela and Saudi Arabia 
only. This process was also driven by the increasing involvement of oil corporations. With 
favourable exploration terms, national and international corporations quickly settled in Alberta’s 
attractive business environment.  
The Constitutional Act of 1867 and its subsequent 1982 amendments explicitly recognize that 
the Canadian provinces have constitutional rights to manage their own non-renewable resources, 
                                                 
1 According to the Bitumen Valuation Methodology (Ministerial) Regulation, “dilbit,” or diluted bitumen, is “a 
blend of heavy crude oil or cleaned crude bitumen mixed with diluent in order to meet pipeline viscosity and 








including the power to levy taxes and royalties. Governments collect revenues from the natural 
resource sector in a variety of ways, including corporate taxes, concession and transit fees, 
signing bonuses, in-kind payments, and royalties (Ross, 2015). Royalties, however, are often the 
lion’s share of oil revenues collected by governments.  According to Anielski (2015), a royalty 
is a “compensation, consideration, or fee paid for a license or privilege to use…a natural resource 
(…), computed usually as a percentage of gross revenue or profit realized from the use” (p. 3). 
In other words, a royalty is a fee paid by the developer (the licensee) of the resource to the owner 
of the resource (the licensor).  Today, Alberta has a generic system with two tiers of royalties: 
pre-payout (royalty paid by the developers on gross revenues) and post-payout (royalty paid on 
net revenue). In the pre-payout phase, the royalty rate is set between 1% - 9%; in the post-payout 
phase, the royalty is the greater of 25% to 40% of net revenue, in addition to the pre-payout rate 
(Government of Alberta, 2021). However, the generic system is a relatively recent addition to 
the royalty framework, which has undergone multiple transformations in the past five decades. 
Despite having large oil resources and the ability to profit substantially from oil royalties, Alberta 
levies lower royalties on oil corporations than other comparable jurisdictions. Even when oil 
prices were extraordinarily high in the post-2000s, researchers argue Alberta was inefficient in 
maximizing revenues from the oil industry (Campbell, 2013; Shrivastava and Stefanick, 2015). 
This is a critical problem given that the natural resources sector, particularly the oil sands, is a 
primary stream of provincial government revenue.  
Focusing on ideational, interest-based, and institutional factors (the “3Is”) that influenced 
provincial policy under both successive Progressive Conservative (PC) (2007) and New 
Democratic Party (NDP) (2015) governments, this study examines the underlying reasons for 
Alberta’s unwillingness to raise royalties and profit accordingly from oil exploitation during the 
two landmark royalty review processes of 2007 and 2015-16. 
1.2. Problem and Research Question 
The royalty reviews of 2007 and 2015-16 marked critical moments in Alberta’s political-
economic history. In 2007, global oil prices were high and the oil sands sector was booming in 
Alberta. To ensure that the provincial government—and therefore Albertans—would profit from 
this boom, the 2007 PC-led provincial government launched a royalty review Panel, the first of 
its kind. The Panel suggested middling changes in oil sand royalties, including an increase on net 
profits, and faced wide-ranging criticism for not recommending more dramatic royalty increases. 
In response to the Panel’s recommendations, the PC government made some palatable changes 








In 2015-16, in the context of falling oil prices since the end of 2014, there was a remarkable 
political shift in provincial electoral politics: the NDP was elected with a majority after more 
than four decades of PC rule. The NDP campaigned in part on reviewing royalties and 
implementing a more progressive royalty framework, committing, as the PCs had in 2007, to 
regain more public benefit from Alberta’s oil sands. Specifically, the NDP had plans to review 
the royalty framework and to increase corporate taxes by 2% (from 10% to 12%). However, post-
review, the 2015-16 Panel recommendations were unambitious: in particular, the Panel 
recommended no changes to oil sands royalties. Following suit, the NDP government’s new 
royalty framework proposed no more than the status quo for oil sands royalties.  
This study asks why both PC and NDP governments were unwilling to increase royalties in 2007 
and 2015-16 in any significant way. In both cases, the leading political party was ostensibly 
committed to capturing more royalties for all resources (including conventional oil, natural gas, 
and the oil sands), there was public support for it, and arguably, the industry was able to bear it. 
Yet at both times, the Panels either opposed or recommended only middling changes: the 2007 
Panel recommended moderate changes whereas the 2015-16 Panel recommended none. In 
response to the unambitious recommendations, neither the 2007 PC nor the 2015 NDP 
government made significant changes to the royalty framework.  
What explains the decision of the Alberta government not to significantly increase oil sands 
royalties in province-wide reviews in 2007 and 2015-16? Answering this question contributes to 
our understanding of the reason why low royalties in Alberta have endured, despite political 
power shifts and historic oil price and production booms. Based on insights drawn from growing 
scholarship that examines corporate power in the oil sands (Nikiforuk, 2010; Le Billon and 
Carter, 2012; Adkin, 2016; Carroll, 2017), this study notes the key role of oil industry actors 
(firms and associations) influencing policy outcomes, but also the influence of institutional 
structures that define policy possibilities, and the impact of ideas in shaping discourses and 
beliefs around royalty policy.  
1.3. Literatures, Analytical Framework, and Argument Summary 
This thesis argues that the Alberta government chose not to significantly increase oil sands 
royalties in 2007 and 2015-16 because of a combination of institutional, interest-based, and 
ideational factors in both instances. Institutional factors set the stage for a dominant type of 
interests—corporate interests—to successfully influence policy-making via means of framing 
royalty policy in ways that resonated with shared myths and ideas that some Albertans have about 
themselves. Because this study investigates a piece of policy directly connected to oil—a unique 








curse  and petrostate theories to illuminate clues about the types of institutional, interest-based, 
and ideational factors that influenced royalty policy. Lastly, diving into interest-groups in 
particular, this study uses Fuchs’ typology of the three forms of corporate power in global 
governance to understand how one group of interests came to dominate the conversation on 
royalty policy-making. 
To track, classify, and analyze the factors that explain royalty stasis in Alberta, I identify specific 
institutional, ideational, and interest-based factors relevant to explaining the government of 
Alberta’s royalty policy. In terms of institutional factors, the outcomes were partly a product of: 
1) the fall in global oil prices at the time of launching the reviews declining world oil prices; 2) 
the institutionalization of corporate influence in government decision-making (e.g. revolving 
doors, their engagement in royalty panels, the funding of political parties); 3) the institutional 
weakness of the Albertan government (e.g. economic dependency on oil); and 4) issues around 
oil sands costs calculations. For each review specifically, the 2007 review faced institutional 
challenges, especially the lack of support from universities and the media. Both played a central 
role in encouraging oil activity and creating a framework for supporting anti-royalty-increase 
discourses. There was also a debate on the rules and regulations around oil sands costs to 
determine royalties, given that the main argument in favour of protecting the oil sands revolved 
around the prohibitive costs of extraction. The 2015 review faced challenges due to 1) the shale 
revolution, which affected oil sands’ market share by changing the behaviour of Canada’s largest 
buyer, the U.S.; 2) the NDP’s weaker institutional capacity because of its lack of experience, the 
surprise nature of its electoral victory, and the lack of institutional memory transfer from the PC 
to the NDP governments; 3) the greater hostility of the media and civil service in 2015-16; and 
4) the limitation of the four-year electoral cycle given that the NDP government had never been 
elected before. These institutional factors impacted the possibilities open to the PC government 
in 2007 and the NDP government in 2015-16.  
Regarding interest-based factors, oil industry interests opposed royalty changes in both 2007 and 
2015-16 and exerted influence through a variety of means. Yet, it is important to note that 
corporate interests were not a homogenous group: this study accounts for differences between 
large multinationals and small local producers. In the same vein, other interests proved significant 
too: the general public by demanding a royalty review; the government by virtue of its policy-
making responsibility to its constituents; and other clusters, such as rural interests and civil 
society actors. Nevertheless, corporate interests remained the best organized interest-group, 
especially in 2015-16 because of their experience in 2007. They also had more direct channels 









In terms of ideational factors, the outcomes were also partly a product of the industry’s framing 
of the issue in ways that resonated with broader “shared myths” that some Albertans have about 
themselves (specifically, the “frontier” identity and popularity of free market economics) and 
their perception of what ownership entailed. Other ideational factors include some Albertans’ 
dedication to extracting “ethical oil” as well as ideological divisions amongst NDP.   
Finally, it is important to note that while the 3Is are used here to explain the final outcome—
namely, oil sands royalty stasis—they sometimes worked to promote larger change than what 
actually happened. In other words, some institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors 
discouraged change, while others encouraged change. Pressure to raise royalties and challenge 
the status quo was triggered by the institutional factor of rising oil prices, combined with the 
popular idea of “thinking like an owner to get our fair share,” which itself was built upon the 
deeper idea that Albertans are the owners of the resource.2 The 2007 Panel appointed by then 
Premier Ed Stelmach was independent, open-ended, and received the support of the government 
as Stelmach was determined to review all royalties (not only oil sands’). The election of the NDP 
in 2015 also contributed to strengthening the chances of royalties being increased given that the 
Party had long campaigned on raising royalties.  
On the other hand, ideational factors such as the popularity of free market economics, the 
“frontier” identity, the narrative of “ethical oil,” and the ideological schism inside NDP ranks all 
promoted the status quo for royalties. In addition, institutional limitations around the oil sands 
costs debate, industry’s capture of important institutions (e.g. the 2015-16 Panel, universities, 
and the media), the fall in global oil prices at the time of launching the reviews, the limited 
political capital afforded to the NDP within the four-year electoral cycle and the intrinsic 
challenges it faced equally participated in discouraging royalty change. Finally, rural interests’ 
economic dependency on the oil sector, the anti-royalty raise front presented by heterogeneous 
corporate interests, their subsequent strategies, and the power they exercised contributed to 
ensuring that royalties would remain low.  
In addition to the role of these specific interest-based, ideational, and institutional explanations, 
the outcomes in 2007 and 2015-16 were also a product of the fact that Alberta was a “petro-state” 
suffering from “resource curse,” both of which point to specific constellations (or “collections”) 
of institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors in Alberta. Resource curse and petrostate 
theories also help situate and frame Alberta’s context by highlighting the atypical structures, 
dynamics, processes, and actors that exist in the province because of the presence of and 
dependency on oil activity. 
                                                 









Resource curse theory gives us clues to understand institutional weaknesses at the provincial 
level, while petrostate theory explains why oil interests were so powerful in this context. Indeed, 
Alberta’s status as a petrostate allowed international circumstances to affect royalty possibilities 
in the province. In addition, Alberta exhibits many petrostate characteristics, which can be 
categorized by the 3Is. For example, Alberta’s institutional economic dependency on oil 
prevented it from escaping industry’s influence; its petro-elite had highly concentrated political 
and economic interests (notably compared to government); and Alberta’s political culture is built 
on an ideational landscape that favours oil. The analysis presented in this study shows that 
Alberta is a resource-cursed petrostate with institutions susceptible to corporate influence, a 
government who lacks administrative capacity, and a less robust democracy overall. 
Finally, building on the field of global governance which accounts for the political role of non-
state actors, this study suggests that corporations—a specific kind of interests—played a major 
role in influencing royalty policy outcomes. More specifically, it draws from global governance 
scholar Doris Fuchs’ three dimensions of power (i.e. instrumental, structural, and discursive) to 
conceptualize and frame corporate influence over royalty policy in Alberta and highlight how 
these actors derived power from specific ideational and institutional factors (Fuchs, 2005, 2007; 
Fuchs and Lederer, 2017). For example, corporations exerted their power through mechanisms 
such as revolving door practices, financial contributions, lobbying, judicial courts, and framing. 
They exerted structural power both through threats of capital strike (Przeworski and Wallerstein, 
1988; Young et al., 2018) by instilling fear and uncertainty about their oil activity not only to 
government, but also by playing on some Albertans’ dependency on the oil sector, and through 
threats of capital “exit” (Pastor Jr, 1990; McKenzie and Dwight, 1991; Crystal, 1994; Petersen, 
2004; Epstein, 2005) by threatening to leave Alberta and move their oil activity elsewhere. They 
also proved particularly in their use of discursive power, which links to ideational explanations 
of royalty policy outcomes and materialized at several levels, including influencing policymakers 
directly, opinion-leaders in universities, and the media that might, in turn, influence policymakers 
and/or the public. Indirectly, they could influence policymakers by shaping broader public 
opinion and developing arguments that resonated with longstanding ideational currents in Alberta 
elite circles and the general public (i.e. the frontier identity and free market economics). 
1.4. Methodology and Positionality 
1.4.1. Case Selection and Methods 
I chose to focus on Alberta for multiple reasons. First, Alberta’s oil sector is globally significant 
because the province is, and will long continue to be, the epicentre of Canadian oil extraction. 








Moreover, the province has embodied the global shift from conventional to unconventional oil, 
with its attendant environmental consequences (Carter, 2020) and become a premier example of 
a “petrostate” (Karl, 1999; Adkin, 2016). The scope of the study also allowed for a wide range 
of actors to be analyzed (especially corporate actors), but also accounted for the structures and 
institutions in place that defined the playfield, and for the ideas that determined and rooted 
interest groups’ beliefs about royalty policy. Given Alberta’s attractive business environment, 
the province hosts many kinds of corporations: international oil companies (IOCs), Canadian oil 
companies, and powerful lobby and industry associations who represent oil interests.3 Alberta 
also presented an intriguing policy puzzle: in two very different political contexts (i.e. PC vs. 
NDP), the government of Alberta attempted to increase its royalty capture with little success. 
This failure was in part due to the influence of corporate power on the state, but also to the 
institutions and ideas at play. In this way, Alberta provided a context to observe the inner 
workings of the 3Is in a resource cursed petrostate on two distinct, yet similar in outcomes, policy 
processes. 
This study uses qualitative methods, using process tracing and fieldwork-based interviews to 
understand the 2007 and 2015-16 royalty reviews. Process tracing sheds light on the chronology 
of change of oil sands royalty frameworks and royalty review Panels’ recommendations reports. 
Fieldwork provides new insights to explain policy outcomes and royalty review stasis. The case 
study approach is particularly useful to generate “an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a 
complex issue in its real-life context” (Crowe et al., 2011). This study follows an intrinsic case 
study model to learn about the uniqueness of the phenomenon of royalty stasis in Alberta—the 
Alberta case was selected “on its own merit” (Crowe et al., 2011)—yet, it also aims to obtain a 
broader appreciation of governments’ opportunities (or lack thereof) to extract value from their 
resources as they are impacted by the dynamics of a plethora of stakeholders, thus hinting at an 
instrumental case study approach (Stake, 1995). Each royalty review is described and analyzed 
in each detailed case study chapter, including the circumstances and context when each review 
was launched, the actors involved, and the reception of the Panel reports. By comparing both 
reviews, I use process tracing’s key focus on describing processes “over time” (Collier, 2011, 
824). This descriptive work is the foundation for insights gathered through fieldwork and 
interviews in Alberta. Most of the content there is based on the review of documents relevant to 
the cases such as the two royalty review Panel final reports from 2007 and 2015-16, ensuing 
government royalty framework reports, and general media coverage in the province.  
                                                 
3 In the thesis, oil corporations and oil producers are used interchangeably to refer to oil companies who produce 









Prior to commencing fieldwork, this study obtained research ethics clearance which involved 
multiple reviews of interview questions, information letter and letters of invitation, consent 
forms, recruitment emails, feedback letters, and other ethics material. A list of potential 
interviewees was created through the literature and media review, and through the network of 
researchers and scholars I had from my time in Alberta. Guided by the 3Is, this study is built on 
four sets of semi-structured interviews with various groups involved in the reviews and ensuing 
policy processes. These groups include: a) royalty review Panel members (3); (b) formerly 
elected government officials, members of opposition parties, and long-standing civil servants (5); 
(c) industry actors, particularly corporate executives of major companies involved specifically in 
the oil sands and industry associations (e.g. CAPP) (2); and (d) civil society actors, university 
academics, researchers at institutes, and journalists (6). The latter set includes researchers at the 
Parkland Institute at the University of Alberta, the Pembina Institute in Calgary, academics at the 
University of Calgary, and journalists with the Edmonton Journal.4  
In December 2018, I went to Alberta to conduct fieldwork, travelling between Edmonton and 
Calgary on the “Calgary Trail,” a portion of Alberta’s Highway 2. When I could not meet in 
person, I conducted interviews over the phone. The interviews were all conducted during 
fieldwork in Alberta (except one on the phone a year later due to availability constraints both 
from the interviewee and myself) and scheduled at a mutually agreed upon time with participants. 
The information collected provided contextual knowledge and an insider perspective on the 
conduct of Alberta and industry before, during, and after the reviews.  
I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews because they allowed me to “reconstitute specific 
processes of decision-making by understanding the perspectives and strategies of key actors…to 
determine why particular decisions were made at specific moments” (Smith, 2010, 102). In 
addition, semi-structured interviews were particularly well-suited to elite interviews, a necessity 
in my case given my interest in interviewing royalty review Panel members, government 
officials, and industry executives (Leech, 2002). All interviewees were based on a common 
interview schedule,5 though some questions were tailored to different stakeholders to allow me 
to ask what was relevant to different groups. These interviews provided an understanding of each 
interviewee’s role in and perception of the royalty reviews, as well as their thoughts on the impact 
or influence of the 3Is. The incredible value of fieldwork is evident in that these interviews also 
enriched my understanding of royalties by suggesting “I”s I had not anticipated. 
The nature of and policy around Alberta oil made the case of royalty policy controversial, thereby 
improving my chances of obtaining more nuanced discursive information and a wider array of 
                                                 
4 For more information on the interview sets, see Appendix. 








opinions. For example, opposition parties provided a critical perspective on government policy 
in 2007 and 2015-16, whereas industry representatives provided a more general picture of the 
government from the industry’s standpoint. In the same vein, the last set of interviewees (civil 
society actors, university academics, researchers at institutes, and journalists) were crucial not 
only in providing empirical data, but also in helping cross-check information provided by 
government officials and corporate executives. Further, interviews were conducted with a 
confidentiality clause that removed the name and other direct identifiers to allow for more honest 
takes (Morse, 1998; Lancaster, 2017).  
To immerse myself in the history of oil, I also visited the Canadian Energy Museum, home to 
Leduc No.1, the first oil rig to strike oil in 1947 in Leduc, Alberta. There, I consulted archives 
that had been donated by various oil groups, a miscellany of reports, accounting books, permits, 
and historical accounts of oil activities in the province—an overwhelming experience that echoes 
that of 2007 Panel members’, which I describe in the later chapters of this thesis.  
Through the case study approach, this study collected data from multiple sources, including peer-
reviewed articles and books, reports, news media, and press releases, as well as interviews with 
multiple actors. Conducting interviews on the ground with key actors is the centrepiece of this 
research project and its most significant contribution, given that some of the actors interviewed 
intervened in one or both royalty review processes and many had not yet shared their assessments 
and reflections on those reviews. Given that the some interviews were about events that happened 
more than a decade ago, some scholars have designed new ways of addressing issues around 
memory and recollection, including the use of pre-interview activities in the week prior to the 
interviews (Ellis et al., 2011). Given the “elite” character my interviews (interviews were difficult 
to secure and interviewees could offer me very little time), I instead designed the information 
letter sent to potential participants prior to the interview not only to highlight the research study, 
but also to provide general facts about the review to help contextualize the interview and assist 
in recollection.  
The interviews helped accomplish two tasks. First, they allowed for the collection of information 
on the various institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors at play and compare them to 
insights drawn from the literature. This comparison helped bridge the gap between theoretical 
assumptions and practices in the public and private sector. Second, the interviews were previous 
primary data as they tapped into interviewees’ institutional memory—whether they be 
government, industry, Panel, etc.—with regards to the events of 2007 and 2015-16. As for 
interview content, because there is a degree of secrecy and reluctance to reveal some of the 
practices held behind doors, the questions asked were mostly on general appraisals of satisfaction 
and disappointment with the royalty review process and the royalty frameworks of 2007 and 








Despite my long preparation, I faced obstacles in the interview process. I could not secure 
nineteen of my interviews I had hoped to conduct: some actors were still active in royalty policy 
at the time of fieldwork and were simply too busy to meet and share insights (2); others felt they 
might not be well-placed to share insights (5); others did not express interest in participating in 
the study (4); finally, some did not reply to interview requests (8). Also, some interviewees who 
had had central roles in the royalty review process at the time of the reviews had changed position 
entirely and were now bound by a duty of confidentiality or were reluctant to disclose 
information. Those nineteen interviews included industry, government, Panel members, and civil 
society groups. Nevertheless, the interviews I conducted still covered all the groups I had sought 
to interview and each was in-depth enough that I did not require follow-up interviews.  
The sixteen interviews conducted proved extremely informative and laid the ground for the 
analysis presented here. Interviews were of varying length (ranging from 31 to 150 minutes), 
generating a large quantity of data. Together, the interviews provided 23+ hours of recording, 
which I transcribed. During the transcription process, I kept a separate file to track essential 
quotes and insights that might later be central to my analysis.  
I then analyzed the interview data to identify factors that contributed to creating oil sands royalty 
stasis in Alberta. While I explored using qualitative data analysis (QDA) softwares (e.g. NVivo), 
the number of interviews allowed me to code, sort, and analyze the data manually (Glasner and 
Strauss, 1967; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). I used different color codes to track the following: 
institutional, interest-based, ideational factors, and intersections; facts and contexts for each 
review; pre-2007 royalty review historical events (chronology); background information on 
royalties, royalty structure, and calculations; and perspectives/interpretations/opinions from 
government, political parties, industry, civil society, and Panels. The analysis of interview data 
combined with insights and theoretical guidance from the various literatures reviewed provided 
me with a close-to-the-ground, fine-grained perspective on the institutional, interest-based, and 
ideational factors that influenced royalties in 2007 and 2015-16.  
1.4.2. Positionality: Distant Yet Connected 
Fieldwork involved important personal challenges, especially related to how I positioned myself 
in the research. Studying contexts of deep political polarization like the royalty review 
controversy certainly brings expected challenges, such as interview access, defensive attitudes, 
and so forth. However, as mentioned previously, the controversy also improved my chances of 
obtaining nuanced information and diverse opinions. For example, in Alberta, there is a very 
clear divide between pro-oil sands and anti-oil sands groups, which often translates into divisions 








ensure both that I would have access to representatives of each group highlighted above and that 
I would maintain the highest standards of ethics and confidentiality—all the while ensuring that 
my interview requests would be met positively.  
While I was requesting interviews, my interviewees often requested, implicitly or explicitly, to 
know my position as a researcher to the subject matter despite my sending exhaustive letters of 
information well in advance. These requests took multiple forms, from asking explicitly what my 
“take” was on royalties before starting the interview, to more implicit questioning of why I was 
interested in this work, given my position as an out-of-province, Waterloo-based researcher. 
During these times, I was posed with the ethical debate of positioning myself as honestly as 
possible while still being able to continue with the interview.  
To answer the question of my “take” on royalties, I approached each interview—whether with 
industry, government, Panel members, or civil society actors—with a growth and learning 
mindset, putting all my assumptions aside to concentrate openly on the stories and experiences 
of my interviewees. My only assumption was that each story was as valid as another—here, 
following in the path of the 3Is that ideas “tell interests what to mean” (Heclo, 1994, 383) and 
“what actors believe may be just as important as what they want” (Campbell, 2002). The beliefs 
of industry, government, Panel members, and civil society actors were various and translated 
differently into their respective interests—whether those interests were personal or not. As a 
researcher, I focused on giving my interviewees the space to share their ideas and interests freely. 
I knew my attempt to understand the reviews would not be complete without including all factors 
presented by the myriad of actors involved.  
As an Ontario-based researcher, I also needed to explain my interest in Alberta-centric questions 
and research aims, especially given the complex history between Alberta and Ontario (i.e. 
longstanding federal-provincial tensions). My Ontario affiliation was complicated by the fact that 
my native language is French, and therefore, I anticipated that some of my interviewees would 
assume I was French-Canadian, from Québec or Ontario, and would have difficulty “placing” 
me. Foreseeing these challenges, I started each of my interviews with a short description of my 
background, which included many aspects that resonated with Albertans’ experiences: I 
explained that I moved to Canada as an immigrant from Europe; I highlighted that I was a 
University of Alberta alumnus who had become fascinated with the oil sands during my master’s 
degree there; and that I hoped to learn more through doctoral research from the perspective of an 
institution outside Alberta. Ultimately, I sought to place myself as a researcher with connections 
to and experience in Alberta, but with enough distance and autonomy from the province and its 









This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Empirically, it provides in-depth 
comparative case studies of oil sands royalty policy and review processes in 2007 and 2015-16 
in Alberta. These case studies contribute to understandings of how royalty policy is decided and 
its reviews conducted. Furthermore, this is the first comprehensive study comparing the two 
royalty review processes of 2007 and 2015-16, both of which are unique in Alberta’s history.6 
By doing this comparative work, this study tracks similarities and differences between the two 
reviews and analyzes how some of the differences impacted the review outcomes. In addition, 
the dissertation’s main empirical contribution comes from fieldwork, which provided new 
insights to explain royalty policy and stasis. Indeed, as mentioned previously, conducting 
interviews on the ground with key actors is the centrepiece of this research project and its most 
significant contribution, given that many of the interviewed actors who intervened in one or both 
royalty review processes had not yet shared their assessments and reflections on those reviews. 
The study also provides analytical contributions. First, it presents an understanding of how the 
3Is can be applied in the Alberta oil sands policy context to recognize, map, and categorize 
institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors at play in influencing royalty policy. In testing 
the value and usefulness of the 3Is, my conclusion is that all 3Is played an important role in 
influencing royalty policy and many were intertwined. Second, it confirms that resource curse 
and petrostate theories can be applied to a subnational entity, as opposed to the more common 
applications on national states. Both resource curse and petrostate theories prove useful to explain 
the royalty situation in Alberta. Third and last, it applies Fuchs’ theory of corporate power to 
frame the significant power and influence of one specific interest group, oil corporations, on 
royalty policy. This application shows that corporations promoted their legitimacy as important 
actors in oil governance by drawing upon instrumental, structural, and discursive power. 
Finally, this study also makes two theoretical contributions. The first is to provide a framework 
for using the 3Is in combination with specific oil theories, namely the resource curse and 
petrostate theories, to illuminate specific constellations (or “collections”) of institutional, 
interest-based and ideational factors to be found in analyses of energy policy development. The 
second is to combine the 3Is with Fuchs’ corporate power framework to understand the tools 
available to corporations exerting influence and transforming into governance actors. 
                                                 








1.6. Thesis Structure 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents literatures relevant to analyzing the 
cases of Alberta’s 2007 and 2015-16 royalty reviews in light of the province’s oil’s dependency, 
including: the institutions, interests, and ideas framework (the “3Is”); resource curse and 
petrostate theories; and the influence of corporate power over policy-making. Each of these 
literatures provides tools and concepts that help make sense of Alberta’s royalty policy in light 
of the 2007 and 2015-16 reviews. The 3Is framework allows for recognizing, mapping, and 
categorizing various factors at play in influencing royalty policy-making. The foundational 
resource curse and petrostate theories illuminate clues about the types of institutional, interest-
based, and ideational factors that influence royalty policy (i.e. patterns) and lay out the context 
in which these 3Is operate. Lastly, Fuchs’ typology of the three forms of corporate power in 
global governance help us understand how one group of interests came to dominate the 
conversation on royalty policy-making. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed historical review of the government of Alberta’s royalty trajectory, 
from the discovery of oil in Leduc, Alberta in 1947 until 2015. It tracks the evolution and growth 
of provincial government policy in relation to the industry throughout the Conservative dynasty 
from 1971 until 2015, with a special focus on the leadership of premiers Peter Lougheed, Ralph 
Klein, Ed Stelmach, and Rachel Notley. I also review national oil policy and the involvement of 
the federal government in matters related to oil governance, specifically those conducted in 
partnership with Alberta’s—or to its detriment. In addition, the chapter pinpoints key global 
events that affected oil realities in Alberta and shed light on its vulnerability. Finally, the chapter 
provides a detailed description of the royalty review processes of 2007 and 2015-16, including 
the recommendations made by both Panels. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the 2007 royalty review case and retraces ideational, interest-based, and 
institutional factors that played a role in influencing the review and following policy. It identifies 
central institutional factors such as fluctuating global oil prices, the capture of institutions 
(universities, media), and oil sands costs; ideational factors such as the popular phrases “thinking 
like an owner,” “getting our fair share,” pioneer/frontier identity-based perceptions, and the 
narrative of ethical oil; and interest-based factors such as corporations’ use of instrumental, 
structural, and discursive power to adopt strategies designed to prevent royalty increase and the 
role of rural interests. 
Chapter 5 examines the 2015-16 royalty review along ideational, interest-based, and institutional 
lines. It first highlights the impact of falling oil prices upon the launch of the review along with 
other institutional challenges such as the Panel membership and structure, as well as Alberta 








this second review and the many ways it exercised its power, including a focus on discursive 
power. The chapter also reviews how civil society actors challenged industry, before turning to 
the Panel’s recommendations and policy reception. It also identifies how the vacuum left by 
decades of Conservative rule in part led to challenges for NDP, including the limitation of the 
four-year electoral cycle given that the NDP government had never been elected before, 
ideological challenges within the Party, and the backlashed it faced due to falling oil prices. The 
chapter concludes with a comparative summary of both royalty reviews. 
The dissertation concludes with Chapter 6, which answers this study’s main research question by 
weaving together empirical findings that consider institutional, interest-based, and ideational 
factors to explain royalty stasis in Alberta. It includes a summary of individual “I” factors, then 
collections of “I”s highlighted through the resource curse and petrostate theories, and then sheds 
lights on 3Is factors that interacted. It also highlights the contributions of this study, including 
empirical, analytical, and theoretical contributions and limitations—many of which can point us 
in the direction of future research. Finally, it proposes policy alternatives to improve royalties in 

























Framing Institutions, Interests, and Ideas 








While oil was first discovered in 1947, Alberta only started to become dependent on oil in the 
1960s. As the oil industry grew, the province’s economy became increasingly dependent on oil 
revenue and thus, its oil sector as a whole, including its largest players in the private sphere. 
Eventually, Alberta settled for a royalty-based framework which changed a few times over the 
years. This chapter presents literatures relevant to analyzing the cases of Alberta’s 2007 and 
2015-16 royalty reviews in light of the province’s oil dependency, including the institutions, 
interests, and ideas framework (the “3Is”); resource curse and petrostate theories; and the 
influence of corporate power over policy-making. Each of these literatures provides tools and 
concepts that help make sense of Alberta’s royalty policy in light of the 2007 and 2015-16 
reviews.  
To understand the decision of the Alberta government not to significantly increase oil sands 
royalties in the two province-wide reviews of 2007 and 2015-16, this study first employs the 3Is 
framework because it allows for recognizing, mapping, and categorizing various factors at play 
in influencing royalty policy-making. Next, because this study investigates a piece of policy 
directly connected to oil, it draws from the foundational resource curse and petrostate theories to 
illuminate clues about the types of institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors that 








patterns—with the expectation that certain institutions, interests, and ideas will appear—and lay 
out the context in which these 3Is operate. For example, this study examines the institutional 
foundations that structure policy, the various interest-groups operating in this context, and the 
underlying ideas that constitute normative belief systems. Lastly, diving into interest-groups in 
particular, this study uses Fuchs’ typology of the three forms of corporate power in global 
governance to understand how one group of interests came to dominate the conversation on 
royalty policy-making.  
2.2. The 3Is in Comparative Politics & International Political Economy 
Within the comparative politics literature, structuralism, rationalism, and culturalism are three 
important theoretical approaches that differ with regards to their basis. As described succinctly 
by Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997), a structural approach is based on conditions (i.e. “political 
institutions and processes that shape collective mobilization”); a rational approach is based on 
means (“mobilizing structures supporting collective action”); and a cultural approach is based on 
norms (“framing processes around which collective action is conceived and acted out”) (p. 144).  
In the political economy literature, the 3Is echo—to an extent—with the comparative politics 
literature. An institutional approach involves analyzing “enduring rules, procedures, and 
organizations that tend to structure individual conduct” (Heclo, 1994, 375). Examples of 
institutions include judicial courts and government regulating agencies, but can also consider 
institutions in the broader sense of structures that frame, shape, and limit actions and actors (e.g. 
fluctuating oil prices) and non-governmental institutions (e.g. the media and universities). 
Second, an interest-based approach involves attuning to “self-interested and purposive pursuit of 
material goals” (Heclo, 1994, 375). For example, interests include oil corporations, the 
government, rural communities, and Albertans in general. Third, an ideational approach 
foregrounds “mental constructions” (Heclo, 1994, 375). Examples of ideas include the belief that 
the oil sands can be a “clean” industry, or the perception that Canada ought to assume a global 
leadership role in energy matters. 
However, this study follows in the paths of scholars who have highlighted how institutions, ideas, 
and interests are fundamentally intertwined. Interestingly, the same parallel can be made with 
structuralism, rationalism, and culturalism. Indeed, structuralism connects to culturalism the 
same way institutions “tell ideas how to survive” (Heclo, 1994, 383); in the words of Lichbach 
and Zuckerman “individual action aggregates into and also responds to collective action” (1997, 
262). In the same vein, culturalism connects to rationalism the same way ideas “tell interests 
what to mean” (Heclo, 1994, 383); indeed, “individual beliefs correspond to and ultimately 








connects back to structuralism the same way that interests “tell institutions what to do” (Heclo, 
1994, 383); Lichbach and Zukerman find that “individual desires reflect and produce social 
norms” (1997, 262). 
This study also builds on the work of two scholars, Hall (1997) and Majone (1998), who capture 
the evolution of the 3Is, with Hall focusing on political economy and Majone emphasizing the 
transformation of public-policy making. Hall argues that one of the foci of political economy is 
power, especially issues that examine whose interests are served by a set of economic 
arrangements and how the latter distributes power and resources across social groups. This 
approach is relevant here given the power of Alberta’s petro-elite to influence economic 
arrangements to serve its interests and is studied in depth through Fuchs’ work. Majone’s work 
complements Hall’s and provides excellent insights into public policy by using the 3Is as a 
framework to contextualize policy-making and outcomes. In particular, Majone explains how 
decision-makers increasingly need to be efficient, to be credible, and to maintain their reputation, 
thus making use of ideational and institutional approaches complementary to the interest-based 
approach.  
2.2.1. Institutions 
In general, institutions refer to the formal institutions of the state, including how business-state 
relationships become formalized and normalized through state institutions (Purdon, 2015). In the 
comparative politics literature, structuralism explains policy outcomes from causal factors in the 
organizational structures of the political economy (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). Indeed, an 
institutional theory of social change comes from the study of the “historical dynamics of 
[organizational] structures” (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 265). This study uses a broader 
institutional approach to explain policy by examining structures that frame the behaviour and 
interactions of stakeholders and groups. Electoral systems, campaign or party financing 
arrangements, the division of jurisdictional authority, and taxes and spending are all of interest 
in this approach. As mentioned previously, it also covers the political organization of the state, 
especially with regards to the relationship between the state and businesses.  In an oil context, 
these state-business dynamics can reveal that certain institutional arrangements are more 
vulnerable to influence from the oil sector (Lockwood et al. 2016); they can also be opened or 
closed to oil interests (Hoberg and Philips, 2011). In the Alberta context, the institutional 
approach is used to identify central institutional factors such as fluctuating global oil prices and 
the capture of institutions (e.g. universities, media), but it also accounts for factors such as the 








While institutional approaches’ unit of analysis is often the state, it can sometimes be a sector, a 
region, or a system. One of the main assumptions of the institutional approach is that actors are 
rationally influenced by institutions, or in Purdon’s words, “institutions produce a distinctive 
combination of sanctions and incentives that shape patterns of political influence and 
organization, and lead political and economic actors toward some kinds of behavior and away 
from others” (Purdon, 2015, 10-11). For example, institution-based analysts might argue that 
Alberta’s dependency on oil allows oil corporations to dominate and even direct public policy. 
The institutional approach has several strengths relevant to this study. First, the approach 
acknowledges that economies can vary and thus, that there are different patterns of policy and 
performance. Second, the approach emphasizes the sanctions and incentives of institutions as a 
major causal factor in determining policy outcomes (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). 
Institutions shape the interests of key actors: indeed, interest-groups use windows of 
opportunities opened by institutions to change policy outcomes (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997, 
153). For example, a window of opportunity could be coming from a tendency in North America 
to delegate significant regulatory powers to independent agencies, boards, or commissions. These 
agencies, by virtue of being independent, are separate from the government, and therefore not 
directly accountable to citizens like an elected government would be (Majone, 1998). They are 
often discreet, relegated to the background, and difficult to trace. They thus open windows of 
opportunities for interests to penetrate policy-making, creating a perfect ground for corporations 
hoping to “regulate” their own industry. In terms of limitations, the institutional approach misses 
what interest- and idea-based approaches focus on: for example, it is silent on the different 
resources that interest groups need in order to access these institutions and does not capture the 
influence of ideas in the very creation of these institutions. 
2.2.2. Interests 
In this approach, interests are usually defined as “real, material interests” (Hall, 1997, 176). 
Interests are often derived from “variation in costs and benefits of various policy actions across 
actors, tensions between political and economic objectives, trade-offs between short- and long-
term effects, and geographical variation in who wins and who loses” (Purdon, 2015, 12). In this 
approach, social change comes from “how individuals react to the unintended and unwanted 
social consequences of rational action and construct new institutions–which are, of course, 
subject to dysfunctions and hence institutional change” (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997, 265).  
The interest-based approach focuses in part on interactions between actors who often compete 
for material interests and the strategies they use to profit or defend themselves (Dabrowski, 2017; 








(Gough, 2016; Steves and Teytelboym, 2013). Within the interest approach, Hall (1997) presents 
two bodies of literature, one focused on producer group coalitions, and another emphasizing the 
electoral approach. For this study, the former is of particular relevance because its contributors 
explain variation over time in patterns of economic policy, including how different economic 
policies can affect material interests of actors (Hall, 1997). The central actors are producer groups 
whose material interests drive policy, themselves influenced by international conditions (e.g. low 
oil prices), “allowing politicians […] to put together new coalitions behind particular mixture of 
policy” (Hall, 2002, 177). The producer group coalition has multiple strengths. First, it shows 
how policies are maintained by groups whose interests are advanced by it. Second, it shows how 
policies advantage some groups and disadvantage others, acknowledging that politics is 
ultimately a struggle for scarce resources. For example, interest-based analysts would argue that 
oil price fluctuations threaten corporations’ interests leading the latter to demand the status quo 
in the royalty framework. The interest approach is linked to the structuralist and culturalist 
approaches because it accounts for different forms of mobilization and accounts for collective 
action as sometimes embedded in cultural communities (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). 
Still, the producer group coalition approach has limitations. In the context of this study, there are 
two relevant limitations: the approach gives little attention first, to the ways collective action 
problems are overcome and second, to how the producer group actually gains influence 
(Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). More generally, a challenge for the interest approach is to 
identify interests when actors have a multitude of interests, sometimes conflicting and open to 
interpretation (Hall, 1997). Other criticisms include ideational scholars who would argue that the 
interest approach does not account for interests being subject to interpretation, or for the fact that 
actors may have difficulty knowing their interests and understanding economic realities to act 
upon their interests (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). 
2.2.3. Ideas 
An ideational approach is focused on ideas, meanings, and interpretations. Ideas have a causal 
role in determining how we think, or the “mental constructions” we build, to use Heclo’s 
language (1994, 375). Beland and Cox (2010, 3) define ideas as “causal beliefs”: they are “mental 
constructs, cognitive belief maps about phenomena and interpretations of the world around us.” 
Multiple concepts are embedded in the ideational approach, including science, development, 
legitimacy, and culture (Purdon, 2015).  
Hall (1997) argues that scholars who use an ideational approach are divided in three groups. The 
first considers ideas as important but give pre-eminence to other variables; in other words, ideas 








Keohane, 1993). The second gives ideas causal priority because governments or firm actors are 
influenced by ideas they wish to translate into policy. The third gives ideas causal primacy 
because ideas are “constitutive of the most basic meaning systems that make individual or 
collective action possible” (Hall, 1997, 185).  
This study uses the second approach, namely, that ideas have causal priority in influencing our 
understanding interests and perception of institutions. Indeed, once institutionalized, ideas are 
difficult to modify (i.e. path dependent). Within that understanding of ideas, one can chose to 
emphasize either “the bearer of ideas and how they secure power” or “the way in which the ideas 
themselves have an impact on economic action” (Hall, 1997, 185). This study focuses on the 
latter. For example, an idea-based analyst would suggest that the government of Alberta was 
persuaded by corporations that we are in a post-peak oil phase and, therefore, that energy security 
and oil investments should be protected.  
In the comparative politics literature, comparativists differentiate between culture as 
instrumental, non-instrumental, and both (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). First, culture can be 
seen as instrumental and considered a strategic resource, for example when leaders expand a 
movement’s appeal through framing.  Second, culture can be seen as non-instrumental and 
considered as carried by (as opposed to “used for”) social movements, for example. Third and 
last, culture can be seen as being both instrumental and non-instrumental, thus carrying meaning 
and constructing it at the same time. 
The ideas-based approach has multiple strengths, especially that it emphasizes that much of 
politics is a struggle over interpretations. Actors’ interpretations of what constitute their best 
interests makes interests themselves “objects of contention” (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997, 
197) because they can be given multiple meanings and are malleable to interpretation. Still, the 
ideas-approach has limitations. For example, as it is difficult to define culture, it can also be 
challenging to sort out cultural variables from other ones. Other limitations include the absence 
of consideration for how ideas might be institutionalized and how old and new ideas might 
interact (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). 
2.2.4. 3Is Interactions 
If fruitfully blended together, the 3Is can help provide a better understanding of the political 
outcomes that interest us. As Hall noted two decades ago, important conceptual developments 
take place “at the margins of each approach, where it interfaces with the others” (1997, 189). For 
example, an interest-based approach can integrate ideas by acknowledging that: (1) cultural 
understandings are often mobilized by strategic agents choosing cultural frames; (2) costs and 








and (4) collective interests depend on communities, which are culturally informed (Lichbach and 
Zuckerman, 1997, 154-156). In the same vein, an institutional approach can integrate ideas by 
accepting that (1) the opportunities allowing change in an institutional framework must first be 
perceived and considered useful to be acted upon; (2) culture is diffused through structure; (3) 
and therefore that creating cultural understandings often happens through structural networks, 
themselves created by institutions (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). Idea-based approaches also 
lend themselves well to being combined with other approaches. As Bradford (1999, p.20) 
explains, ideas can progress if they “‘work’ on interests to realign the policy goals of collective 
actors,” and “‘work through’ organizations to transform policy-making routines and state 
capacities.” 
2.3. Resource Curse & Petrostate Literatures 
Alberta is a good example of a province plagued by the resource curse because it is highly reliant 
on oil revenue, which restricts its ability to invest both in other sectors and in social benefits for 
Albertans, and thus the province remains vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. In the 
same vein, it embodies petrostate characteristics similar to the resource curse, including the 
negative political and economic outcomes, as well as the rentier mentality. 
While resource curse literature is usually applied to the level of the state, the work of Ross (2015) 
and Carter (2016) demonstrating the value of applying resource curse and petrostate theories 
below the level of the nation-state and subnational level, respectively, are foundational because 
they allowed these theories to guide research done in oil-producing provinces like Alberta. More 
importantly, resource curse and petrostate theories provide clues to the type of institutional, 
interest-based, and ideational factors that impact oil policy.  
Literature on the resource curse posits that states with abundant natural resources tend to have 
slower economic growth, weaker democracy, and worse social development outcomes than states 
with fewer natural resources (Jenson and Wantchekon, 2004; Karl, 1997; Leite and Weidmann, 
1999; Ross, 2001; Collier, 2007; and Dunn, 2017). In the case of Alberta, resource curse is 
particularly relevant because it frames the unexpected negative economic and political impacts 
of oil dependency. 
For example, negative economic outcomes include the state’s inability to invest in other sectors 
of the economy because of its dependency on oil revenues. The state’s revenues are thus left at 
the mercy of fluctuating oil prices, following booms and busts cycles—institutional structures 
over which the province has no control. Karl (1997, 15) has called this phenomenon institutional 
“inertia” because the state is stuck in a vicious cycle of natural resource investments reinforced 








and resists attempts to harness resource surpluses into more sustainable economies (Collier, 
2007, 67). Interest groups who can influence, even dominate, oil policy. 
In addition, negative political outcomes, for example, include oil wealth’s tendency to provoke 
incumbency among elected officials (Ross, 2001; Goldberg et al. 2008), discouraging democratic 
engagement. Oil wealth can also affect democracy through the “rentier effect.” A “rentier 
mentality” can set in when government extracts wealth from oil exploitation rather than from its 
citizenry (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987, 88). For Shaxson, oil wealth creates “misplaced lines of 
accountability” (2007, 1129). This is echoed by Karl (1997) who suggests that oil-rich societies 
have shifted to an “oil-based social contract” (1997, 57) whereby “government institutions 
become more accountable to private developers than to citizens.” In practice, the rentier effect 
encourages government to decrease taxes and increase patronage and public goods, allowing it 
to mitigate dissent through bribery, among other means (Mahdavy, 1970; Crystal, 1990; Ross 
2001; 2015). In Collier’s words (2007, 42), “resource rents make democracy malfunction.”  
The petrostate embodies many aspects of the resource curse, including the negative political and 
economic outcomes, as well as the rentier mentality. A petrostate has two central characteristics. 
First, it has the oil sector at the centre of its economic accumulation. It is heavily dependent on 
petroleum and derives “extraordinary rents” (Karl, 1997, p. 58) from its exploitation. Second, as 
the petrostate becomes fiscally dependent on petroleum rents, its jurisdiction widens while its 
authority decreases. Thus, the petrostate has every reason to engage in rent-seeking behavior, 
which combined with the weakening of state institutions, leads to inadequate taxation and a 
rentier mentality. Rentier state theory tells us that relying on corporations, royalties, or any form 
of taxation from one sector—instead of relying on citizens’—can turn the state’s responsibility 
away from its citizens, creating an imbalance in its duty, a model neither sustainable, nor 
desirable for citizens and for building a healthy economy (Carter and Zalik, 2016). Change to the 
system becomes increasingly difficult as both public and private interests benefit from their 
addiction to petro-dollars.  
The resource curse and petrostate literatures are particularly useful to frame issues related to the 
oil sector because they provide clues to the type of factors that plague an oil-producing 
jurisdiction and highlight structures, actors, and discourses that might influence policy-making. 
Therefore, while the 3Is allow for the systematic mapping and classification of factors impacting 
royalties, the resource curse and petrostate theories lead the researcher to expect certain 
institutions, interests, and ideas to be influential. In short, merging both literatures allow both for 
the 3Is’ actor/strategy/organizational insights and for the resource curse and petrostate’s sector-








2.4. Global Governance and the Role of Corporations  
As described above, Alberta’s royalty policy is best explained with reference to the 3Is in a 
general sense, as they provide tools to identify institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors 
relevant to the 2007 and 2015-16 reviews. This study also uses the resource curse and petrostate 
theories to identify specific “I”s: these theories are especially useful to describe a number of 
specific constellations (or “collections”) of institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors 
that are present in the cases studied here.  
Going further, insights from the field of global governance lead me to pay close attention to the 
role of corporations—a specific kind of interest—as they played a major role in influencing 
royalty policy outcomes, starting with a general discussion on corporations as policy actors, 
followed by an overview of the strategies they use. Finally, I draw from the work of global 
governance scholar Doris Fuchs who proposed a three-dimensional typology of corporate power 
in order to frame corporate power’s influence on royalty policy in Alberta. 
2.4.1. On Corporations as Policy Actors 
Global governance, which gained traction in the 1990s, has multiple varying dimensions that 
differentiate it from international relations. In particular, global governance accounts for 
globalizing processes that shift structural forms of governance from traditional hierarchical 
structures (e.g. states) to more horizontal ones (e.g. networks). Most importantly, global 
governance accounts for and recognizes the important role of non-state actors in exerting 
influence on policy-making processes that are traditionally controlled by governmental actors 
(Avant et al., 2010; Hettne, 2005; Koppell, 2010; Lake, 2010; Moloney and Stone, 2019; Scholte, 
2005). For example, global governance recognizes the role of corporations (Avant et al., 2010; 
Lake, 2010; Ruggie, 2004; Strange, 1996), non-governmental organizations (Cooley and Ron, 
2002; Keck et al., 1998; Lake, 2010; K. Lee, 2010; McKeon, 2016; Price, 2003), and networks, 
such as transnational advocacy networks (Gilson, 2011, 2011; Hudson, 2001; Keck et al., 1998; 
Price, 2003), epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), and transgovernmental networks (Slaughter, 
2004) amongst others. By broadening the spectrum of actors with influence on the policy scene, 
global governance can pay close attention to the role of corporations and multinational 
enterprises in influencing policy, actors who often have assets greater than some states’ GDP. 
The influence of corporations over public policy has also long been identified outside global 
governance, in the critical political economy literature for example. This body of research 
typically discusses corporate influence over political parties (Myers, 1914); the dynamics and 
influence of the business elite in Canada (Porter, 1965; Newman, 1975); the alliance of 








and the business elite’s control of the media (Clement, 1975). Today, critical political economy 
scholars suggest that there has been a worldwide shift in power towards corporations in the post-
2000s, especially international corporations. Drache (2001, 6) astutely points out that 
globalization has allowed these powerful actors to increasingly shape governance at multiple 
levels and simultaneously become “agent, architect, villain, and major beneficiary” of the new 
world order. Political sociologists have called this shift in power “corporate power in transition” 
(Carroll, 2004, 8).  
The role of corporations in policy is important because their goals have evolved from the limited 
objective of increasing shareholders’ profits (Friedman, 1978), to seeking influence over policy 
and regulations, both of which used to be in the traditional realm of the state. As corporations 
acquire political roles, they also gain rule-setting powers (Fuchs, 2005; Pearson and Seyfang, 
2001; Ruggie, 2004). As Cutler puts it, “firms are basically functioning like governments” (2002, 
p.32). Increasingly, taxpayers and corporations questioned the need for state regulation because 
it used taxpayers dollars to regulate industry—thus increasing public spending—and discouraged 
companies from investing, leaving “greater governance responsibility (…) on companies 
themselves” (Detomasi, 2007, p. 323). In consequence, there was a push for voluntary self-
regulation (Pearson and Seyfang, 2001) although as companies’ main fiduciary responsibility 
and priority remained with their shareholders, they had no imperative to improve their behaviours 
and practices (Ollila, 2003).  
Corporations support certain kinds of state policy and oppose others. They usually focus on 
strong regulations that favour their interests (in the case of Alberta, the generous pre-/post-pay 
out royalty system) and strongly oppose regulations that do not (e.g. higher oil sands royalties) 
(Rundall and Brady, 2011). Corporations are thus still driven by their fiduciary responsibility—
their end goal being to increase profits—but their means to do so have broadened to include a 
political role they leverage through various strategies.  
2.4.2. Corporate Strategies 
Corporations, especially oil corporations, exercise power to influence public policy using a 
number of strategies, primarily, revolving door practices, financial contributions, lobbying, 
judicial courts, and framing.  
Corporations often consult with ex-government employees who can provide insights on the 
functioning of governmental institutions. But pushing this further, the “revolving door” (Blanes 
I Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen, 2012; Cayley-Daoust and Girard, 2012), or “businessman[sic]-
politician” strategy entails the “migration of capitalists into government as an expression of their 








also move to industry, sitting on corporations’ board of governors, advocating in favour of the 
corporation by use of connections, and seeking financial contributions. In Alberta, multiple 
former public servants transitioned to careers in industry and vice versa. One of the most 
infamous examples is Gary Mar, CEO of the Petroleum Services Association of Canada, who 
was previously cabinet minister in five different ministries under Ralph Klein (Nikiforuk, 2019). 
He was leading Alberta’s lobbying efforts for oil sands projects in Washington and even tried to 
run for Premier (Dembicki, 2012).  
Corporations also influence public policy through financial contributions to political parties 
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Kumar, 1999; Portugal and Bugarin, 2007; Mcmenamin, 
2012). Regular donations from industry to political parties assure pro-business initiatives and 
minimal governmental involvements in industry affairs (Clancy 2014). Despite corporate 
contributions to political parties being constrained in Canada since 2004 (Jensen, Thomas, and 
Young, 2012), there are multiple other ways corporations can exert influence on political parties. 
For example, indirect financial contributions, invitations to social events, and membership to 
private clubs have often proven effective strategies to increase networking and collaboration. To 
shield itself from changing parties in power, industry often ensures that all major parties receive 
campaign donations (Mcmenamin, 2012). 
The literature on the strategies used by corporations to influence oil policy has long pointed at 
lobbying as one of the most common strategies to sway decision-makers. Early studies like 
Sampson’s Seven Sisters (1975) demonstrate in detail the ways lobbying favoured the growth of 
oil corporations, allowing them to influence a palette of domestic policy goals (e.g. controlling 
supply like the prorationing system of the 1930s). More recent studies like Coll’s Private 
Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power (2012) traces the evolution of giant ExxonMobil and 
demonstrate how it exercised influence to sway American domestic—and even foreign—policy. 
For example, 2009 marked a record year in the U.S. for oil and gas lobbying, with at least 
US$154 million spent on lobbying by oil and gas companies in the U.S; by comparison, 
environmental organizations spent US$21.3 million (Mulkern, 2010). In the Canadian context, 
Cayley-Daoust and Girard (2012) exposed high level bureaucrats and elected officials’ 
accessibility to oil corporations by pointing out that the high frequency of meetings and 
communication between industry and the Canadian government. To lobby more effectively, 
corporations often formed group associations and alliances. Since the 1980s, trade associations 
have evolved to include maintaining close relationships between their members and government, 
keeping the former informed of legislations and the latter onboard with the association’s interests 
(Litvak, 1982). Coalitions of industry players, especially corporate players, also allow for 
alliances to be created and operate as strategic “command centres as they work to pool resources 








organize because they bring corporations together to speak with a unified voice and have political 
influence (Carroll, 2004; Clancy, 2014; Carroll and Sapinski, 2018). An open capitalist economy 
is ostensibly based on a competitive environment, yet cooperation does happen among 
enterprises, who sometimes need to show a common front against policies that they perceive as 
detrimental. Industry follows almost to the letter Mancur Olson’s (1965) logic of collective 
action of concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs, wherein a minority group succeeds in “free 
riding” on the efforts of others to ensure that its concentrated interests dominate. Therefore, while 
governments have the authority to enact policy as they see fit—notwithstanding public support—
they had to learn rapidly that non- or anti- business initiatives could bring about the sudden wrath 
of the industry (Hoberg and Phillips, 2011; Gunster and Saurette, 2014). As Clancy (2014, 191) 
puts it, industry actors can—and do—“‘vote’ with their wallets.” In Alberta, industry players 
organize both in associations and alliances, the most famous of those being the Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) comprised primarily of large producers. Other 
active groups include Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA) and the Oil Sands 
Community Alliance (OSCA), formerly known as the Oil Sands Developers Group (OSDG) 
(OSCA, n.d.). These actors and their respective interests, organized into coalitions, pulled their 
resources together, and presented a united front (1) to ensure their voice is heard; (2) to share 
resources and information with each other; and (3) to present a common front, giving them both 
credibility (amongst civil society, for example) and influence (when they lobby). 
As an additional recourse to forward and protect their interests, corporations use the judiciary. 
Clancy (2014, 206-7) calls “strategic litigation” a “political weapon”, which has a variety of 
functions: it can be used at the beginning of a policy process to set limits on further elaborations, 
it can re-order a government’s agenda in favour of industry, or it can go as far as contesting 
implementation of perceived anti-business policies by taking the case to court.  
Finally, recent scholarship on corporate strategies to influence oil policy has documented the use 
of framing (Downie, 2017). Corporations frame issues and solutions and make use of strategic 
dissemination of information to rally key interest groups to their cause. Such strategy takes roots 
in ideational influences, tapping into various actors’ perception of a given issue. In addition, 
corporations also often position themselves as the bearer of solutions, therefore increasing their 
credibility and controlling the problem solving process.  
Overall, revolving door practices, financial contributions, lobbying, judicial courts, and framing 
are all strategies oriented to influence institutional decision-making bodies; they are made 
possible thanks to the oil sector’s huge financial revenues (Downie, 2017). Extreme profits, and 








and influence the policy process (Carroll, 2017). And corporations’ ability to extend their 
influence into government institutions via the strategies aforementioned comes from their power.  
2.4.3. Corporate Power at Play 
Global governance and critical political economy both pay close attention to the role of 
corporations, a specific kind of interest, in policy-making. As described above, corporations can 
use various strategies to exert influence over policy; these strategies are manifestations of the 
power held by corporations. Bringing the conversation back to global governance, this study 
zooms on power and draws from the foundational work of global governance scholar Doris Fuchs 
who proposed a three-dimensional typology of corporate power. Her typology is particularly 
useful to analyze how oil corporations influenced royalty policy in Alberta.  
2.4.3.1. On Power 
Dahl’s definition of power is a relation between two actors where actor A has power over actor 
B (1957). Dahl’s perspective focuses on the direct influence of A over B, including the sources, 
means, and scope of the power exerted, but does not account for more indirect exercises of power 
such as when an actor constrains another from participating in a given activity (Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970).  
In addition, while power is widely conceived as a relationship, there is a large literature that 
conceptualizes power into varying dimensions, placing Dahl (1957) in the one-dimensional view, 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) in the two-dimensional view, Lukes (2004) and Fuchs (2007) in the 
three-dimensional view, and finally, Barnett and Duvall (2005) in the four-dimensional view 
(Hay, C. 2002, p.180). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) is two-dimensional because they include not 
only Dahl’s traditional decision-making power over the issues that arise on the agenda, but also 
pay close attention to the issues that do not. Lukes (1974; 2004) adds to Bachrach and Baratz’s 
taxonomy with his third “face” of power, namely, ideological power, which shapes “perceptions, 
cognitions, and preferences” (1970; p. 24). Fuchs nuanced these power dimensions further by 
distinguishing between three dimensions of powers: instrumental, structural, and discursive 
power, all of which can overlap and reinforce one another (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009b; Fuchs, 2005, 
2007; Levy and Egan, 2000). Finally, Barnett and Duvall proposed four dimensions of power 
that account for compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power (2005). This study 
uses global governance scholar Fuchs’ three dimensional taxonomy to conceptualize 








2.4.3.2. Instrumental Power 
Instrumental power refers to the direct exercise of influence over another actor. In the case of 
corporate influence over policy-makers, instrumental power often includes the use of strategies 
such as lobbying and campaign financing (Fuchs, 2007). Critical state theorists also expand the 
use of corporate strategies with regards to instrumental power to “revolving doors” and social 
networks, all of which enable further business control, including more targeted lobbying and 
campaign financing (Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1978). The instrumentalist approach is 
particularly powerful because it provides “a framework for an assessment of the direct influence 
of interests on political output based on an actors’ resources” (Fuchs, 2007, p.57). Given that 
instrumental power is dependent on the “financial, organisational, or human resources, as well 
as access to decision-makers” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 775), in the case of Alberta, the instrumentalist 
approach predicts a strong influence of oil corporations on policy-making. However, the 
instrumentalist view of power does not account for structural power, which predetermine the 
options available to actors (Fuchs, 2005). 
2.4.3.3. Structural Power 
While instrumental power is usually on a one-on-one relationship, structural power is more 
diffuse in nature (Barnett and Duval, 2005). The structuralist approach emphasizes “the input 
side of policy and politics and the predetermination of the behavioural options of political 
decisionmakers” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 58). The structuralist approach stems from Bachrach and 
Baratz’s second face of power (1962) which recognizes that some issues arise on the political 
agenda and some do not. Sometimes referred to as “agenda-setting power,” this approach 
received a lot of attention in international political economy given the “structural dependence of 
state elites on private sector profitability” (Fuchs, 2005, 58). The approach also highlights 
corporations’ bargaining power when promising economy activity to host governments (Cox, 
1987; Frank, 1978; Wallerstein, 1979). Structural power accounts for the influence of institutions 
and organizational structures in positioning policy-makers into decision-making hotspots, thus 
replacing “those holding formal decisionmaking power” with “actors in control of pivotal 
networks and resources [who] have the capacity to adopt, implement, and enforce rules” (Fuchs, 
2005, p. 59). We usually see structural power at play when state and corporations try to influence 
formal institutions, such as state regulations or international standards (Falkner, 2008). In 
Alberta, where the economy is highly dependent on oil activity, the structuralist approach 
predicts a strong influence of corporate interests in the oil sector over policymakers. Yet, 
structural power lacks the ability to account for less apparent exercises of power such as 








2.4.3.4. Discursive power 
Discursive power is the power derived from the ability of actors to shape norms, ideas, and 
beliefs. Fuchs argues that “discursive contests over the frames of policies” and “linking problems 
to specific fundamental normal and values” increasingly play a role in impacting policy-making 
(Fuchs, 2005, p. 777). Actors hoping to influence the policy process can thus ensure their interests 
and objectives are safeguarded by framing debates accordingly (Rein and Schön, 1996; Snow 
and Benford, 1992). The strategy of framing mentioned previously is often a direct way of 
exercising discursive power: corporations can shape the way issues and stakeholders are 
conceptualized and decide the policy responses that are possible and appropriate as well as those 
that are unlikely or excluded (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Similar to structural power, discursive 
power can be used to frame the terminology of an issue, eventually impacting whether it arises 
on the agenda (Hawkins and Holden, 2013). Yet, in Fuchs’ words, discursive power “relies on 
persuasion, the perception of legitimacy, and voluntary compliance rather than coercion and 
hierarchies of legally assigned responsibility” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 780). Of the three dimensions of 
power, it is the most difficult to recognize. 
2.4.3.5. Three types of power in Alberta 
In Alberta, we see all three dimensions of power at play. Oil corporations exercise instrumental 
power through their lobbying, political donations, and relationships with political actors. While 
there was a cap of C$4,000 set on political donations (contributions) to political parties, 
constituency associations, candidates, nomination contestants, and leadership contestants, there 
is no limit for election and Senate third party advertisers (Elections Alberta, n.d.(a)). This means 
oil corporations in Alberta can pay the advertising of a candidate to promote, oppose, or take a 
position on a given issue or policy (Elections Alberta, n.d.(b)). Structurally, the threat of a 
“capital strike” (i.e. refusing to invest or shutting down operations in ways that affect 
employment) was common during the royalty reviews. This form of strike allows corporate actors 
to wield structural power by virtue of their control over private investment decisions (Przeworski 
and Wallerstein, 1988); further, this control can “translate into leverage over government when 
it is selectively applied and accompanied by demands for specific policies (Young et al., 2018, 
p. 5-6). In Alberta, this control appeared in the form of industry representatives instilling fear and 
uncertainty about their oil activity not only to government, but also by playing on some 
Albertans’ dependency on the oil sector. 
In the same vein, the threat of an “exit” by corporations threatening to leave Alberta also plays 
an important role here. It is a form of structural power of capital in an age of globalization well-








the interdependency between state and capital, including the consequences on state behaviour, 
consequent economic performance, and wider implications for state power (Crystal, 1994); the 
domestic consequences on growth costs, the eroding of the tax base (including taxation on capital 
income and businesses), and worsening of income distribution (Pastor Jr, 1990; Petersen, 2004); 
or the importance of better governance—rather than better institutions—in alleviating the 
impacts of capital flight (Epstein, 2005). McKenzie and Dwight (1991, p. xi, 12) conclude that 
governments “have lost the vestiges of unchecked economic sovereignty” and “must concede to 
the implied threats” of this new mobile capital. Although it is more relevant to internationally-
mobile than to domestically-oriented capital (given that the latter has no real option to move 
elsewhere), the threat of “exit” was conflated by the oil industry.  
Finally, corporations’ use of discursive power links to ideational explanations of royalty policy 
outcomes and materialized at several levels. One involved the direct influence of policymakers 
in elite policy discussions. Another involved influencing opinion-leaders in universities and the 
media that might, in turn, influence policymakers and/or the public. Still another was associated 
with the shaping of broader public opinion in ways that could influence policymakers indirectly 
by developing arguments that resonated with longstanding ideational currents in Alberta elite 
circles and the general public (i.e. the frontier identity and free market economics).  
2.5. Analytical Framework and Context 
Combining the rigor of the 3Is with the resource curse and petrostate theories necessary to 
understand Alberta’s unique oil context, and Fuchs’ focused global governance typology of 
corporate power provides a comprehensive conceptualization to explain the government of 
Alberta’s royalty policies following the 2007 and 2015-16 review processes. 
2.5.1. Theorizing the 3Is, Resource Curse & Petrostate Theories, and Corporate Power in Alberta 
Taking an institutional approach helps identify central factors that impacted royalty possibilities 
such as fluctuating global oil prices, the capture of institutions (e.g. universities and the media), 
or oil sands costs. This approach also covers the time limitations faced by provincial governments 
given that their mandate is based on a four-year cycle. In the case of the NDP who had never led 
the province before, the party operated not only within a limited policy window, but also without 
prior experience in office. 
Weaving institutions and interests together, this study also examines how corporate interests have 
become part of the institutional establishment in Alberta, including the normalization and 
formalization of close business-state relationships through state institutions such as the 








institutions (e.g. the 2015-16 royalty review Panel). Further, taking an interest-based approach 
helps map and organize the various policy actors who exerted influence on royalty policy-making 
in 2007 and 2015-16, including rural interests, civil society actors, and especially a dominant 
policy actor, corporations. Finally, the interest approach also helps assess how corporate interests 
are organized and what specific resources and strategies they use to intervene in policy making.  
Taking an ideational approach directs me to study how the identities of Albertans as a whole—
and therefore, their policy choices—are shaped by “shared myths” such as free market ideologies, 
and pioneer/frontier identities. Other ideational factors include some Albertans’ dedication to 
extracting “ethical oil” (in 2007) as well as ideological divisions amongst NDP (in 2015-16). 
Indeed, differences around the need—or not—to compromise with the oil industry led to a schism 
inside the party, further eroding its ability to garner support for potential royalty changes. These 
ideas inform the policy choices both of individuals and groups and therefore participate in 
positioning key actors on the map. Behind every interest-group, every institution, there is a set 
of beliefs and ideologies that shape the structures of the playfield.  
Taking the 3Is further attunes me to drawing from the resource curse and petrostate literatures, 
both of which point to specific collections of “I”s in this unique oil context. Structural economic 
dependency, the power of oil lobbies, and a political culture emphasizing the public benefits of 
oil extraction are all “I” factors hypothesized from the resource curse and petrostate literatures. 
Going further, while using these literatures certainly sheds light on oil-related institutions, 
interest-based, and ideational factors, the analysis goes beyond the limitations of examining each 
approach individually and instead, integrates these approaches to reveal insights from 
interconnected “I”s. For example, corporate actors are also important cultural actors who actively 
seek to re-frame public understandings and debates to favour their economic interests. Finally, 
this study’s integrative approach draws from Fuchs’ typology of corporate power in global 
governance to understand how a dominant policy actor, oil corporations, successfully opened 
windows of opportunity (i.e. weak links) to exercise influence on policy (Fuchs, 2005, 2007; 
Fuchs and Lederer, 2017). In addition to being both actor and player in royalty policy, 
corporations have more resources at their disposal than any other interest-group in the province. 
Fuchs’ typology allows for mapping the consequences of this disparity, particularly the strategies 
corporations can use to exercise instrumental, structural, and discursive power.  
2.5.2. International and Provincial Institutions in Alberta 
2.5.2.1. The Impact of Global Oil Prices 
International circumstances certainly played a role in Alberta’s royalty reviews because they 








First, Alberta is more vulnerable to price fluctuations than other oil-producing jurisdictions due 
to the presence of a price differential: Alberta oil sells under Western Canada Select (WCS) at a 
discounted price from the global standard set by the West Texas Intermediate (WTI). In 2007, 
WCS traded between US$15.14 and US$41.72 below WTI; in 2015, WCS traded between 
US$7.41 and US$18.98 below WTI (Government of Alberta, n.d. (a)). The WCS discount 
reflects a difference in oil quality (WCS is for heavier, unconventional oils whereas WTI is 
known for light sweet oil), marketability, and transportation costs (Oil Sands Magazine, 
2018). Combined with the facts that Alberta is landlocked, has little to no refineries, and 
produces unconventional oil, the price differential affects circumstances in the province, 
rendering it more vulnerable to global price fluctuations. By trading at a lower price than the 
WTI, oil traded at WCS yields smaller profits. The price differential, under which Alberta oil 
sells, adds a layer of complexity.  
The price differential combined with global oil price fluctuations affected royalty review 
possibilities, both in pre- and post-review times. Pre-review, rising oil prices created an 
opportunity for Albertans to demand a province-wide royalty review, particularly for oil sands 
royalties, both in 2007 and 2015. The reviews were triggered because Albertans had witnessed 
for years the steady growth of oil sands and had seen oil sands reserves transform from unknown 
to internationally known resources. The recognition by the U.S. Energy Agency of oil sands as 
part of a country’s official reserves bumped Canada into third place for the world’s largest oil 
reserves. However, the fall in global oil prices at the time of launching the reviews and during 
the time of the review led to anti-government sentiment, both in 2007 and 2015-16. For Stelmach 
(2007), falling oil prices put Alberta in a difficult economic position and provoked the end of the 
Conservative dynasty: Stelmach was blamed for Alberta’s financial hardships.  In the same vein, 
falling oil prices upon Notley’s election (2015)—along with the newly elected party’s fragile 
foundation and its absence of ties to the oil industry—eventually led to the implementation of an 
unambitious royalty policy.   
These episodes echo former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s attempt at establishing a National 
Energy Program (NEP) in the 1980s. Like Stelmach, Trudeau wanted to assert control and 
manage oil resources—in his case, nationally. But the collapse of oil prices at the time 
transformed mild NEP opposition into an uproar from the Western provinces. The perceived 
“failure” of the NEP was a factor in Trudeau’s downfall and many blamed him for the ensuing 
economic disaster of the 1980s. Blaming Trudeau’s NEP was easy, despite the North American 









In contrast, when former Albertan Premier Peter Lougheed (in office from 1971 to 1985) 
announced profound transformations to the royalty regime in 1971, oil prices had been 
consistently rising and continued to do so as he redesigned the royalty framework. Despite 
expected industry criticism, his leadership and initiative were generally accepted, even admired 
(Bell, 1993; Steward, 2017). These various experiences demonstrate that reviewing royalties at 
a time when global oil prices fluctuate strongly impacts domestic political circumstances. When 
prices rise, they open windows of opportunities for citizens to demand change from their 
government and for government to follow suit relatively safely; in contrast when prices fall, they 
bring about political misfortune to Albertan Premiers, who succumb to industry pressure and can 
no longer give their constituents their fair share of royalties.  
2.5.2.2. Buried in Shale 
Similar to the 2007 royalty review which was hampered by falling global oil prices at launching, 
the U.S. shale revolution, which started in 2011, shook Alberta to the core: it transformed 
Canada’s relationship with its largest buyer, the U.S.. The shale revolution threatened the very 
existence and necessity of Alberta’s oil sands and brought unexpected challenges to the newly 
elected NDP and its 2015-16 royalty review. 
Since the 2007 royalty review, the world had changed by 2015. Global oil prices had been 
fluctuating and the shale revolution changed the rules of the global oil game. While the 2015-16 
royalty review had started similarly to the 2007 review—both driven by a desire to increase 
government and Albertans’ revenues—the shale revolution shifted the 2015-16 discourse from 
maximizing revenues to “modernizing the framework,” a change that would prove crucial in the 
unfolding of the review (Mowat et al., 2016). Part of Alberta’s oil sands success had happened 
because the oil sands were considered one of the last profitable jurisdictions on earth opened for 
new business and private investment. But the advent of hydraulic fracturing for shale-trapped 
resources, or “fracking,” in 2011, severely affected oil sands, especially as the two competed for 
refining capacity and market share.  
First, fracking for shale affected industry’s ability to send oil sands to refineries, despite shale 
resources being different from oil sands. The oil sands industry knew that a newfound resource 
does not necessarily compete with others; in this case, the oil sands did not compete directly with 
the light oil derived from shale gas (Interviewee 7). However, light oil does compete with the oil 
sands in refinery capacity share. Refineries are particularly important for the oil sands because 
the latter’s by-product, heavy oil, cannot be used unless it is refined. Before the shale revolution, 
refineries expected light crude oil to decline as most major light oil resources had already been 








types of oil, from light to heavy oils (Interviewee 7). This created a demand for oil sands’ heavy 
oil, thus enabling it to reach markets. Unfortunately for the oil sands, the shale revolution enticed 
many refineries to revert back to prioritizing light crude oil instead of heavy oil.  
Second and more importantly, the shale revolution affected oil sands’ market share by changing 
the behaviour of Canada’s largest buyer, the U.S.. The U.S. tapped into its shale reserves and its 
relationship with Canada weakened, as the U.S. no longer relied on its neighbour. In the words 
of a Canadian industry representative, “our biggest market is now our biggest competitor.” 
(Interviewee 9) This change forced Alberta’s oil sands producers to suddenly compete for a 
market share they had owned for decades (Yedlin, 2015). With Alberta being landlocked, the oil 
sands industry feverishly started looking at alternative pipeline routes, both to strengthen existing 
market shares in the U.S. and to reach potential new markets to compensate for the loss of 
American revenues. Together, the TransMountain expansion pipeline proposal by Kinder 
Morgan and the Energy East pipeline in 2013, Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipeline project 
approved by the federal government7 in 2014, and TransCanada Energy’s Keystone XL pipeline 
proposal in 2014-2015, all illustrated the Albertan industry’s desire to expand their oil sands’ 
market outreach to counter the shale revolution. 
2.5.2.3. Institutions Susceptible to Corporate Influence: Decentralization of Powers and the 
Civil Service 
If industry could capture governments on opposite ends of the political spectrum, then elected 
political party ideology alone cannot explain the government’s inability to increase royalties. 
Indeed, fundamental flaws in the governance of oil institutions in Alberta in part prevented 
Albertans from getting their fair share. Institutional circumstances such as the decentralization 
of powers and the influence of the civil service created a context unfavourable to increasing 
royalties. 
Indeed, Alberta’s policy system is quite decentralized. Various agencies lack minimum oversight 
and are at arm’s length from public scrutiny (e.g. non-elected members); yet, they directly 
enforce and regulate broad economic activities. The Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) is a perfect 
illustration of how decentralized regulatory powers left unchecked can go wrong. The AER was 
created under the Responsible Energy Development Act in 2012 with a mandate to ensure “the 
safe, efficient, orderly, and environmentally responsible development of oil, oil sands, natural 
gas, and coal resources over their entire life cycle” (Alberta Energy Regulator, n.d.). As the 
centralized authority for regulatory approvals of oil projects, it combines the duties of the Energy 
                                                 








Resources Conservation Board (ECRB) with responsibility of Alberta Environment and 
Sustainable Resource Development—both of which were absorbed by the AER. However, the 
AER’s mandate was contradictory (Hunter, 2007; Rodgers, 2015). When she was the NDP’s 
environment critic, Notley had accurately noted the AER’s “conflicting mandate, both [as] a 
promoter of energy and the primary vehicle of environmental protection in Alberta” (quoted in 
Henton, 2015). She recommended splitting the AER to differentiate between these mutually 
exclusive mandates; yet, by the time she became Premier, Notley did not even make changes at 
the senior level of the AER and she concluded that the AER was “working well. Industry like[d] 
it” (Cotter, 2015). 8  
Operating far from the public eye, the AER has full control over the approval process for oil 
projects. In fact, the provincial cabinet is responsible for appointing hearing commissioners, who, 
“contrary to the principle of administrative independence (…) serve at the pleasure of the 
politicians who appoint them” (Urquhart, 2018, 222). The AER rarely used its power to deny 
approval; worse, the Regulator has complete control over the holding of public hearings for new 
petroleum projects (Urquhart, 2018), limiting public involvement and exacerbating opacity 
further. In the words of a former civil servant now academic, the AER “has been totally asleep” 
(Interviewee 11). This trend was exacerbated in 2013, when CAPP’s founding president and 
energy executive Gerry Protti was appointed first chair of the AER board (Carter, 2020). Under 
his leadership and beyond, the AER almost never stopped a project from happening. 
The decentralization of regulatory powers leaves a gap for industry influence and can also be 
seen in Alberta and other Western provinces’ relationship with the federal government. 
Constitutional arrangements give Alberta (and all Canadian provinces) control over the 
management of its resources and thus, prevent federal involvement. In particular, resource-rich 
British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan all operate in silos, making it difficult for any kind 
of “coordinated, public-minded resource policy” to occur (Interviewee 10). This coordinated 
policy might have arguably helped provincial governments gain regulatory capacity. Therefore, 
despite giving provinces rights over their resources, these constitutional arrangements also give 
provinces responsibilities, no matter how discretionary.   
Federally, Alberta had leverage and could have gained the upper hand in the face of the oil 
industry by joining forces with Ottawa. Alberta’s oil sands have a clear advantage: they are 
accessible to all investors, unlike most major world resources that are operating under the 
umbrella of NOCs. By using these strengths, they might have perhaps controlled the oil industry 
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locally and strengthened their position on royalty policies. Yet, Alberta’s history with Ottawa 
combined with its resource-cursed petrostate status left the provincial government unable to 
collect significantly more royalties. Ultimately, government institutions—including the civil 
service—were often under industry influence (Interviewee 6; Stefanick, 2015).  
Often overlooked, the civil service, unlike elected government officials, provides continuity 
transcending electoral circumstances. However, with more than forty years under a pro-oil 
industry Conservative government, the civil service was anything but neutral (Interviewee 6; 
Simons, 2007; Stefanick, 2015). The civil service is both a key institution for government and 
for industry. It is a corps that remains relatively constant over time, regardless of election 
outcomes, and is responsible for the immense task of supplying information, research, and 
support to elected officials with decision-making power. As a former politician points out, while 
the Premier is elected by the people, the civil service can leverage industry contacts to frame 
decisionmaking in government. In his words, the Premier’s desk “would be stacked with binders 
from the civil service (…) What’s in those binders is determined by the civil service. So if 
industry can take control of the civil service, their [sic] message is delivered for them” 
(Interviewee 6).  
For example, the civil service’s influence came particularly apparent prior to the launch of the 
2015-16 review. As Political Scientist Ian Urquhart indicates in his book Costly Fix: Power, 
Politics, and Nature in the Tar Sands, the appointment of the only economist of the 2015-16 
Panel—Peter Tertzakian—had been “vetted” by Alberta Energy’s “old guard” (2018, p. 275). 
The “old guard” referred to the most senior civil servants of Alberta Energy (i.e. assistant deputy 
minister and deputy minister) who served their entire career under successive Conservative 
governments. As Notley did not make any changes in the ranks of these same seniors, they 
heavily participated in advising her; in Urquhart’s words, they “helped their new bosses decide 
if a royalty review should take place, when a royalty review should take place, and finally, who 
should be appointed to the review panel” (2018, p. 288). Thus, the civil service proved to be an 
important actor that can exert influence on policy processes and thus, outcomes—both positive 
and negative.  
High-level civil servants often hold the keys to the complexity of policy design and 
implementation, making them a perfect target for powerful actors like industry. And while civil 
servants have job security, benefits, and often find meaning in serving the public good, many 
have been tempted by the oil industry’s higher salary and prestige. Industry captured the civil 
service in subtle ways, the most apparent of which was under Klein’s leadership (more in the 








the very structure of Alberta’s civil service influencing it from the bottom up to the highest level. 
Industry was not only after converting civil servants to its cause; it also needed their expertise.  
2.5.2.4. Lacking Administrative Oversight: The Costs Debate 
Yet, one of the government of Alberta’s most pressing issues is not the quality of its civil 
servants, but their administrative capacity. Indeed, the government lacks the administrative 
power to oversee and monitor the activities of the oil industry. The vacuum in the province’s 
governance’s structure also facilitated industry’s influence as illustrated by the costs debate.  
Alberta is plagued with an administrative and compliance problem wherein under-funded 
enforcement efforts in policing and auditing are allowing industry to behave with impunity. 
Multiple interviewees referred to the government as being overwhelmed and unable to track the 
money it was owed, particularly royalty money—despite attempts to rectify this deficiency. For 
example, in 2015-16, government considered measures to assess oil wells’ profitability instead 
of relying on companies’ data; however, these measures were abandoned because they proved 
too administratively onerous. 
Alberta’s captured institutions and lack of government capacity translated into a vacuum in the 
province’s governance structure. It is important to focus not only on the actions of government 
itself, but also on the space it left empty for industry to occupy; fieldwork reveals that industry 
was skilled at filling these gaps. In the words of a former civil servant, “with government perhaps 
having to take a hand off, it leaves a lot of space for industry interests to dominate” (Interviewee 
10). Institutions can constrain, but also favour powerful interests; in Alberta, the costs debate 
illustrates how industry’s presence facilitated a dominance of its interests at the core of public 
institutions. 
Appropriate policy requires solid data. How can a government make sound royalty policy and 
give Albertans a “fair share” when there is no agreement on incurred costs of oil sands extraction? 
While this might seem like a straightforward question, it was hotly debated amongst government 
officials, members of industry, academics, and energy consultants, as revealed in interviews 
conducted for this study. For the question: “Had oil sands extraction costs gone up or down over 
the 2007—2015-16 period?” I received mixed responses at best. For some, the costs of extracting 
oil sands had gone up because as time passed—and barring technological breakthroughs—most 
of the easily accessible resources had already been mined, leaving harder resources only (cited 
in Interviewee 3 & 4). On the other hand, for others, costs had gone down thanks to advances in 
extraction technologies such as steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD)—which came out of 








5). Indeed, SAGD allowed not only for more targeted and efficient extraction, but also for 
addressing concerns that oil sands extraction by proposing a “less environmentally threatening” 
method of extraction than surface mining (McCurdy, 2018, p. 43). There was strong uncertainty 
around costs (Interviewee 4), some also arguing that some costs had gone up, and other had gone 
down (Interviewee 7).  
Looking at the profitability of the whole sector—as opposed to costs as a stand-alone measure—
profitability may have gone down because there was less demand for oil sands. Indeed, over the 
course of the royalty reviews, the circumstances regarding resource competition in 2007 and 
2015-16 changed. In 2007, Alberta was the only new major source of oil in U.S. markets that 
seemed inexhaustible in terms of supply (Smith, 2015). After the shale revolution, in 2015-16, 
Alberta was instead competing with the U.S.—its main customer—for market share, in addition 
to other world competitors. Alberta had to start looking for new markets because the U.S. was 
not going to absorb all of the oil sands production as they previously had. With decreased 
demand, oil sands costs were proportionally higher relative to revenues. 
Yet, because of the Revenue minus Costs (R-C) system, the difference between revenues and 
costs was smaller, and thus, royalties were charged on a smaller amount. In this system, 
companies first deduct allowable costs from their revenues, and then are charged a royalty on the 
remaining amount. As such, the higher the value of costs, the smaller the amount on which 
royalties are collected—and therefore, the smaller the royalty payment. Therefore, industry’s 
argument that they should be paying less royalties when oil sands are more expensive to extract 
is problematic. In the R-C system, costs are already accounted for in the royalty calculation 
(Government of Alberta, 2021). Therefore, when oil sands are more expensive to extract, industry 
is actually paying a lower royalty than if costs were low. On the other hand, the argument that 
industry should be paying less royalties when oil sands costs are low is also problematic. If costs 
have gone down, according to the R-C system, industry is making a higher profit overall, and 
should thus pass down the profits to Albertans, who are owners, in the form of increased royalties.  
Yet, industry consistently demanded tax or royalty breaks for driving costs down. In other words, 
industry wished to be rewarded for conducting its activities in the most efficient manner, reaping 
both the benefits of efficiency for its books and the rewards from government. For example, 
while some wanted royalty rates fluctuating with global oil prices, others advocated for a flat 
royalty rate to be reviewed regularly. But industry argued that a flat royalty rate would shut 
production, deter investment, and eventually kill the sector. However, insights from a Texas oiler 
show a completely different picture (Texas has a flat rate of 25%): while he was aware of 








cost conscious and innovative: “The benefits we get from cost consciousness and innovation is 
well worth the conceptual negative from stopping production. Because that innovation leads to 
even more production, not ultimately in shut-in production” (Interviewee 10). Thus, a flat royalty 
rate like Texas would have forced industry to optimize its activity while giving Albertans their 
“fair share.”  
To conclude, one may ask: what could a relatively vulnerable government with institutions 
susceptible to industry influence and limited administrative oversight do? When factoring in 
external circumstances, a strategic government with foresight could have adapted its royalty 
share to global oil price fluctuations, taking smaller royalties in a low price environment, and 
higher royalties in a high price environment—regardless of costs. This strategy was actually 
prescribed by the 2007 royalty review Panel. But industry coalitions eliminated it. Another 
strategy would have been to calculate extraction costs early on to provide a reference point for 
future calculations. This would have established a benchmark instead of lowering the rate 
marginally and arbitrarily. In fact, industry regularly mentioned costs as rates part of the 
calculations and not as clear-cut numbers for that exact reason: it did not want to declare costs.  
2.5.3. The Importance of the Oil Industry’s Interests 
2.5.3.1. The Oil Industry’s Economic Influence 
As expected in a petrostate, the oil industry (a petro-elite) in Alberta has highly concentrated 
political and economic influence. The oil industry yielded its power in various ways that are 
described by Fuchs’ corporate power theory.  
Unlike other interests during the royalty review, the oil industry had the necessary resources and 
funding to reinforce Alberta’s and Albertans’ dependency on oil. It could hire talent, create 
powerful narratives, and overwhelm government with data it does not have the resources to 
examine. For example, in terms of instrumental power, it is cheaper for industry groups to fund 
an aggressive anti-royalty media campaign and make political contributions than to pay for 
higher royalties. The financial scale at which industry operates is greater than government’s.  
In addition, industry is incredibly agile: it has the ability to shift strategy and woo whoever is 
most favourable to its interests, while maintaining close ties to decision-making actors at the 
highest level. It can also adapt to changes in the political paradigm and continue to thrive in a 
new environment as demonstrated by its success under both Conservative and New Democrat 
leaderships. For example, in terms of structural power, industry consistently positioned itself as 








paid too well a salary for job seekers to work outside the oil sector, ultimately preventing 
diversification. From the beginning of the Alberta oil boom, Fort McMurray and other oil towns 
successfully attracted low skilled labour with the promises of high salaries. During the boom, it 
was common for workers with little to no formal education to make yearly six-figures salaries.  
In terms of discursive power, industry “generated [its] own narrative” (Interviewee 9), often 
ensuring that the public would be on its side by associating the future of the oil sector with that 
of the province (CAPP, 2015).  In the words of Dave Mowat, chair of the 2015-16 royalty review 
Panel, “Success for Albertans only comes when the industry is successful” (quoted in Bakx, 
2016). Industry crafted a message oriented toward using its expertise for the public good and 
maintained that it had always been acting for the wellbeing of Albertans and the province 
(Interviewee 9).When the first significant wave of negative publicity hit the oil sands in 2008—
including the death of 500 ducks on a toxic tailing pond at a Syncrude mine—various companies 
attempted to counter the negative publicity by launching their own public relations strategy 
(Vidal, 2008). Shell, for example, launched “Canada’s Oil Sands: A Different Conversation,” a 
website encouraging discussions with the public; these efforts were mirrored by other large oil 
sands producers, including Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. (CNRL), Petro-Canada, Suncor, 
Syncrude, Imperial, EnCanada, and ConocoPhillips (Marriott, Stockman, and Kronick, 2008). 
To secure public support, Shell also took journalists on tours of its operation across the province, 
a strategy it had successfully adopted for its operations in the Niger Delta in the late 1990s 
(Rowell, Marriott, and Stockman, 2005).  
In the golden years, it is true that the enormous oil sands wealth trickled down to Albertans in 
the form of provincial debt absorption, low unemployment rates, and overall high salaries 
(despite inflation). However, the benefits of the boom could have been more long-term and 
sustainable, had Alberta considered extracting more value from the oil industry. Support for 
industry was rooted in the economic advantage (e.g. jobs) given by oil companies despite the fact 
that like all private sector enterprises, industry’s fundamental goal is to give returns to its 
shareholders. Indeed, industry is driven by national and international finance, not the wellbeing 
of Albertans. Overall, “a combination of poor fiscal stewardship on the part of the province, i.e. 
not sticking with the savings plans, poor management of spending in general, as well as the 
industry not wanting to pay because it hurts their economics” all illustrate that “companies are 








2.5.3.2. The Oil Industry’s Political Influence 
Industry’s economic influence translated into political influence through electoral politics 
(instrumental power), narratives to influence Albertans (discursive power), and via threats of exit 
(structural power).  
Amongst industry players, small producers proved surprisingly influential at the level of electoral 
ridings, yielding instrumental power. Interviews reveal that many rural voters consider Alberta’s 
oil industry to be a pillar of Canada’s economy. Small oil producers thus represent voters in large 
rural ridings despite being scattered throughout the province. In turn, these ridings often feel a 
responsibility, to themselves and to Canada, to keep extraction going—which they perceived was 
only possible if royalties were kept low. They supported more extensive and rapid oil sands 
expansion.  
In terms of discursive power, industry still needed more support than the votes of a few rural 
communities highly dependent on oil. It had to tap into the minds and hearts of all Albertans 
broadly. To rally Albertans, industry created powerful narratives that associate the future of the 
sector with that of the province at large. Given the province’s political economic history and 
reliance on oil, it proved relatively easy for industry to spread the idea that Albertans’ fate was 
positively correlated with industry’s. This practice normalized a discourse of “us vs. them” by 
creating a pro-industry pro-Albertan vs. anti-industry anti-Albertan groups (Stevens and 
McCurdy, 2019, p. 20); in Alberta, being against the oil sector meant being against Albertans 
and Alberta. This made it extremely difficult for opposing voices to be heard without their 
“patriotism”9 questioned. Communication scholar Imre Szeman speaks of the concept of 
“deepening” to highlight how political, economic, and social practices are ingrained in oil and 
explains why it is especially difficult to break away from this petroculture (2016; 2017; Wilson 
et al., 2017). Indeed, the perception of industry’s fate as tied to Albertans was a public relations 
strategy designed to influence public opinion in favour of industry. And when this public 
relations strategy did not work, industry capitalized on Albertans’ fears and threatened to leave 
the province if its interests were not protected, that is, if royalties were increased. To examine 
the veracity of these threats, one needs to compare the power available to international and 
domestic interests.  
While major international players such as Shell, Chevron, and Exxon were able to exercise 
structural power and move their capital at will following global trends, most domestic players 
could not. Major international oil companies are more experienced in dealing with royalty 
                                                 








reviews as they operate in multiple jurisdictions globally; they also have experience facing 
instability, resource nationalization, and sometimes war. As a result of oil prices tanking in 2014, 
some majors started to leave Alberta, selling their assets to Canadian companies, who were more 
vulnerable to royalty changes because they operated exclusively in Alberta. This had three main 
consequences. First, these companies were more vocal in the face of policy changes because they 
were more exposed. Second, because they are Canadian—and often Albertan—they benefited 
from the unique support of the population—unlike international majors with headquarters 
elsewhere. Narratives blaming government for Albertan companies’ unfortunate circumstances 
spread easily because there was a strong impetus to protect Albertan and Canadian businesses. 
Third, with the majors gone and the smaller Albertan/Canadian companies dominating Alberta’s 
oil sector, they did not have anywhere else to go. Some companies did threaten to move across 
provincial borders: according to industry, producers and investors moved drilling rights to British 
Columbia and Saskatchewan in response to the 2007 review. However, the royalty rates post-
2007 review in Alberta were more attractive than those in British Columbia and Saskatchewan. 
As a result, industry’s threats to leave proved empty. 
Finally, industry’s instrumental, discursive, and structural powers were not only apparent in 
industry’s ability to influence rural politics, present narratives favourable to oil extraction, and 
exert fear; industry was also extremely agile in shifting its discourse at will. Being unaccountable 
to citizens, it could freely use a narrative and discard it once it had served its purpose. For 
example, industry supported free markets and no government involvement until it needed the 
government to bail it out. Most recently, in 2018, the oil industry asked the provincial government 
to implement production cuts—thus directly meddling with the market—to prevent the 
consequences of rising production, overrun pipeline capacity, and a glut of bitumen storage 
(Gordon, 2018). This agility escaped civil society actors and government, while industry 
managed to shift its usually pro-free markets stand to yearn financial profits.  
2.5.4. The Ideational Landscape 
2.5.4.1. What Is an Owner?  
In Alberta, unlike in the U.S., oil sands are owned collectively, not individually. Albertans own 
the oil sands. But what does ownership entail? In the Alberta context, ownership is neither equity 
in a physical property (e.g. a house), nor something one can cash in given they fulfill specific 
requirements like in Norway, where every citizen is entitled to a “real” share of the resource by 
virtue of citizenship. In Alberta, ownership is a vague concept, a right in a gray area not clearly 








Throughout history and across political lines, all of Alberta’s Premiers— from Lougheed and 
Klein, to Stelmach and Notley—agreed that Albertans own the resource. Owners have as much 
rights as they have responsibilities and one of these rights is to develop the resource in the most 
lucrative manner to benefit the owners, Albertans. However, the fluidity of what being 
“Albertan” entails, makes it difficult for government—in practice—to implement long term 
policy. For example, from an Albertan’s standpoint today, it might be more beneficial to align 
with the oil industry and derive as many benefits as possible now, than to allow the government 
to decrease industry dominance to build a better future, in which one may or may not be 
“Albertan.” This example reflects a preference for short term gains over long term benefits.  
In a petrostate environment, resource ownership is often synonymous with short-term gains—
despite regular attempts in history to plan long-term. While Lougheed pioneered the idea of 
establishing an oil fund to collect and invest oil revenue, the Fund dwindled after his leadership, 
culminating with the total halt of transfers of natural resource royalty revenues from 1987 to 1997 
(Alberta, n.d. (d)). In the early 2000s, the Fund was ‘rebooted.’ Despite the Fund’s mixed success, 
Norway learned from Alberta and the model was successfully replicated by various countries 
around the world (Onifade, 2017; Jordison and Hojjati, 2021). In the same vein, Alberta could 
have decided to restrain resource extraction and keep some for future generations. Indeed, oil 
sands resources are unique because they are finite, non-renewable. Groups like the Alberta 
Federation of Labour (AFL) believed that “thinking like an owner” required more processing 
domestically to take advantage of low discounted prices without compromising resources of the 
future. Alternatively, Albertans could have extracted as much oil sands as possible now, collected 
high revenues while the sector was booming to invest in the fund for future generations and live 
off interest the fund generated. But Alberta chose none of these paths; instead, it preferred 
extracting oil sands, letting industry drive the process, contenting itself by giving away tax credits 
and sending cheques to people (see the “Klein bucks” in the following chapter). Alberta chose to 
offer its unique, non-renewable, profitable resources to the few instead of the many.  
Ironically, oil developers have become so confident in their ability to manage and extract value 
from the oil sands that their interests have superseded oil owners’. While I examined what 
“ownership” meant for Albertans, the term was also used by industry, who used it cleverly. For 
example, although Albertans were stuck demanding a larger share of the pie (i.e. a larger oil 
sands royalty share), industry kept their demands in check while growing the pie itself (i.e. 
increasing oil sands profits). Financiers and oil developers treated the oil sands as their property, 
despite the resource ultimately belonging to Albertans. Industry’s “ownership” or control of the 
resource illustrates the confluence of ideas and institutions: the perception of ownership vs. the 








provision, while the perception of ownership became the de facto position. In the same vein, 
industry often presented its relationship with Albertans as a “hands-off,” passive partnership of 
sorts. In this partnership, industry manages and extracts the resource, oversees day-to-day 
operations, and gives a small share of its profit to the owners, as a token of appreciation. 
Albertans remain a distant party. 
2.5.4.2. Albertans’ Shared Myths 
Many Albertans struggle to free themselves from a number of ideas that discourage them from 
challenging the petrostate and petro-elite. At the societal level, Albertans share a number of 
mythologies, some more true than others. In addition, there are key psychological and cultural 
impacts on citizens that have allowed industry interests to maintain their dominance, including 
the perceived “weakness” of the government, which not only indicates an acquiescence to 
industry’s power, but also an unwillingness to remedy to it. 
Perhaps more than anywhere in the world, Alberta is a place where oil-related myths and facts 
are inextricable. First of all, many Albertans consider themselves and the province to be socially, 
politically, and economically conservative (Takach, 2010). This perception is rooted mainly—
and understandably—in the four decades of Conservative government in power and the history 
of the province. In the words of an Alberta-based academic, “we think of ourselves as much more 
conservative than we actually are” (Interviewee 13). A pioneer/frontier identity Alberta has 
nurtured and transformed with neoliberal ideals is clashing with the progressive nature of 
Alberta’s civil society. Alberta’s political culture is rich with progressive leaders and avant-garde 
endeavours. In contrast to the province’s “redneck” reputation, Alberta is home to many 
progressive endeavours, from the Famous Five, to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 
(which morphed into the NDP in 1961), to various ethnic minority leaders being elected as 
MLAs, mayors, or appointed in Senate (Collins, 2015).  Yet, many Albertans do not all seem 
aware of this paradox. These perceptions matter because they impact how Albertans see 
themselves and their opportunities for policy change. 
This perception of themselves as socially, politically, and economically conservative translates 
into a deeply-rooted pro-free markets belief, defending a “market knows best” approach. Many 
Albertans pride themselves for being enduring business entrepreneurs. In believing strongly in 
free markets, they resist government involvement in private sector regulation, best captured by 
Ralph Klein’s motto: “the government should be getting out of the business of being in business” 
(quoted in Young, 2013). This tendency allowed the oil industry to place itself on equal footing 
with Albertans, despite only being a developer of the resource: the oil industry became as 








Supported by oil industry narratives (such as the expertise of industry), some Albertans’ belief 
in their social, political, and economic conservatism combined with their defense of free markets 
leads to a belief that industry is an independent actor who does not rely on government. However, 
here again, they are victims of a false mythology. As an Alberta-based researcher points out, 
“businesses in the province, far from being independent actors, (…) actually receive a lot of 
government support” (Interviewee 5). As will be seen in the following chapters, the government 
of Alberta has been and continues to be provider, supporter, and protector of the oil industry. 
Whether through subsidies, tax breaks, or positive messaging to attract investment, the 
government of Alberta has effectively been working for and building Alberta’s oil industry from 
scratch—and this was a government strategy from the beginning, as exemplified by the National 
Task Force on Oil Sands Strategy examined in the following chapter.  
Taken together, these mythologies lead some Albertans to believe they are more reliant on 
companies than government, particularly, that they need industry and economic activity more 
than government. Ironically, they are reluctant to let their trustee, government, manage their best 
interests by the powers given by the Constitution. Nevertheless, they do not mind letting 
“partners,” companies, do it (Interviewee 16). In a petrostate, this leads to petro-citizens being 
captured easily by industry narratives. 
2.5.4.3. Oil Sands Pride and Prejudice 
Paradoxically, these mythologies make many Albertans simultaneously pride themselves in the 
oil sands, and undervalue them. Royalties in Alberta are an emotional topic for two main reasons. 
First, as mentioned above, they are so deeply embedded in Alberta’s dependency on the oil sector 
that an attack on one, means an attack on the other. Second, royalties are connected to the oil 
sands, which are a matter of Albertans’ pride. It is interesting to note here that this pride spreads 
to other areas of life in Alberta, notably, the absence of a sales taxes which merged with 
Albertans’ cultural ethos: as a former civil servant with Alberta Energy states, “We don’t have a 
sales tax. We don’t need it, we are Albertans” (Interviewee 4). 
Due to the incredibly high carbon footprint and energy intensity of oil sands extraction, Alberta’s 
environmental record, both nationally and internationally, was stained. Alberta is infamous for 
the oil sands, and many celebrities and leaders criticized it, from Leonardo DiCaprio to Desmond 
Tutu, James Cameron, and Jane Fonda (Wilt, 2015; McCornell, 2017; McCurdy 2017). As 
Communication scholar Patrick McCurdy explains, the “logic of celebrity” operates “whenever 
established celebrities, such as actors and musicians, are recruited to boost the visibility of a 
social cause and in the cultivation of ‘celebrity activists’” (2017, p. 133-134; 2013). In the case 








base to propel oil sands issues: Canadian actress Neve Campbell, followed by Canadian film-
director James Cameron, Canadian musician Neil Young, and American actor Leonardo 
DiCaprio all visited the oil sands to orient public support away from oil extraction in Alberta 
(McCurdy, 2017). 
In addition to individual celebrities’ activism, Anti-Alberta oil coalitions also sprang up both in 
Canada and internationally: for example in 2007, European banks decided to apply pressure on 
the oil sands by not investing in Alberta and were quickly followed by American anti-oil sands 
organizations who lobbied against extraction. These actions underlined the negative sides of oil 
sands extraction while bringing to light the minimal royalties collected in compensation for 
environmental destruction. 
These criticisms have been very poorly received by many in Alberta. They stained Alberta’s 
reputation as the wealthiest province in Canada and the first debt-free province in the country—
thus, hurting Albertans’ pride. When celebrities who had never even been to Alberta criticized it 
from afar, many Albertans were enraged. The Canadian federal government, having no control 
over the management of provincial resources due to constitutional arrangements, was left with 
the options of being supportive, neutral, or critical of the oil sands. It chose to be critical despite 
having “benefited” from equalization payments for decades, which worsened the conflictual 
history between Albertans and Ottawa. These factors have transformed oil sands royalties into a 
deeply emotional and sensitive issue. 
However, while some Albertans pride themselves in the oil sands and take any attack against the 
latter as an attack against all, Albertans ironically undervalue their provincial treasure. In Chapter 
4 and 5, the studies of the 2007 and 2015-16 royalty reviews consistently show that Albertans 
undervalued their product to keep industry and economic activity in Alberta. In the words of a 
Panel member, “We have a very stable product, large reserves, very little exploration risks, 
massive markets attached by pipelines, a stable government, we pay for healthcare and education, 
there is no sales tax…there is no better jurisdiction on the planet. So why are we charging as if 
we need to incent companies to come here, if we are such capitalists and free markets people?” 
(Interviewee 12). The mentality around the birth of oil sands activity in a climate of investment 
uncertainty forty years ago may not have yet faded as many Albertans fail to appreciate their 
resources’ true value today. 
Despite priding themselves as entrepreneurial capitalists, many Albertans undervalue their most 
profitable resource, the oil sands, and refuse to consider long term benefits over short-term gains. 
Despite all the reasons highlighted above, many Albertans remain loyal to the petro-elite because 








companies—both of which will be studied in details in the case studies—fit right into these 
companies’ PR branding. Ultimately, it is all about jobs. Can people keep their jobs? Will 
unemployment decrease? Those are Albertans’ most important economic realities. And in this 
economic environment, free markets rule all, including salaries for employees; but with this rise, 
comes economic dependency and social issues. For example, some Albertans were becoming so 
used to high wages that their dependency to their job increased (Interviewee 15). In the same 
vein, hiring low skilled labour at high salary rates made this type of labour force incredibly 
dependent on the oil sector (Köhler, 2009). It proved difficult for these workers to be re-hired in 
other sectors when they were laid off from the oil industry during price busts (Interviewee 15; 
AFL, 2009). McLean’s reported in 2008 that the rate of high school drop-outs spiked during the 
oil boom years in Alberta (Taylor-Vaisey, 2008); these dropouts who were laid off also often 
proved too old to be admitted back into high school at no costs. As a high level government 
official mentioned: “Society paid the price” (Interviewee 15). Yet, the lay-offs challenged neither 
people’s perceived dependency on the oil industry, nor their loyalty to it. If anything, it was 





























Alberta’s political economic history is marked by its dependency on oil. Government revenue 
and economic activity are both tied to the province’s long-standing reliance on the oil sector. One 
important policy that the government of Alberta controls in theory is the royalties it collects from 
oil producers. Therefore, the contentions around royalties are crucial: they are the heart of 
Alberta’s political economy. In the same vein, the royalty review Panels are important because 
they became the only way the public could learn about and participate in the management of its 
non-renewable resources.  
This chapter provides a detailed historical review of the government of Alberta’s royalty 
trajectory, from the discovery of oil in Leduc, Alberta in 1947 until 2015. It tracks the evolution 
and growth of provincial government policy in parallel to industry throughout the Conservative 
dynasty from 1971 until 2015, with a special focus on the leadership of premiers Peter Lougheed, 
Ralph Klein, Ed Stelmach, and Rachel Notley. I also review national oil policy and the 
involvement of the federal government in matters related to oil governance, specifically those 
conducted in partnership with Alberta’s—or to its detriment. In addition, the chapter pinpoints 
key global events that affected oil realities in Alberta and shed light on its vulnerability. Finally, 
the chapter provides a detailed description of the royalty review processes of 2007 and 2015-16, 








3.2. The Origins of Alberta’s Oil Sands Industry 
The history of royalties in Alberta is long and complex. The year 1947 is often regarded as the 
beginning of the oil industry in Alberta, as Imperial Oil, ExxonMobil’s Canadian subsidiary, 
struck oil at Leduc, Alberta, on February 13 of that year. This discovery marked a shift in 
Alberta’s economy from agriculture to oil (Mansell and Schlenker, 2006). In 1948, the royalty 
rate was capped at 16.67% but was then transformed in 1951 to a sliding scale system depending 
on the stage of development. By then, the oil sands had been recognized as having potentially 
high profitability.   
The first bituminous sands mine opened in 1967 and growing development spread to Alberta’s 
neighboring provinces, British Columbia and Saskatchewan. The oil wealth was slowly but 
steadily shifting from East to West. Economist and political scientist John Richards and Larry 
Pratt’s groundbreaking book Prairie Capitalism (1979) was the first to recognize the central role 
played by Alberta and Saskatchewan to make extractive capitalism the basis of their economy. 
The development of the oil sector—and parallel to it, the development of royalties—was very 
much driven by provincial state action. Incentives (such as tax reduction) and efforts in research 
and development on oil sands activity were part of a conscious effort to re-design the economy 
of Alberta. Richards and Pratt also demonstrated that these developments laid the ground for the 
creation of a local Canadian capitalist class central to the ‘New West.’ Having both national and 
international ramifications through oil development across the country and the globe, the 
capitalist class became increasingly powerful in the subsequent decades, extending through 
2015.   
3.3. Royalties under Peter Lougheed’s Leadership (1971 – 1985) 
3.3.1. Lougheed’s Vision: Oil for Albertans  
One of the first things Lougheed did upon being elected in 1971 was to increase royalties 
significantly. He raised Albertans’ share from 17% of all non-renewable revenue to 40%, 
boosting government revenue by C$10 billion a year; as a result, the oil industry nicknamed him 
a “red Tory” (Nikiforuk, 2012). 
Lougheed’s focus was on managing the resources’ development through public funding (Wilt, 
2017). His vision was to reinforce “Alberta’s position in Canada, shift economic power 
westward, build a lasting economic infrastructure, and create strong citizen attachments to 
Alberta and its government.” (Tupper, 2004, p.220) Lougheed was fundamentally an advocate 
of government involvement and he took the role of government as proxy to Albertans for oil 








continuous development of the province and benefit future generations. Under his leadership, 
the province used oil revenues to finance various public infrastructure projects (roads, bridges, 
etc.) as well as schools and community centres.  Despite industry’s attempts to pressure the 
Lougheed government by threatening to move drilling rigs and cancelling proposed projects, 
Lougheed’s interventionist approach had the support of many Albertans and he was re-elected 
three times in a row, winning four elections as Premier of Alberta (Steward, 2017).  
Lougheed was also the first to coin the phrase “think like an owner” (Nikiforuk, 2010; Nielsen, 
2012). For him, it was primordial that oil sands develop act as a public good for Albertans and 
Canadians, and not be developed based on foreign energy demand (Conservation and Utilization 
Committee, 1972, p. 6). The fact that the reserves did not “require highly speculative investment 
to find and prove” meant they could remain in the hands of Albertans rather than contribute to 
the increasing trend toward foreign control of Canadian non-renewable resources (Conservation 
and Utilization Committee, 1972, p.16). Lougheed was determined to diversify Alberta’s 
economy and “reduce the dependency for our [Albertans’] continued quality of life on 
governments, institutions, or corporations directed from outside the province.” (Richards and 
Pratt, 1979, p. 233) To put his idea into action, Lougheed created the Alberta Heritage Savings 
Trust Fund in 1976 to fund economic diversification (Carter, 2020; Jordison, 2021), contributing 
30% of all non-renewable resource revenue to the fund (Nikiforuk, 2012). 
Further, Lougheed created the Alberta Energy Company (AEC), with split equity between the 
province (49%) and individual Albertans who wished to support AEC’s investments in oil and 
gas, pipelines, forestry, petrochemicals, coal, and steel (Steward, 2017). He further developed 
the oil sands by creating the Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority (AOSTRA) 
designed to advance and support the technology required to extract and develop the oil sands—
and AOSTRA was successful. In less than two decades, AOSTRA became one of the largest 
research and development programs ever launched in Canada with C$448 million spent on 
public-private projects and research (Hester and Lawrence, 2010, in Steward). Further, 
Lougheed also collaborated with the federal government in creating the Alberta Oil Sands 
Environmental Research Program (AOSERP) to understand, analyze, and prevent the impacts of 
oil sands on the environment.  
3.3.2. The Involvement of the Federal Government  
As scholars like Foster (1979), Brownsey (2007), and Urquhart (2018) have demonstrated, the 
history of oil sands was marked by fluctuating oil prices, international geopolitical events, and 
federal involvement. First, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent fourfold rise of 








corporations—panic, as Middle East supplies were interrupted (Foster, 1979). Looking west, 
they saw Alberta’s slowly but steadily growing oil sands and moved their operations there. In 
Brownsey’s words, “multinationals flocked back to Alberta’s oil patch” (2007, 98). 
However, the federal government had also been observing oil sands’ growth. First, the federal 
government implemented the National Oil Policy (1961- 1973). This policy allowed those east 
of the Ottawa Valley to continue to use cheaper imported oil, while those west of the line (most 
of Ontario) were required to use more expensive Alberta oil (prices 33% to 50% higher) (Foster, 
1979; Thrift, 2016; Urquhart, 2018). In addition, wishing to get its share of the economic returns, 
the federal government invested directly in the oil sands, buying a 15% stake in Syncrude in 
1975 in order to save the dwindling project (Pratt, 1976; Foster, 1979). The Alberta government 
bought a 10% stake in Syncrude and the Ontario government bought 5%. It is also noteworthy 
that the Ontario government owned 25% of Suncor between 1981 and 1993 (Wilt, 2018). 
But perhaps the federal government’s most remembered participation came in the creation of 
Petro-Canada in 1974, the first national oil company in the country (Foster, 1979; Thrift, 2016). 
Reactions were mixed. On the one hand, the federal government would benefit from profits from 
oil extraction and decrease dependency on corporate actors (national and international) thanks 
to Petro-Canada (Fossum, 1997). On the other hand, Albertans, the provincial government, and 
industry all saw the federal involvement in oil and gas as intrusive. For Albertans and Alberta, 
it was indeed intruding on their legal right as the Canadian Constitution clearly delineates natural 
resources ownership, management, and control under provincial jurisdiction (Brownsey, 2007).  
3.3.3. Global Crises Land in Alberta 
In 1979, the Iranian Revolution sent shock waves to Canada’s oil industry and again drove global 
oil prices to unprecedented heights.  After the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the following 
economic sanctions, oil prices doubled from US$20 to US$40 (Thrift, 2016). In response, the 
federal government implemented the National Energy Program (NEP) whose objectives were 
threefold: first, to secure Alberta’s supplies for domestic use and thus reduce Canada’s 
dependency on foreign oil and price fluctuations; second, to share and redistribute Alberta’s oil 
wealth to the rest of the country; third, to gain better control and ownership over the oil industry 
(Pratt, 1982; Fossum, 1997; Urquhart, 2018). But the NEP was short-lived: in 1984, Canadians 
elected a PC government at the federal level. Led by Brian Mulroney, the PCs eliminated the 
NEP in 1985 with the signing of the Western Accord. Oil wealth was to remain concentrated in 
the hands of a few.  
The 1980s were thus a time of uncertainty for the oil sand industry which saw continuous 








term as Premier, his successor, Don Getty (1985-1992), provided C$250 million in incentives 
and royalty cuts during his government, including a nine-month cut in royalties from 12% to 1% 
to Suncor in 1986. Yet, as oil prices fluctuated, the commercial viability of projects proposals 
was often questioned, especially in the late 1980s when global prices fell and investment came 
to a halt (Helliwell et al. 1989). At that point, there was no set royalty framework: companies 
had to negotiate individually with the government—which meant that rates were “unknown and 
unknowable” to other companies (Plourde, 2009, 115; Urquhart, 2018). This left little room for 
alliances among corporations, and thus challenged corporations’ ability to exercise influence on 
royalty policy.  
The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 under the federal 
Liberal government further undermined both provincial and federal governments’ ability to 
control pricing and secure domestic supply (Urquhart, 2018). By integrating Alberta’s oil 
industry in the North American markets, the province would be increasingly dependent on global 
oil prices. The “boom-and-bust cycle” favouring Alberta during high oil prices and harming it 
during low oil prices would become Alberta’s new reality (Brownsey, 2007, 100).  
3.4. Accelerating the Oil Sands: The Klein Years (1992-2006)  
On December 14, 1992, Ralph Klein was elected Premier under the Conservative banner. He 
would be the most ardent defender of the oil industry in Alberta and under his leadership, the 
nascent oil sands industry grew to become one of the most powerful industries in the country.   
In the early Klein years, there was an upheaval within the ranks of government policymakers as 
Klein sought to bring his own colleagues to build a team that aligned with his interests. Klein’s 
primary focus with respect to the oil sector was on “not killing the goose that lays golden eggs,” 
and on “not putting our foot on the break.” Those ideas were anti-regulation and anti-government 
involvement and resonated with many Albertans’ belief and trust in free markets, combined with 
their frontier/pioneer identity and fear of losing their jobs. Unfortunately, Albertans did not 
realize that they were not getting “golden eggs” as such (i.e. long term, passive income from 
interests).  
Regarding royalties, the government set rates for separate projects in different Crown 
agreements, or contracts until 1997 (Urquhart, 2018). This produced an ad hoc approach to fiscal 
system design and application and it was manageable only because of the relatively small number 
of oil sands projects at the time. However, it was a time consuming process, and did not provide 








With the industry struggling to take off in the 1990s, Alberta and Canada jointly implemented 
tax incentives to attract investment in the oil sands (Plourde, 2009). In 1995, the National Task 
Force on Oil Sands Strategies (NTFOSS) published a report titled “The Oil Sands: A New 
Energy Vision for Canada.” The NTFOSS was largely a body created by the oil industry for the 
oil industry, and its policies were implemented without any public consultation or input 
(Steward, 2017; Urquhart, 2018). The report advocated for a generic royalty regime with a 
smaller royalty share at the beginning of a project and a larger royalty share after developers 
recover their costs. Dobson (2015) highlighted that the philosophy behind the pre-payout/post-
payout system was based on recognizing the role of the government as a partner with 
corporations to oil sand ventures. Indeed, recognizing the need for large upfront investments, the 
government would receive its share later to alleviate the risks undertaken by corporations. 
This dual-based generic framework came into effect on July 1, 1997, under the Oil Sands Royalty 
Regulation, 1997, for all new oil sands projects and included the same taxation for both surface 
mining and in situ projects (Plourde, 2009). It was clearly designed to encourage investment. At 
the same time, the federal government extended its Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance (ACCA) 
to oil sands projects to encourage their development (Plourde, 2009). This incentive allowed 
companies to reduce their tax liability in the short term: by allowing for an increasing capital 
cost allowance, a higher expense could be deducted from revenues, thus lowering the company’s 
taxable income. The 1997 royalty framework, considered alongside the federal ACCA, was 
designed to favour the industry and stimulate investment (Panel, 2007).  
Several scholars argue that investment in Alberta spurred in May 2001 onwards when U.S. 
President George W. Bush announced the National Energy Policy, underlining the U.S.’ need 
for secure and stable oil supply, most of which would come from Alberta’s sands (Salameh, 
2003; Brownsey, 2007).  In the context of NAFTA,10 this meant that Alberta’s sands were tied 
to American demand of oil, and therefore, that any change in the royalty framework, and thus in 
their profitability, would have trickle down effects for industry and governments both nationally 
and internationally (Clarke, 2009; Le Billon and Carter, 2012).  
With growing oil development, Alberta’s debt was eliminated during the Klein years—a 
distinctive political legacy from the Klein government that marked Albertans. In truth, this was 
not a surprising endeavour given the amount of oil money pouring in Alberta. The Klein years 
were defined as “opportunism” (Taft, 2017) as Alberta opened up to the world under Klein’s 
leadership. At the time, Alberta could offer “plentiful undeveloped petroleum resources, political 
                                                 
10 NAFTA’s proportionality concept limits the Canadian government’s ability to restrict exports. Article 605 
especially prevents the Canadian government from reducing U.S. access to certain Canadian resources without a 








stability, a skilled and educated workforce, and…no requirements for the private sector to partner 
with state corporations (Urquhart, 2018, p. 176). In the words of a former civil servant, “What 
more could you ask for?” (Interviewee 4). 
Further, awash in oil money, Klein issued the “Prosperity Bonus,” (Mulvale and Vanderborght, 
2012) whereby the government of Alberta sent C$400 cheques to each Albertan, nicknamed 
“Ralph bucks.” Given the economic prosperity, Klein was not keen on making any changes to 
royalties. His refusal to increase royalties was supported by many who believed climate change 
was a hoax and therefore not a reason good enough to touch royalties. This perspective connected 
the environment and royalties; royalties were usually associated mainly with economics, money, 
and jobs. At the time, increasing royalties could have helped address the mounting ecological 
impacts of oil extraction and ensure a price for oil sands that reflected their value.   
But the Klein story did not end well. A senior civil servant interviewed indicated that at the time 
Klein was still in power, a more senior colleague had confided in him his concern regarding the 
Klein administration and said: “they have been lucky for so long, they are starting to think they 
are smart” (Interviewee 4). Klein’s demise was tainted by multiple scandals, including the 
plagiarism scandal in 2004 over an essay he wrote for an online course at Athabasca University 
wherein he was accused of having copied online material without proper attribution. To make 
things worse, then Minister of Education Lyle Oberg (the same who later became Minister of 
Finance under Premier Stelmach and received the first royalty review Report) called on the 
Presidents of various universities in Alberta to express their support for Klein, including 
Athabasca University, the University of Lethbridge, the University of Calgary, and the University 
of Alberta. The next day, University of Calgary and University of Alberta Presidents published 
letters in newspapers praising Klein’s “commitment to lifelong learning” (CBC News, 2004). 
This led to an immediate outcry from academics and politicians, accusing Klein’s government of 
“bullying” the universities to express their support for the government and quell public criticism 
of Klein (Macdonald, 2004; Henton, 2013). 
As for royalties, with global oil prices surging at the beginning of the new millennium, the oil 
industry made enormous profits, while the provincial government captured proportionally much 
smaller economic rent. Under the generic royalty regime established under Klein, “between 1997 
and 2010, oil sands producers paid less than $20 billion in royalties and land sales for the rights 
to more than $205 billion worth of bitumen” (Boychuk, 2010, cited in Steward, 2017, p.28). 
Groups like the Pembina Institute and Parkland Institute raised the issue of royalties and the need 
to increase them. The issue resonated with some Albertans who denounced the royalty 
framework established in 1997 as too favourable to the industry at the detriment of Albertans 








government whether they were receiving a fair share from their resources. Klein responded “We 
do get our pound of flesh” and that he did not give “a tinker’s dam” about royalty reviews or 
Albertans’ fair share (cited in Finch, 2008; Nikiforuk, 2007; and Urquhart, 2018). That irritated 
some Albertans who argued: “We should know, we are the owners of the resource” (Interviewee 
8). As companies got richer and in-situ technology changed the game, people criticized Klein, 
accusing him of “having given the farm away.” Klein’s former popularity could not save him 
from Albertans’ growing frustration. In 2006, Klein resigned.  
3.5. Ed Stelmach Launches the 2007 Royalty Review (2006 – 2011) 
The royalties issue became central during the 2006 Progressive Conservative leadership race. 
Institutionally, global oil prices kept increasing while royalties in Alberta remained low. Many 
Albertans were demanding increased royalties based on the idea that, as owners, they had the 
right to get a fair share of oil sands resources. Other groups, such as Indigenous people, as well 
as environmental groups, had been consistently contesting the oil sands (McCurdy, 2017). 
During the electoral campaign, provincial leadership candidate Ed Stelmach promised that he 
would review royalty rates if he became Premier. Stelmach observed that “the policy of lower 
royalties to maintain a minimum level of investment is no longer needed to attract investment to 
Alberta” (cited in Anielski, 2015, 7). He had recognized widespread dissatisfaction with royalties 
among citizens in the province (Plourde, 2009). 
The government appointed a royalty review Panel to revise Alberta’s royalty framework in 2007. 
The royalty review was a process designed by the government of Alberta to examine the royalties 
(and their associated programs) collected by the government, as proxy to the owners, on 
producers. The reviews’ ultimate objective was to provide government with enough information 
and analysis of the royalties to support the creation of a new royalty framework (i.e. policy). 
Institutionally, the Panel’s mandate was to assess the royalty framework for all non-renewable 
resources, including oil sands, conventional oil, and natural gas. The Panel’s report, “Our Fair 
Share,” was released on September 18, 2007 and argued that Albertans had not been receiving 
their fair share from energy development, especially from the oil sands. The Panel recognized 
that industry resisted royalty increases, unlike municipalities, non-industry groups, and the 
public (p. 8), and emphasized that the resources belong to Albertans, and therefore, that their 
interests had priority.  
In particular, the Panel made two clear recommendations regarding oil sand royalties 
(summarized in table 1). First, the Panel argued that, in the post-payout period, the net royalty 
rate should go from 25% to a flat 33% rate, regardless of global oil prices. Second, while the 








recommended the 1% to be paid in addition to the net royalty in the post-payout period. At the 
time, the framework prescribed industry to pay only the greater of the base royalty or the net 
royalty in post-payout—which in practice, meant paying only the net royalty (Panel, 2007). 
Finally, the Panel recommended the creation of an Oil Sands Severance Tax (OSST) payable 
upon commencement of production which would increase based on oil prices to a maximum of 
9%. 
 









Oil Sands 47% 53% 64% 36% 
Conventional 
Oil 
44% 56% 49% 51% 
Natural Gas 58% 42% 63% 37% 
Table 1: Panel Recommendations for Overall Energy Share in 2007  
(Source: Royalty Review Panel Report “Our Fair Share,” 2007, 7) 
 
After the public release of the Panel’s recommendations, there was strong discontent amongst 
industry players (Interviewee 9). Indeed, while the recommendations were relatively timid, they 
were leaning toward increasing royalties, recognizing the rights of Albertans as owners and of 
government as their proxy, as well as advocating for oil sands producers to refrain from 
intervening as governance actors. Instead of following all of the Panel’s recommendations, 
government held numerous meetings with industry behind closed doors before releasing the new 
royalty framework in October 2007. Moreover, to give the industry time to prepare for it, the 
new royalty regime did not come into effect until January 1, 2009. 
In the new framework, government decided that the new royalty framework would have gradual 
base and net royalty rates. In “Alberta’s New Royalty Framework,” the policy established a base 
rate (in pre-payout) starting at 1% and increasing for every dollar oil was priced above $55/barrel 
to a maximum of 9% when oil was priced at US$120 or higher (Government of Alberta, 2007).  
Similarly, in the post-payout period, the net royalty rate would start at 25% and increase for 
every dollar oil was priced above US$55/barrel to a maximum of 40% when oil was priced at 








of the base or the net royalty rate was kept, making changes to the base royalty effectively 
useless. Finally, the government rejected the creation of the Oil Sands Severance Tax because 
“rather than impose a new tax, the government will increase base and net royalty rates to achieve 
similar results” (Royalty Framework, 2007, 9).  
The report and following royalty policy received mixed reviews among scholars and pundits. On 
the one hand, oil sand supporters applauded the report and praised the Panel’s attempt at 
“increasing the size of the pie” rather than “haggling over how a small pie gets divided” (Shaffer, 
2007). On the other hand, scholars underlined that the Panel’s recommendations and 
government’s policy were still not providing Albertans with their due share of revenue (Gibson, 
2007; Plourde, 2009; Nikiforuk, 2010; Hoberg and Philipps, 2011; Campbell, 2013). In Gibson’s 
words, “as owners, they [Albertans] are entitled to the maximum revenue possible from those 
resources while still encouraging the appropriate level of investment” (2007, 1). 
However, there was a total reversal on royalties that came with the 2007-08 financial crisis. As 
a result of the crisis, Alberta entered a recession and Stelmach—and by extension the PC—was 
blamed for it (Interviewee 9). During the recession, the government also provided a number of 
royalty incentives for conventional oil and gas (mostly for deep-wells). For example, one of 
Stelmach’s programs was to cut royalties on new conventional oil and gas wells to 5% from an 
average royalty rate of 15% to 25% depending on the project. A second program provided 
smaller producers a drilling royalty credit. Together, these two programs were “expected to cost 
the province C$1.5 billion in for-gone royalties” (Cattaneo, 2009). Those incentives were kept 
once the new royalty regime came into force in 2009, and eventually made permanent. Many 
Albertans blamed Stelmach and the PCs both for the recession and their inability to substantially 
increase royalties. They needed a new party to turn to, one not too left-leaning—politically, the 
province leaned conservative. Unbeknownst to Albertans, the oil industry provided an 
alternative: the Wildrose party. 
3.6. The Blooming (and Withering) of the Wildrose Party 
Alberta is a highly partisan province and the rise and fall of the Wildrose Party is perhaps the 
best illustration of how even a pro-oil Conservative party can quickly fall out of favour in 
Alberta. Two main factors led to the rise of the Wildrose: first, there were growing internal 
divergences inside the Progressive Conservative Party as part of the membership supported 
raising royalties to assuage industry to pay a fair share to Albertans whereas the other advocated 
for minimal royalties to continue encouraging the oil sector to grow. Second, Ed Stelmach’s 
determination to ensure Albertans’ well-being and to “do the right thing,” meant he would not 








The Wildrose Party was created in great part by a schism inside the PC party (Interviewee 9). 
Following Stelmach’s new royalty framework, discontent grew inside Conservative ranks. Some 
Conservatives sided with Stelmach and approved of increasing royalties. They believed, like 
Lougheed four decades prior, that industry was a partner in the oil sands venture, but that the 
government of Alberta remained in control on behalf of Albertans. On the other hand, a growing 
number of Conservatives advocated for minimal royalties and deplored government involvement 
in the sector. Staunch defenders of the oil industry, they argued it should not pay additional 
royalties as this would halt investment and affect the province’s economy. Their interests aligned 
with those of the newly founded Wildrose party (Interviewee 9) which heavily criticized 
Stelmach’s review and framework.  
In addition, industry was dissatisfied with Stelmach’s leadership and his commitment to review 
all royalties (not only oil sands’)—and it was determined to make that dissatisfaction known 
(Interviewee 8). Indeed, from 2004 to 2010, the oil industry was the largest contributor to 
political parties in Alberta: the largest donors across all parties were the Encana Corporation, 
TransCanada Pipelines Ltd., Suncor Energy Inc., Enbridge Pipelines Inc. and Nexen Inc. 
(Timmons, 2012). On the Conservative side toward the end of Stelmach’s mandate, the Party 
kept trying to buy industry back—to no avail.  Similarly, industry put pressure on the Liberal 
caucus to stop calling for increased royalties through various means (e.g. frequent meetings with 
politicians). Pointing to flaws in the 2007 report, many corporate actors decreased their political 
contributions to the Liberals and Conservatives, and re-directed donations to the newly founded, 
industry-backed Wildrose Party which advocated for socio-political conservatism and liberal, 
pro-oil economics (Interviewee 2, 6, 8). Political donations to the newly founded Wildrose Party 
from individuals and corporations in the oil and gas sector grew exponentially over 2008-2011 
period: from C$233,000 in 2008, they rose to C$2.7 million in 2011 (Calgary Herald, 2012). The 
Wildrose became the oil industry’s new champion.  
But both Wildrose and PC fell out of favour in 2014, following Danielle Smith’s crossing the 
floor to the PC caucus, together with eight other Wildrose members. Prentice then decided to 
call an early election and rally forces with Smith’s Wildrose Party. He was attempting to unify 
the PC party after it had been split. However, due to the Westminster’s model which separates a 
majority/minority government from the official opposition, this move was seen as shocking by 
most Albertans. Suddenly, the opposition, whose primary role is to counter-balance government, 
was allying with it. In the words of an interviewee, this triggered in many Albertans the feeling 
that “something was wrong” (Interviewee 12). The Smith/Prentice episode is a clear example of 
how institutions lost the trust of people when two political parties in opposing positions rejoined. 
This episode eventually led to the demise of the Wildrose Party and a deepened mistrust of the 








Party, Albertans flocked to polling stations in spring 2015; the 2015 election marked the highest 
voter turnout since the 1993 elections (Elections Alberta, n.d. (c)). A few days later, the NDP 
assumed office for the first time in the province’s history.  
3.7. Rachel Notley Launches the 2015 Royalty Review (2015 – 2019) 
The majority-elected NDP government ended more than four decades of PC rule in Alberta. This 
landmark victory came, in part, from a growing disenchantment with the PC’s pro-corporate 
stance at the detriment of Albertans. Indeed, PC leader Jim Prentice ran a campaign platform 
with no increase in corporate taxes, whereas NDP candidate Rachel Notley promised a 2% 
increase on corporate taxes (from 10% to 12%) and a review of the royalty framework to 
“implement competitive, realistic royalty rates as prices rise, to ensure full and fair value for 
Albertans as the owners of the resources” (Maki, 2015; NDP, 2015; CBC News, 2015). Albertans 
used their votes to provoke an institutional change and elect a party whose campaign promises 
echoed with some Albertans’ ideas to increase royalties. 
Once in power, the NDP government followed through on its campaign promise and 
commissioned a royalty review Panel in August 2015. Its report, “Alberta at a Crossroads,” was 
released on January 29, 2016. The report sent a mixed message: it accounted for Albertans’ right 
to receive a good share of their resources, and simultaneously emphasized the crucial need for 
Alberta to remain competitive—and therefore maintain a favourable environment for the 
industry. Overall, the 2015-16 Panel considered Albertans were receiving a fair share and made 
no recommendation to change oil sand royalties; instead, the Panel suggested increasing the 
transparency of allowable costs (Panel, 2016, 12). For drillers, it recommended the creation of a 
program where the most efficient drillers would be rewarded with various incentives. It also 
encouraged the development of Alberta’s markets for the use of natural gas (Bakx, 2016).  
In response, the NDP government enacted its “Modernized Royalty Framework.” Unlike 
Stelmach government who had only selected some of the 2007 Panel recommendations, the 
Notley government accepted all of the 2015-16 recommendations—which were not much. 
Notley’s new framework left oil sands royalties untouched. Price sensitivity was maintained, but 
the new policy rejected the idea of increasing price sensitivity at higher prices; in other words, it 
rejected the possibility that producers would pay higher royalties at high prices, which was the 
rationale at the heart of the price sensitivity initiative. 
Unsurprisingly, the report and framework received mixed reviews. Pro-industry critics were 
initially against the need to review royalties, because they argued investments suffer when 
“governments inject uncertainty into markets” (Green, 2015, 7). Alarmist claims about the 








blow to the sector (Dobson, 2015). However, after the publication of the Panel report and 
government framework, industry supporters praised the new framework; indeed, oil sands were 
largely left untouched by this review (Crisan and Mintz, 2016). 
On the other hand, many royalty-increase advocates expressed their disappointment with the 
modernized framework (Diamanti, 2016; Rodgers, 2016). In Nikiforuk’s words (2016a), the new 
framework is “an economic disaster and represents a capitulation to Big Oil and its financial 
backers.” Indeed, pundits have pointed out the irony of having a NDP-commissioned review 
process that essentially declares itself satisfied with a PC-led royalty framework in an issue as 
controversial as the oil sands (Acuña, 2016). Commentators argued that additional profits 
derived from high oil prices should instead belong to Albertans (Acuña, 2016). To explain the 
complete ‘U-turn’ of the NDP government regarding royalty policy, Gil McGowan, President of 
the Alberta Federation of Labour concluded: “what happened can best be described as the 
government being captured by industry” (quoted in Bell, 2016). Despite progress towards 
improving transparency in oil sand projects, the new framework thus fell short of expectations 
because it maintained low royalties during high oil prices, effectively preventing Albertans from 
benefiting from an increase in the value of their resources.   
3.8. Conclusion 
While oil was first discovered in Alberta in 1947, the first bituminous sands mine only opened 
twenty years later. Knowing that the province was sitting on large oil sands reserves, the 
Lougheed government made it its priority to develop the resource for Albertans. Lougheed’s 
vision was to support the development of the oil industry in Alberta, while ensuring that the 
resources remained under the control of the government. Lougheed increased royalties and 
undertook several projects designed to ensure that Albertans would strongly benefit from 
extraction and receive a fair share of the resources they owned. The federal government quickly 
got involved as well. The federal government’s implementation of the National Oil Sands 
Strategy, creation of Petro-Canada, and investment in various oil sands producers sent a clear 
message to Albertans: the federal government wanted in. This partnership was not well perceived 
by many Albertans. Soon after, the Iranian Revolution sent shockwaves to the oil industry by 
sending global oil prices sky-high. Together with the signing of NAFTA in 1993, it became 
evident that Alberta’s oil sands were now tied to global oil markets—for better or for worse.  
Former Premier Ralph Klein would prove to be the most ardent defender of the oil industry in 
Alberta. Under his leadership, the nascent oil sands industry grew to become one of the most 
powerful industries in the country—often at the detriment of Albertans. In power for fourteen 








Charmed then frustrated with Klein, Albertans witnessed consistently high global oil prices from 
2000s onward and demanded a fair share of the resources they owned. They elected Ed Stelmach 
in 2006 in part for his promise to review the royalties. Following through, Stelmach launched 
the 2007 royalty review, the first of its kind in the province’s history. The 2007 Panel 
recommended some changes to the royalty framework, but Stelmach only selected a few 
palatable recommendations in his new framework. The moderate changes Stelmach made proved 
disastrous for his political career as he was criticized on both sides: first, by many Albertans who 
felt he had not gone far enough on increasing royalties and second, by industry who felt he had 
indeed. Stelmach’s policy reinforced the cleavage inside Conservative ranks between pro-royalty 
increase and anti-royalty increase members. This divide on appropriate royalty policy led in part 
to the creation of the Wildrose Party, a pro-oil, conservative party, who despite its early success, 
made the mistake of joining forces with the opposition. Discontented with more than four 
decades of Conservative power, Albertans flocked to the polls and elected the New Democrats 
in 2015 for the first time in the province’s history. The NDP had always criticized royalties, 
arguing for increasing Albertans’ share. However, when Rachel Notley became Premier, she 
compromised with corporate interests by appointing a Panel with strong ties to industry. Not 
surprisingly, the Panel recommended no changes to oil sands royalties, and the NDP followed 
suit in its new policy framework. 
To conclude, at both times, it seemed the royalty reviews were implemented due to public 
pressure, but ended in disappointment.  The reviews had taken place because with surging global 
oil prices and long-standing government incentives, Albertans had realized they were not getting 
their fair share of the resources and pressured their government to act. The Panels came in 
response to public pressure exerted on elected officials and in an election period where 
politicians had to campaign on the royalty issues. The Panels were expected to report back to 
government, for it to decide what and how it would implement a new framework. In 2007, the 
government’s response was to select a handful of the 2007 Panel’s recommendations to appear 
compromising at minimum; in 2016, the government’s response was to follow the 2015-16 Panel 
recommendations, an easy task given the general lack of change.  
The 2007 and 2015-16 royalty review Panels were the only ones of this kind in the province’s 
history. The following chapters examine the 2007 and 2015-16 episodes in detail, and elaborate 
on and explain their differences. They also map the institutional, interest-based, and ideational 
factors explaining royalty possibilities and stasis in Alberta, ultimately uncovering the inner 










CHAPTER IV  
 
The 2007 Royalty Review:  







On September 18, 2007, the royalty review Panel handed its report to the Honourable Dr. Lyle 
Oberg, Alberta’s Minister of Finance. Titled “Our Fair Share, Report of the Alberta Royalty 
Review Panel,” the 100-page report argued that Albertans were not receiving their fair share from 
energy development and had not been “for quite some time” (Hunter et al., 2007). The Panel 
recommended that the government increase royalties to re-allocate profits extracted from energy 
resources to the owners, Albertans, and ensure that future royalty rates would reflect extracted 
resource value, provide owners with rightful revenue generation, and maintain Alberta’s 
competitive edge in energy investments. A month later, in October 2007, the Alberta government 
released its 23-page response titled “The New Royalty Framework,” which only incorporated a 
small selection of the Panel’s recommendations. It left in place practices, subsidies, and other 
initiatives that had continuously favoured the energy industry in previous decades. What explains 
the Conservative government’s reluctance to embrace the recommendations of the Panel it 
appointed for the specific task of reviewing royalties and advising on future rates? Ideational, 
interest-based, and institutional factors all played a role in explaining royalty stasis in Alberta.  
In the chapter that follows, I outline the ways in which global oil prices, an institutional factor, 
opened a window for Albertans to review oil sands royalties for the first time since the boom of 
the 2000s period. Indeed, with oil being traded on international markets, price fluctuations can 
affect domestic provincial policy. Yet, if global price fluctuations set the stage for a royalty 








“getting our fair share” that catalyzed it. These ideas proved essential to rallying most Albertans 
behind the royalty review because ownership and management of resources are rights entrenched 
in the Constitution and shared by all Albertans. Albertans’ demands to review royalty rates led 
to the launch of the 2007 royalty review. The challenges faced by the Panel during the review 
included industry barriers to accessing quality data, conceptual challenges due to subjective 
understandings of fairness, and the limited capacity and usefulness of public consultations. With 
special attention to the backlash against the Panel post-report, the chapter surveys Premier 
Stelmach’s policy and reactions at the time, focusing on key interests, including industry, the 
public, and government.  
Due to its political history and identity (Palmer, 1982), Alberta proved a fertile ground for citizen-
level narratives such as a strong belief in free markets (e.g. opposition to government 
involvement) and a loose interpretation of frontier/pioneer identity inherited from early settler-
times (Bercuson, 1980). This set of beliefs made it possible for oil industry-lobbyists to construct 
an industry-level narrative with direct policy implications: the “ethical oil” narrative. But these 
ideas operate within a public institutions framework, which had to be captured for industry’s 
interests to materialize. Turning to these public institutions, I focus on universities and the media 
as central public spaces of education and information that serve as channels through which 
industry could exert influence. Further, I confront some of industry’s claims on oil sands costs, 
discussing both the impacts associated with this institutional “reality” and government challenges 
in accessing data to monitor industry. Finally, I detail how the oil industry exerted instrumental, 
structural, and discursive power via specific strategies designed to influence policy, including 
lobbying and verbal threats, astro-turphing, group associations and alliances, and framing. I 
conclude with a case study on industry’s discursive power, particularly its ability to play expert 
or victim depending on the circumstances and highlight that industry’s agenda in part manifested 
through rural interests (e.g. voting power) by successfully aligning the interests of rural 
communities with its own. 
4.2. Opportunity in a Global Oil Price Rise 
After many years of relative stability in global energy markets, oil prices began to rise in 2004, 
sparking a spur in financial investments in oil. While WCS prices had been averaging C$30 per 
barrel in the early 2000s, increasing demand from China and other emerging economies led oil 
prices to increase (Government of Canada, n.d.), generating extraordinary profits for global oil 
companies and governments (through National Oil Companies) from oil extraction. In 2000, on 
average, WTI traded at C$45.60 per barrel, while WCS traded at C$36.75 per barrel. By 2005, 








For a subnational jurisdiction like Alberta, oil price increases boosted provincial revenues, 
strengthening the province’s dependency on its oil sector. But unlike other jurisdictions (e.g. 
Norway), Alberta spent oil money locally, driving up inflation. Fortunately, Albertans tempered 
the impacts of inflation because they had wealth, almost no unemployment, and no provincial 
debt. In 2006, Alberta had an unemployment rate of less than 4% (Government of Alberta, n.d. 
(b); Statistics Canada, 2018) and had eliminated both its net and accumulated debt (Government 
of Alberta, 2006).11 
The newfound oil wealth was striking. Real estate prices shot up, sports cars worth hundreds of 
thousands of dollars tore through the streets of Calgary, and high school dropouts were suddenly 
paid a Financial Manager’s salary to drive a mega truck12 in Fort McMurray’s oil sands (Oil 
Sands Magazine, n.d.). Nurses and teachers were leaving the busy cities and flocking in 
thousands to the more lucrative Athabasca sands. Even Canadians across the country—the “fly 
in, fly out” workers—relocated to Fort McMurray for temporary assignments in search of work 
and hopes of fast cash. They were led by the “promise of plentiful work in the energy economy 
and of the ability to translate it into the ‘good life’” (Dorow, 2015, p. 284); in Dorow’s words, 
“Fort McMurray = good jobs” (2013, p. 132). All the while, oil companies were riding on top of 
this influx of wealth.  
When Albertans realized that oil companies had been the primary beneficiaries of high oil prices 
due to Alberta’s attractive royalty rates, widespread discontent swiped through the province like 
wildfire: Many Albertans denounced their royalty framework (established in 1997) as too 
favourable to industry at the detriment of Albertans —that framework had been designed from 
an investment stimulus perspective (Urquhart, 2018)—and demanded a royalty review (Taylor 
and Reynolds, 2006; Hoberg and Philips, 2011). While it is the spike in oil prices that awakened 
Alberta to the harsh reality of low royalties for their most important resource, reviewing royalties 
would also dissipate the cloud of complexity that coated the royalty framework. The pre-2007 
framework was “complicated by design,” which many attributed to decades of industry lobbying 
(Interviewee 10); in the words of that former civil servant, “people started to distrust [the royalty 
framework] (…) It was so opaque, people didn’t trust it” (Interviewee 10; Nikiforuk, 2016b).   
4.3. Ideas: Thinking Like an Owner to Get Our Fair Share 
Global oil prices fluctuations opened a window of opportunity for a royalty review, but 
Albertans’ catalyzed it domestically by rallying behind narratives that encouraged ownership 
                                                 
11 Though Alberta’s “debt-free” status was debated because pundits argued the province had not actually eliminated 
its debt, but rather had more assets than debt from 1999 until 2016. See McRae and Hussey (2017).  








control. In November 2006, the Pembina Institute, a leading think tank, published a report titled 
“Thinking Like an Owner: Overhauling the Royalty and Tax Treatment of Alberta’s Oil Sands.” 
First coined in Alberta by former Premier Peter Lougheed, the phrase “think like an owner” 
became a crucial rallying call for Albertans to regain control of their resources and derived profits 
(Nikiforuk, 2010; Nielsen, 2012). Lougheed had been a staunch defender of Albertans’ right to 
ownership as entrenched in the Constitution and he valued Albertans’ ability and responsibility 
to decide how to manage their oil resources. Lougheed envisioned ways through which the oil 
industry could support Albertans—not the other way around.   
In the same vein as “thinking like an owner,” Albertans demanded their “fair share” of oil sands 
profits. As owners of the resource, Albertans are entitled to a fair market share of profit for the 
wealth below ground. Very quickly, oil sands royalties became a central issue in the 2006 
provincial election, with most candidates promising a royalty review of the lucrative oil sands if 
elected. As the political parties’ internal leadership races unfolded, Ed Stelmach won the 
Conservative leadership by endorsement from the fourth, fifth, and sixth place candidates despite 
having initially placed third on the first ballot. Competing with other provincial party leaders, he 
won the provincial election and was sworn in as Premier on December 14, 2006.  
Following his promise to review royalties and recognizing that “the policy of lower royalties to 
maintain a minimum level of investment is no longer needed to attract investment to Alberta” 
(cited in Anielski, 2015, 7), the Stelmach government launched a formal review process by 
appointing the royalty review Panel to the task (Plourde, 2009). Led by William M. Hunter, 
former executive with Alberta-Pacific Forest Industries, the six-person Panel was composed of 
Evan Chrapko, a chartered accountant and software entrepreneur, Judith Dwarkin, an economist 
with an energy consulting firm, Ken McKenzie, an Economics professor at the University of 
Calgary, André Plourde, an Economics professor at the University of Alberta, and Sam Spanglet, 
a former Shell Canada executive. Together, they had been assigned the enormous mandate to 
recommend a fiscal program that would provide Albertans with their “fair share.”  
While a royalty review was predictable, Stelmach surprised many when he announced that the 
review would encompass all resources: oil sands certainly, but also conventional oil and natural 
gas. At the time, these resources were considered attractive, but paled in comparison to the 
enormously lucrative and almost infinite oil sands reserves. Asked why he had decided to review 
all royalties, Stelmach simply responded that he felt it was the right thing to do. 
4.4. The 2007 Royalty Review Panel 
Born on a farm near Lamont, Alberta, Edward Michael Stelmach was a third generation Albertan, 








review a top item on his agenda. While the Panel’s mandate was simple in theory, the Panel faced 
various challenges, including industry barriers to accessing quality data, challenges due to 
subjective understandings of fairness, and the limited capacity and usefulness of public 
consultations (Interviewee 3 & 12).  
To constitute the Panel, Stelmach consulted with Alberta’s top natural resources industries, 
including oil, gas, and lumber, as well as advocacy groups and cabinet, ultimately appointing 
Hunter, Chrapko, Dwarkin, McKenzie, Plourde, and Spanglet—as mentioned previously. 
Interestingly, the Panel reported to the Finance Minister—not the Energy Minister—and had its 
own Secretariat and budget. However, despite consulting with the oil industry, Stelmach ensured 
that there would be no external interference in Panel discussions. This was confirmed by Panel 
members who emphasized that the process was open-ended: there was no set agenda, or pre-
dated mandate to publish particular findings and/or policy. In the words of a Panel member, 
“there was never ever, not even once, a directive or a hint, no brown paper envelops shoved down 
under our door suggesting what we should do” (Interviewee 12). Further, the Panel would be 
advised by a recognized expert on global petroleum fiscal systems, Dr. Pedro van Meurs, who 
would prepare a comparative study of fiscal systems to advise the Panel (Urquhart, 2018). Yet, 
by announcing he was reviewing all royalties, Stelmach knew he would soon face push back 
from the oil industry. As such, he surrounded himself with allies including Rick George, Kim 
Carter, and Harley Hotchkiss, all respected civil servants. 
The Panel was instructed to deliver the report on August 31, 2007. As for the process, it would 
be centred on public consultations and submissions. Both the Stelmach government and the Panel 
prioritized transparency by creating a space for all Albertans to express their opinion. Over the 
course of the review, the Panel traveled throughout the province in Grande Prairie, Edmonton, 
Calgary, Fort McMurray, and Medicine Hat, and organized open consultations; all transcripts 
from the consultations would be published online, along with submissions to the Panel (Urquhart, 
2018). Citizens, industry, environmental groups, Indigenous people, and others were invited to 
present their opinions. Similarly, they were invited to submit their thoughts in written form. 
Speaking to industry’s resources to hire consultants, researchers, and writers to produce high 
quality submissions, a Panel member recalls the sophistication of industry’s submissions. In the 
Panel member’s words, “We got more human beings saying ‘raise it’ [royalty] but we got more 
material and sophistication saying ‘don’t you dare touch it’” (Interviewee 12). The Panel read 
hundreds of submissions and together with data extracted from the public consultations, they 
formed a basis to survey Albertans’ perceptions of a “fair royalty.”   
Not surprisingly, the Panel grappled with the concept of “fair share.” Most agreed that in the 
context of the royalty debates, it meant that Albertans were not getting enough revenues from oil 








comparison standpoint, by looking at other jurisdictions and assessing how Alberta ranked in 
comparison. The Panel concluded Alberta could collect more revenues.  
In addition to the concept of “fairness,” the Panel also faced difficulties in accessing quality data. 
While government implemented a process through which all departments collaborated with the 
Panel, the Panel complained it had issues receiving information from the Department of Energy: 
“Many straightforward questions put to the Department of Energy by the Panel were not met 
with answers” (2007 Panel Report, p. 94). However, the issue may not have been Alberta 
Energy’s unwillingness to share data, but rather, its lack of capacity: the Department was caught 
“flat-footed” by enquiries (p. 95).  
In the same vein, the Panel faced difficulties with industry actors who were not as collaborative 
as government. Like government, Panel members had limited access to high quality information 
from industry (Hunter, 2007; Yager, 2008). The 2007 Panel report asked the government to 
“implement means to gather and assess the workings of all aspects of revenue policy and 
collection associated with energy resources in the province. This must be done on behalf of the 
citizens of Alberta, and its findings must be made public and have the highest degree of 
credibility” (Hunter, 2007, p. 5, 93, 96–100). This echoed with a report by Alberta’s Auditor 
General the same year who indicated:  
None of the presentations or documents flowing from [the Department of Energy’s internal 
reviews of royalties] have gone to the public except through [freedom of information] requests. 
Nor can owners determine how the Department analyzes its royalty regimes. The Department 
does not disclose its approach to or results from analyzing its royalty regimes. The principles 
of transparency and accountability dictate that the Department should demonstrate its 
stewardship of Alberta’s royalty regimes and provide analysis to support that statement. This 
has not happened (Annual Report of the Auditor General of Alberta: 2006-2007, 2007, p. 127, 
cited in Boychuk, 2010).  
During the 2007 royalty review, a Panel member disappointed with the information provided by 
government, recalls asking industry for data and being led to a warehouse full of boxes from 
floor to ceiling and told “have at her” (Interviewee 12). According to this Panel member, the 
extreme surplus of information was “a cover up” (Interviewee 12), a way to prevent Panel 
members from doing the required analysis. The Panel member added: “in some settings, that 
would be criminal, it would be verging on not honouring your fiduciary duties to your 
shareholders, or in this case, citizens” (Interviewee 12). This reflects industry’s consistent 
unwillingness to be transparent and its ability to overwhelm public servants with large amounts 
of information. The lack of data accessibility made it difficult for the Panel to defend its ideas. 
In the aftermath of the Panel report’s publication, some critics argued recommendations were 








As for the data provided, the Panel ironically faced both issues of disinformation and information 
overload. While public consultations provided the Panel with primary, empirical data, managing 
and sorting information proved difficult: ideas, opinions, narratives, personal and common 
interests all blended together. The Panel was not equipped to investigate every single claim, yet 
it had to extract accurate information, detangling and analyzing all submissions.  
The Panel’s task was arduous due to the complexity of the subject at hand. The complex nature 
of royalties in Alberta reflect the various types of resources in the province and royalty policy is 
seldom accessible to the average citizen, making it difficult to evaluate future policy needs. With 
two academic members on board, the Panel was cognisant of upholding academic principles of 
doing research exactly as mandated, rather than providing policy advice that anticipated 
industry’s response to increase royalties and adjusting recommendations accordingly. The focus 
was to “do the best report we can, be proud of it, and hand it off” (Interviewee 12). With a few 
months delay due to solving final disagreements and after in-depth deliberation, the royalty 
review Panel handed its report to Alberta’s Finance department on September 18, 2007. Then, in 
the words of a Panel member, “it basically caused a shit storm” (Interviewee 3). 
4.5. Panel Report Reception in Alberta 
Various interest groups greeted the long-awaited royalty review Panel Report differently: 
industry was displeased, the public relatively appeased, and government exposed. 
The report caught industry off guard. A Panel member confirmed that industry anticipated only 
minor recommendations to the existing royalty framework and recalled that the relative absence 
of industry involvement in the process stemmed from “pure brute force arrogance and self-
confidence that the royalty rate had never been publicly reviewed before in the province” 
(Interviewee 12). As a powerful interest-group, industry might not have felt it necessary to get 
involved, trusting that its wishes were known by a government that relied on the oil sector. 
Indeed, then CAPP Vice-President Greg Stringham mentioned he saw the review as “a good 
opportunity to talk about how the royalty system works to the public” (cited in Fekete and 
D’Aliesio, 2006) and then CAPP President Pierre Alvarez told Panel members that he saw “great 
value in getting all the current information out to Albertans” (Alberta Royalty Review Panel 
Meeting Transcripts, 2007, p. 9 cited in Urquhart, 2018, p. 179). Clearly, industry entrusted the 
Panel to ‘educate’ Albertans in favour of keeping royalties low (Interviewee 7).  
Although industry was not involved during the review, it roused after the report came out 
(McQuaig, 2019). In the words of an Alberta-based researcher, “the oil industry went berserk” 
(Interviewee 14). This change is logical from a procedural perspective since the report was kept 








the sliding scale (i.e. adapting royalties to the price of oil), calling it “a little disproportionate” 
(Interviewee 7). On the other hand, others report that oil sands companies were not too concerned 
by the recommendations, as long as they could keep declaring their costs: the R-C formula 
ensured that their profits would still be significant. Overall, however, industry was disappointed 
with the recommendations (Calgary Herald, 2008) and later linked decrease in investment to the 
impact of the review (Yager, 2008; Thomson, 2008). 
In contrast, the report was generally well-received by the public. Many praised the openness of 
the review process and the fact that it drew on consultations with and submissions from the 
public, rather than cabinet deciding on royalties behind closed doors (Interviewee 8; Interviewee 
15). Involving the public to such an extent was a first in the province's royalty-reviews. Albertans 
had demanded a fair share of their resource, and the Panel had indeed proposed some increase in 
royalties. The report also delivered on providing recommendations to simplify and clarify 
royalties, making them more accessible to the average Albertan. These clarifications along with 
the recommended increase generally appeased the public. 
On the government side, Stelmach had decided early on that the Panel’s report would be released 
immediately after being handed to government: he wanted to ensure the utmost transparency in 
the process and give Albertans the chance to see the report in its original form. However, 
government was taken aback by the Panel recommendations. Individuals in government 
criticized the Panel for lack of regular update and expressed discontent with the 
Panel just “dropping” the report. Yet, for many, this confidentiality spoke to the 
Panel’s transparent process: it ensured no-to-minimal interference from government by 
decreasing opportunities to interact and prioritizing an objective report that drew exclusively on 
members’ expertise, research, and public consultations (Interviewee 15).  
The government was also confounded by the report’s suggestion that members of the civil service 
may have been captured by industry (Hunter, 2007). Certain civil servants were indeed under 
pressure during Panel deliberations, but this statement reportedly made many civil servants feel 
as though the Panel was being “sensational,” ignoring the pressure they were subjected to, and 
creating cleavages between trustees and owners. Nevertheless, interviews reveal that “a tradition” 
of revolving doors did exist between government (both elected officials and civil servants) and 
the oil industry. As history shows, this practice was not new for the civil service: in the many 
decades since oil was discovered in Alberta, some civil servants had started up their own oil 
companies (Taft, 2017). 
In spite of certain civil servants joining forces with the oil industry and/or serving its interests, 
many others still served Albertans. Unfortunately, opposing the oil industry to serve Albertans 








recalls, when trying to point out that pro-industry statements made no economic sense, the 
Deputy repeatedly said “I don’t get what you are saying”; in the interviewee’s words, “I 
remember (…) thinking ‘he [the Deputy] does not get it because he knows he cannot get it, he is 
not allowed to get it” (Interviewee 10). This situation led to intrinsic tensions and difficulties 
within the civil service and government officials. In addition, the interviewee recalls seeing 
accusations of incompetence and letters to the Premier from industry (Interviewee 10). There 
were clearly strong ties to the oil industry at the highest level of governance. However, it 
remained government’s right—and some would argue, its duty towards Albertans—to do a 
review. Dedicated civil servants admitted during interviews that since the government was 
elected by the people, the civil service’s prerogative was to support government and trust it, come 
what may (except in exceptional circumstances) (Interviewee 10). 
Anti-royalty-increase critics also deplored the Panel’s attempt at comparing Alberta’s resources 
to those of other jurisdictions (Yager, 2008), based on the work of scholars who differentiated 
Alberta’s resources with conventional oil and called Canada an “outlier” (Reynolds, 2005, 64). 
These critics repetitively insisted that different types of oil around the world could not be 
compared to Alberta’s unique circumstances, especially when arguing that Alberta’s royalties 
were lower than others’ (cited in Interviewee 12). In particular, industry representatives called 
comparisons with Norway and Venezuela “superficial” given their “obvious and inherent 
differences” (MacNichol, 2007). But Panel members were not duped; as one member responded, 
Alberta’s oil sands and other global oil resources “might be apples and oranges, but they are all 
fruits” (Interviewee 3). In other words, the “uniqueness” of Alberta’s resources did not preclude 
it from being compared to those of other jurisdictions. 
As for the Panel, it was disbanded immediately upon handing in its report. The Secretariat was 
dissolved, and in the words of a Panel member, it kept its head low as its “political masters were 
under siege” (Interviewee 12). Upon disbanding, some Panel members felt “abandoned” 
(Interviewee 10, 11, 12)—similar to civil servants highlighted above—because Panel members 
were given no chance to respond to criticisms. As an institution appointed by government, the 
Panel had no power beyond the boundaries set by said government. It had to follow procedures 
throughout the review process, yet lacked the opportunity to defend its work upon completion. 
Critics also turned on government, who, ironically, turned to the (disbanded) Panel for help. A 
Panel member recalls the panic that swept through government, which started transferring all 
incoming royalty review-related calls to the member’s personal cellphone. The Panel member 
then generously decided to explain to each and every caller the rationale behind the 
recommendations. Inside the Panel, the Panel’s President—and former President of the Alberta 
Chamber of Resources, the same people who spearheaded the infamous National Task Force on 








(Interviewee 4). Unfortunately, his response backfired. Looking back, a Panel member disclosed 
that the 2007 report could have withstood the test of time if only the Panel had been allowed to 
defend and explain it. 
On October 25, 2007, in response to the Panel’s report, the Stelmach government issued its policy 
on royalties in a report titled “The New Alberta Royalty Framework.” Unfortunately, just as the 
framework came out, global oil prices collapsed during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This 
unprecedented economic crisis greatly affected Alberta and precipitated a recession. In the same 
way that global oil prices had opened a window of opportunity for Albertans to get their “fair 
share” from royalties, they put a stop to Alberta’s continuing expansion, evidence of the 
international political economy at play in a subnational jurisdiction that traded a global 
commodity. By an unfortunate twist of fate, Stelmach was blamed: he had “killed the goose that 
laid the golden eggs.” 
The timing of the review and new policy—or that of the financial crisis—could not have been 
worse. The crisis that threatened many Albertans’ financial security and plunged them into 
despair provided fertile ground for the oil industry to foment public outrage against the increased 
royalties. Industry blamed the Panel and Stelmach for the catastrophic state of Alberta’s 
economy. In truth, industry had taken a hit because of a global financial crisis and crumbling oil 
prices, both of which were entirely outside of Stelmach’s control. Moreover, royalties set 
domestically obviously do not impact global oil prices. Stelmach also tried to explain that oil 
price sensitivity was built into the model, thus accounting for the fluctuation of the oil market, 
but to no avail. In the eyes of industry—and Albertans—he was responsible for Alberta’s fall.   
The Panel recommendations were more progressive than Stelmach’s new framework (Anielski, 
2015). The government considered the Panel’s recommendations more as input and less as 
recommendations. Stelmach caved in part to proponents of the status quo in royalty policy due 
to a variety of institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors that will be examined in depth 
in below. 
4.6. Pro-Development Ideas: Free Markets, Pioneer/Frontier Identity, and Ethical Oil 
4.6.1. Albertans’ Historical Belief in Free Markets & Pioneer/Frontier Identity 
In a healthy democracy, voting is a central mechanism that ensures collectivities of people can 
make decisions and express opinions. In the Alberta context, the end of Ralph Klein, the call for 
a royalty review, and the election of Ed Stelmach were all expressions of Albertans desire to 
regain control and maximize the benefits from their resources. And while the means to achieving 








Stelmach and the review—the spirit behind their decisions was the same: it was a desire rooted 
in neoliberal thought and trust in free markets that advocated for an increased share of the 
resource pie, not for industry this time, but for citizens.  
Due to its political history and identity (Bercuson, 1980; Palmer, 1982), Alberta proved a fertile 
ground for citizen-level narratives such as a strong belief in free markets that advocated 
“government should get out of the business of being in business” (quoted in Young, 2013) and 
“the market knows best” ideas. For many Albertans, the market knows best how to adapt, and 
more importantly, how to regulate itself. In Alberta, free market ideology has deep roots in the 
history of European colonization of North America. The first European pioneers13—settlers—to 
reach modern day Alberta were those who had not only crossed the Atlantic in search of a better 
future, but had also pushed further inland, looking for gold, land, fame, or social status (Takach, 
2010). They were often “not Canadian”: rather they were from Europe and the United States 
(Bercuson, 1982). They are remembered as being, in the absence of any form of government or 
governance structure, self-reliant and often self-governing, taking, controlling, ruling, and 
defending “their” “new” land with a desperation that matched their determination (Takach, 
2010), ultimately leading to contemporary forms of white settler colonialism embedded in oil 
extraction (Preston, 2013). These cultural conceptions have persisted today in modern Alberta, 
where they happily merged with neoliberal market principles of “markets rule all” and “minimum 
government involvement” to create a distinct political culture in the Prairies (Richards and Pratt, 
1979). 
Indeed, many inhabitants of Alberta and Saskatchewan seem to place their trust in free markets 
rather than governments for historical reasons (Richards and Pratt, 1979). Interestingly, some 
have argued that this distrust of government might be rooted in the demographical bed of the 
region (Takach, 2010). The influx of large Ukrainian immigrants who fled their government to 
settle in Alberta and Saskatchewan may have played a role in the flourishing of government 
mistrust. From the newly arrived population came a desire to start anew, including the belief in 
private enterprise as a way to become successfully self-reliant. In the words of a former civil 
servant, this is an “ideological fundamental bedrock, a belief that the market is the best way to 
allocate resources” (Interviewee 11). From there, it is not difficult to imagine why there might 
be government distrust, namely that the spirit of entrepreneurship and maverick has clashed 
repetitively with Canadian financial institutions. In the minds of many Albertans, the 
                                                 
13 This term is used to refer to the “pioneer identity,” a romanticized concept that glorifies the hardships of poor 
whites who left Europe in search of a better future. It is used here cautiously because I do not adhere to the term’s 








entrepreneurial spirit makes one take risks, but reaps the rewards—for Albertan entrepreneur and 
companies alike.    
Combined with Albertans’ pioneer/frontier identity and free market beliefs, the Klein era had 
encouraged the motto “to get government out of the business of being in business” (quoted in 
Young, 2013). Coming from the former Premier of the province himself, this demonstrates how 
the desire to let business run its course is deeply rooted in the province, even at the highest level 
of governance. By emphasizing “economic opportunity, individual determination and dominance 
over the landscape,” oil supporters echoed “ideals housed in the oil industry” (Stevens and 
McCurdy, 2019, p. 13). Pioneer identity and belief in free market created a conducive 
environment for industry to take its rightful place as a provider for people and enabler of social 
ladder climbers to achieve economic success.  
Together with pioneer/frontier identity, many Albertans’ cultural ethos is very much oriented 
towards self-reliance; Albertans pride themselves in differentiating themselves from other 
provinces. As mentioned previously, a former civil servant indicated “We don’t have a sales tax. 
We don’t need it, we are Albertans” (Interviewee 4) as a common motto in Alberta. Albertans, 
who are often compared to Americans, sometimes see the government “as the enemy, 
incompetent, and it gets in the way…” (Interviewee 4). Albertans’ political culture has an impact 
on royalties because it pre-determines who has the legitimacy of changing the royalty framework 
and who does not. For many Albertans, their beliefs in free markets and pioneer/frontier identity 
explains their reluctance for government to review royalties without approval from the oil 
industry.  
4.6.2. The Question of Ethical Oil 
Similar to some Albertans’s beliefs in free markets and pioneer/frontier identity, the ethical oil 
narrative encourages more oil development, an argument often associated with the oil industry. 
In fact, it is this set of beliefs that made it possible for the oil industry to construct the ethical oil 
narrative with direct policy implications: in Stevens and McCurdy’s words, “the ethical oil 
storyline is crucial to protecting and justifying Canada’s petrostate” (2019, p. 19). Some 
Albertans thus connected with their southern neighbour over more than celebrating anti-
government sentiment: with increased global competition, the Canadian oil industry would need 
to keep its large but unconventional reserves competitive beyond Canadian borders (Szeman, 
2013). To do so, it needed to convince its largest buyer, the U.S., to favour Canadian oil.  
The “ethical oil” argument is the idea that Canadian oil is more ethical than other oil in the world 
(e.g. Middle Eastern oil) (Levant, 2010). This is based on the logic that Canadian oil is extracted 








jurisdictions that may be authoritarian in nature and using oil revenue to pursue their activity 
despite a poor human rights record and much worse environmental regulation and records. And 
industry took advantage of it, asserting the need, the duty, to extract Canadian oil for its ethical 
value.  
In 2007, industry’s plan was to strengthen and amplify oil flow from Alberta to the U.S., 
Canada’s largest buyer of oil. Because Alberta is landlocked, market access had always been an 
issue and going south made the most sense, although Alberta would be exclusively reliant on 
U.S.’ markets. The discourse of ethical oil was thus targeted at U.S.’ markets and consumers as 
an excellent way to have both security of supply and peace of mind (Interviewee 4). However, 
the notion of ethical oil raises uncomfortable truths. First, the complex nature of landownership 
and land claims in Alberta between the Crown and Indigenous peoples is anything but “ethical.” 
A number of Indigenous-led organizations criticized the oil sands in relation to land, including 
Tar Sands Watch, the Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN), and West Coast Environmental 
Law (WCEL).  Indeed, the belief that Canadian oil is more ethical because the Canadian state 
and the province of Alberta have authorized extraction despite non-consultation with Indigenous 
groups (and potential violation of Indigenous treaty law) does not qualify oil sands as ethical 
(IEN, 2021). In addition, the oil sands have one of the highest environmental footprint in the 
world, significantly higher than oil-producing Middle Eastern states that may be used in 
comparison. Thus, the oil sands are ethical neither from a political, nor from an environmental 
standpoint. While the ethical oil argument focuses on political stability and human rights 
records—the latter being controversial at best—it disregards the ethics of Indigenous people’s 
lands and the systematic destruction of Alberta’s ecosystems.  Finally, using “ethical oil” as an 
argument also has important consequences for the pace of development. For industry, if Canadian 
oil is more ethical, it needs to be taking a larger market share today, not tomorrow. 
Interestingly, interviews with industry reveal that it perceives Canada and Alberta as one of the 
most transparent jurisdictions in the world for releasing information on oil sands development—
part of an ethical superiority. They also highlighted that being transparent has made industry a 
target. In other words, releasing information, numbers and data on oil sands production had 
‘exposed’ industry’s high profits and therefore provoked a royalty review. This is a clear example 
of industry’s ability to position itself as a victim (more on this later): industry voluntarily chose 
to be transparent and was penalized for it.  
Fortunately for the Canadian oil industry, the U.S. needed little convincing. Canada is more stable 
and reliable than oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, and Indigenous and environmental concerns 
are often secondary to the two countries’ economic interests. Still, it remained that the challenges 
in Canada were around the intensity and high costs of extraction and the transportation of the 








aggressive R&D funding placed Alberta’s oil sands, and by definition, Canada’s resources onto 
the world stage. And who better to produce high quality research than universities? 
4.7. Captured Institutions: Universities, the Media, and the Issue of Oil Sands Costs 
These ideas and interests operate within a public institution framework, which similar to rural 
communities, had to be captured for industry interests to materialize. As central spaces of 
education and information, universities and the media could support oil corporations from the 
development of oil sands technology to providing a platform through which corporations could 
spread their anti-royalty increase ideas.  
4.7.1. Universities 
As spaces of research and innovation in a province where the oil sector relies on constant 
technological innovation, universities provided prime ground for scholars and students to 
innovate and solve issues faced by industry for industry. Similar to rural communities’ 
dependency on the oil industry for jobs, universities began to rely on the oil industry for funding. 
With large scale, multi-year, and often inter-university research projects, Alberta’s universities 
needed only funding to put brilliant minds to work—and industry had money. With their funding 
dependent on the well-being of the oil industry, many academics and researchers became 
advocates for industry, and thus, advocates of the status quo for royalties.  
As the largest university of the province—and ranked in Maclean’s 2020 top five universities 
(Brown, 2019)—the University of Alberta boasts a national and international reputation. 
Unsurprisingly, its Faculty of Engineering has a robust engineering department famous 
worldwide for its specialization in oil sands extraction. The Faculty’s hosts the Institute for Oil 
Sands Innovation (IOSI), a $50 million, multidisciplinary research centre focused on developing 
the oil sands. Three hours south of Edmonton, the School of Public Policy at the University of 
Calgary, “Canada’s leading policy school,” has half of its research agenda connected directly or 
indirectly to the oil sands, including The Energy and Environmental Policy Stream and the Fiscal 
and Economic Policy Stream. Substreams include the “Canadian Network for Energy Policy 
Research and Analysis” funded by the Energy Council of Canada and the “Energy for Life” 
initiative. The School also offers an “Extractive Resource Governance Program” (ERGP) whose 
goal is to “educate international officials who are developing resource sectors” (University of 
Calgary). These ground breaking research centers and institutes function as the oil industry’s 
arm-length R&D department.  
For the oil sands, technological innovations drove a nascent industry to international fame and 








selective and limited geographically. Then, industry switched to truck and shovel, a technique 
more selective, covered wider distances, and ensured consistent oil body quality. Next, it went 
to hydro-transport, which shipped further, was less costly, and sped up the extraction process 
because dilbit was already mixed with some water. Finally, in-situ and steam-assisted gravity 
drainage (SAGD) methods became possible as reserves were easily identified and measurable. 
As mentioned by an Alberta-based researcher, “Much of the research that allowed the tar sands 
to become profitable was developed at the University of Alberta, with public funding and 
support” (Interviewee, 5). These technological innovations were born in university laboratories.  
All things considered, it is understandable that publicly funded research at post-secondary 
institutions could benefit industry. Indeed, public funding channeled through Alberta’s 
universities led finding solutions to real problems faced by an industry who is the backbone of 
Alberta’s financial health. However, how can one envision an alternative to economic 
dependency if all funds are allocated to research that perpetrate it? Funding for academic, non-
partisan research can be problematic if a higher percentage of those funds than average is re-
directed to fund industry’s needs, if there a direct interference from industry into the university 
(“setting” of the research agenda by industry), and/or if research topics that propose alternatives 
to the oil economy are not being funded.  
In addition to direct research funding, there are subtle ways through which industry participates 
in the academic realm: university-industry research partnerships, including Industrial Research 
Chairs (IRCs) (e.g. Goldcorp Chair) or even donations to universities. In recent years, a few 
dominant examples come to mind, including the Deans of Business and Engineering at the 
University of Alberta who prevented David Suzuki’s address upon him receiving an honorary 
degree from the University; or a province over in Saskatchewan, Dr. Emily Eaton’s lawsuit 
against the University of Regina, which refused to disclose funding donors and project 
assignment despite Eaton’s repeated requests to examining if and how the oil industry was 
involved in public education and research funding (CBC News, 2019). 
By funding academic research, industry ensured it would maintain grassroots support in the 
province’s universities. In other words, researchers’ dependency on private funds secured 
industry’s agenda on royalties. 
4.7.2. The Media 
As a central space of public information, the media plays an important role in informing, but also 
shaping, public discourse. As McCurdy points out, “media (…) function as key arenas, resources 
and sites of information in the ongoing battle for the public’s imagination” (2017, p. 132; 








with competing ideas and resources actively engage in symbolic contests” (Gamson & Wolfsfled, 
1993, cited in McCurdy, 2018, p.35). In the case of royalties, there was a strong polarization on 
the future of royalties in Alberta, which turned the media into a “site of struggle” (McCurdy, 
2018, p. 34): mainstream mass media—often supported by corporate oil actors—advocated 
mainly for the status quo or a small royalty increase, whereas alternative media supported 
significant royalty increase.  
In particular, a most concerning trend emerged in Alberta’s media world: the centralization of 
media ownership structures. At the time of the 2007 review, two of Alberta’s most influential 
newspapers, the Calgary Herald and the Edmonton Journal were both owned by the same media 
conglomerate, Canwest Global Communications, now known as the Postmedia Network 
(Gunster and Saurette, 2014; Stevens and McCurdy, 2019). The centralization of ownership 
increased industry’s ability to spread narratives top-down, from the media to the public, because 
instead of capturing multiple media chains, it only needed to capture the head, Canwest Global 
Communications. This centralization of media ownership structure decreased the media’s ability 
to resist industry influence and provide nuanced accounts of royalty affairs by limiting 
opportunities to disagree with industry narratives.  
Another significant aspect of industry influence in the media is the one exerted from the bottom-
up, through the media, instead of by the media (though both are mutually reinforcing). In many 
cases, citizens employed in the oil sector were encouraged by industry to use the media to 
influence the public. The royalties were such a polarizing issue that letters to the editors from oil 
employees criticizing government abounded in the media, creating the appearance of strong and 
widespread anti-government and/or anti-royalty raise sentiment.  
On the flip side, people who advocated for a royalty raise were not published, their submissions 
rejected, their voices silenced. As channels used to inform the public, the media could decide 
which story would run, whose opinion was worthy and whose was not. As one former civil 
servant recalls, when trying to publish some pieces, the newspapers media repetitively refused 
because of previously published pieces in favour of increasing royalties. In the interviewee’s 
words, “they had heard from me and didn’t want to hear anymore” (Interviewee 10). Worse, the 
few pieces successfully published triggered a backlash: for example, the interviewee received 
comments stating he should be “deported” (Interviewee 10). While backlash is not unheard of 
for opinion pieces, the fierce opposition he faced speaks to the presence of strong pro-industry 
groups in the province. In a restrictive environment owned by one conglomerate in a province 
with a dominant industry, there is a real risk in diverging from the dominant narrative.  
The media thus have power in choosing which stories get coverage—or not (e.g. pro-royalty 








media world, headlines and newspapers articles sometimes compromise on nuances to attract the 
public’s attention and sell news. In the words of an Edmonton Journal journalist, “we try to make 
things more interesting” (Interviewee 8). The oil-drilling auctions—a frequent, business-as-usual 
practice—illustrate accurately industry’s collusion with the media in determining which story is 
covered and how, compromising nuances to sell news. Companies depicted these auctions in the 
media as proof that industry was struggling. Companies would sell large, impressive rig 
machines, invite the media, and roll the cameras for maximum visual effects (Interviewee 8). In 
the same vein, the media would reinforce these graphic events by presenting a narrative whereby 
industry was suffering so much that it was selling all its equipment. Their goal was to play on 
citizens’ perceptions to portray a struggling, fragile industry, barely afloat, ultimately incapable 
of surviving a royalty increase.  
While companies marketed powerful images in the media to reach the public’s emotion, the 
media took advantage of companies to sell news. However, the media can attract attention and 
present nuance through other mechanisms than simplified headlines and graphic drill auctions. 
The media can create a space for dialogue by exposing frictions, debating issues, and presenting 
opposing opinions to inform the public. These strategies can be an excellent way to attract the 
attention of the readership while presenting both sides of a story (e.g. pro- versus anti-royalty 
raise). Thus, while a concentrated ownership structure impacts the direction of a journal, it cannot 
completely suffocate all opposing voices. Certain journalists retained their integrity by steering 
away from controversial topics or exposing safer parts of the story.  
Nevertheless, due to the media’s concentrated ownership structure deciding the direction of a 
newspaper, divergent opinions were often silenced, strongly discouraged, and often attacked. 
Examples abound of pro-oil opinion pieces in the Edmonton Journal and the Calgary Herald. 
The overwhelming quantity of pro-industry pieces may have played a role in capturing swing 
citizens (i.e. citizens who did not clearly stand for or against a royalty increase) and reinforcing 
the mentality of pro-industry individuals as they gained strength from their group membership 
and symbols (Callahan, 2012). This gave the impression that the majority of Albertans were in 
favour of low royalties. 
4.7.3. The Issue of Oil Sands Costs 
Is investment in the oil sands as fragile as industry portrays it? The main argument in favour of 
protecting the oil sands revolved around the prohibitive costs of extraction. In Alberta, costs are 
important for a myriad of reasons, other than the obvious necessity of determining a project’s 








oil sands are so expensive to refine that increasing royalties would destroy this fragile and nascent 
industry.  
But digging deeper, one may ask: What is meant by “oil sands are expensive”? Why are costs 
central to royalty calculations? As an unconventional resource, oil sands cost more to extract than 
any other hydrocarbons in Alberta. From the complex nature of bituminous sand to the monstrous 
scale of equipment and material required, the longevity of projects over multiple decades, and 
the extensive extraction and refining process, oil sands are an expensive enterprise. Thus, it is 
not surprising that there are many arguments against a royalty increase for it would not be fair to 
collect increased royalties from an industry that incurs such high costs. “Fairness” was turned in 
corporations’ favour.   
In addition to claiming that oil sands are expensive, corporations often highlighted that oil sands 
are a financially risky enterprise. The remote location of points of extraction, the use of expensive 
technology, and the increasing costs of refining all participated in creating an image of oil sands 
as high risks, high rewards projects. However, when looking at the numbers, the profit per dollar 
of risk investment in the oil sands is very high. Oil sands reserves are well-known, well-
established, well-mapped, and the risk of spills—while being high due to dilbit’s corrosive 
nature—is controlled and more manageable than in conventional oil extraction.  
The oil sands operated under the R-C system, which more than compensated the associated risks 
of extraction. As mentioned previously, in this system, costs are central to R-C because under 
this model, companies first deduct allowable costs from their revenues, and then are charged a 
royalty on the remaining amount. As such, the higher the value of costs, the smaller the amount 
on which royalties are collected—and therefore, the smaller the royalty payment.  
However, there are two main issues associated with the R-C system: first, there is no clear 
definition of eligible allowable costs; second, government lacks the administrative capacity to 
monitor companies. According to provincial guidelines, eligible allowable costs for royalty 
deductions include various costs such as fundamental costs (e.g. to recover, obtain, process or 
transport oil sands and derived products) and discretionary costs, but exceptions and exemptions 
blur the costs companies declare.14 Companies can thus include various costs in the equation, 
effectively obtaining a credit on their spending. As R-C accounts for exploitation costs and 
includes them as deductible, allowable expenses, the higher cost of exploiting oil sands is actually 
absorbed by government.  
                                                 
14 For more details, see Alberta Regulation 231/2008 in the Mines and Minerals Act, Province of Alberta. The 








Secondly, government lacks the administrative capacity to monitor companies. R-C only applies 
to oil sands projects (and not to other types of oil). During the review process, when industry 
complained higher royalties would negatively impact it, it was actually referring to conventional 
oil, not the oil sands. Some Panel members wanted to see R-C applied consistently to all oil types 
to streamline the system; others argued that it would be difficult to implement for regular wells, 
due to their sheer number. In the same vein, the Panel looked at a legal way to count barrels and 
therefore calculate royalties transparently without depending on companies’ data; but that legal 
loophole was quickly shut down and the standardization of R-C across all oil types had to be 
abandoned. In other words, the benefits of applying R-C to all resources to ensure maximum 
royalty revenues were traded off against the administrative and monitoring costs associated with 
it. 
In the words of an Alberta-based researcher, “oil sands are actually free” (Interviewee 2) as 
royalties were only charged once a company had recovered its capital investment (the post-
payout factor). Given R-C, the post-payout factor, and the fluidity of what qualified as allowable 
costs, companies had at least three ways to save before paying royalties to government: “they 
were not only getting their capital back, but a return on capital too” (Interviewee 12). The R-C 
system made sense as an incentive at first, since the sector was just beginning and needed huge 
investment. It was an excellent temporary tool to provide attractive investment incentives into a 
new sector, but in the height of the oil sands boom in 2007, it should have been replaced—or at 
least, seconded with a clear definition of allowable costs. This would have helped boost 
efficiency and prevent miscalculations against the system—and Albertans. The oil sands had 
already been thriving for decades, and while there was still room for research and innovation, 
new technologies only helped improve a system already well-oiled. In addition, the federal 
government  “sweetened the deal with a tax break allowing oil sands companies to write off 
100% of their capital investments in the form of an accelerated capital cost allowance (ACCA) 
– this is four times higher than the 25% writeoff allowed for conventional oil and gas projects” 
(Pembina, n.d.). Oil sands cost producers nothing.  
Nevertheless, during and following the 2007 review, and despite the advantageous terms 
highlighted above, industry made multiple cost-related demands, especially that the few 
remaining restrictions on allowable costs be removed. Industry argued the costs of proactively 
establishing a consortium to share information and funding and maximize efficiency should be 
eligible as a deduction in R-C. It defended that working in consortium was entirely “voluntary” 
and served the greater good by having industry players join forces and learn from one another. 
The “greater good” here, meant companies’ interests, given that the consortium’s chief objective 
would be to allow new, more efficient technologies to decrease costs and maximize profits. In 








At the time, there were concerns at Alberta Energy that companies used the flexible definition of 
allowable costs to inflate their costs and decrease the amount on which royalties were collected 
(Interviewee 3). Despite being responsible for monitoring and ensuring companies act by the 
book, Alberta Energy was plagued with a classic issue: the asymmetrical information between a 
regulatory body (e.g. Alberta Energy) and the regulated body (e.g. companies). Indeed, while 
revenues are easy to measure, costs are not. Companies know their costs for obvious reasons; but 
civil servants do not. In a capitalist neo-liberalist economy, multiple factors can affect a 
company’s costs (e.g. transfer pricing) and remain ‘buried’ under massive amounts of data. 
Companies are gatekeepers of information while civil servants are expected to manage and 
control an industry of whom they know little. This contrasts sharply with industry stating that it 
is one of the most transparent jurisdictions in the world (Interviewee 7).  
Due to a lack of resources and personnel, the government was effectively unable to verify costs 
declared, leaving industry to auto-regulate. Industry was aware government was under-funded 
and could not enforce its own legislation, let alone police and audit as appropriate. The main 
challenge thus remained administrative: the government could neither use numbers (instead of a 
ratio), nor could it absorb all R-C calculations for individual wells (there are thousands of them). 
Prohibitive administrative costs prevented better monitoring. 
Still, in 2007, the New Alberta Royalty Framework changed the costs calculations slightly. There 
was also a consideration that the ‘C’ in the R-C system would potentially become a carbon tax 
deducted from R-C formula, but there was no final agreement in the matter. The Panel did 
however introduce price sensitivity in their recommendations, even though it was a proxy for 
profitability, similarly to other sensitivities (e.g. productivity sensitivity, vintage sensitivity, and 
so forth). The Panel also operated under the assumption that pipelines were going to be built.  
Following the announcement that royalties would be increased for companies who lowered their 
costs (since they made more money in an R-C system15), the media headline was that the 
government was taking more money overall. Industry panicked and Panel members were name-
called, harassed, and threatened. There was thus more impetus to remain below standard than to 
abide by the highest standard (e.g. carbon tax). This was particularly distressing since while it 
may have negative consequences for Alberta, repercussions could be felt across the entire 
country: if the federal government were to implement a carbon tax, they might just look at the 
Alberta model—an opaque system—and potentially copy it, building more opacity across the 
board.  
                                                 
15 Example at 10% royalty rate: $1000 (R) – 300 (C) = $700. Royalty = $70 & Company profit = $630 
Example at 20% royalty rate: $1000 (R) – 100 (C) = $900. Royalty = $180 & Company profit = $720. It is thus 








4.8. The Influence of Industry’s Interests: Strategies & Power 
As principal actors—interests with strong economic power—and unlike other interest groups in 
Alberta—be it civil society, ENGOs, government, or Indigenous people—industry has large 
resources to ensure that its agenda prevails. Given its substantial resources and entrenched stakes 
in the oil sands, industry took measures and adopted various strategies to ensure its interest would 
be protected. Generally, it exercised instrumental power through astro-turfing, verbal threats and 
lobbying, and discursive power through framing, including associating industry’s fate with 
Albertans, threats to leave, and a case study on industry’s dual discourse of expert vs. victim. 
Finally, it illuminates an inter-interest influence, namely, the influence of the oil industry on rural 
communities (instrumental power).   
4.8.1. Astro-Turfing, Verbal Threats, and Lobbying 
Industry first made use of astro-turfing to rally public support to its cause. Astro-turfing is a 
practice through which companies attempt to imitate a grassroots campaign by initiating a 
protest—unlike genuine grassroots campaigns whereby people self-organize. In 2007, PR giant 
Hill and Knowlton launched an Astroturf group called GetItRightAlberta.ca who advertised itself 
as a coalition of “concerned Albertans, including private citizens, small oil and gas companies 
and members of the investment community”  to feign grassroots public support for keeping 
royalties from increasing (Littlemore, 2007). Dave Cournoyer, award-winning writer and 
podcaster, investigated and denounced the astroturfing group as a fraud (Cournoyer, 2007). 
Second, some Panel members reported an aggressive response from industry after the release of 
the report. A Panel member revealed being cornered in an elevator by an angry oil sands 
executive. Another recounted being demeaned for being part of the Panel and asked to leave an 
event by a frustrated executive. On the other hand, another recalls that when industry wanted to 
connect with the Panel, it was mostly done through the “financial people around them, their 
surrogates” (Interviewee 12). 
To government, industry exerted its influence through political party donations and the usual 
lobbyism to elected officials. The Polaris Institute published a report about oil corporations 
visiting cabinet ministers fifty-three times, versus a one-time visit by an environmental 
organization (Cayley-Daoust, 2012). In the words of an interviewee, “If ExxonMobil’s Rex 
Tillerson had showed up here, some of the public may have thought ‘that’s too much.’ But the 
private jet and the limos beat a path to the backdoor of the Legislature” (Interviewee 12). 
In addition, industry capitalized on its organizational strength. Alberta has various associations, 








Producers (CAPP) comprised primarily of large producers. Other active groups include Canada’s 
Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA) and the Oil Sands Community Alliance (OSCA), 
formerly known as the Oil Sands Developers Group (OSDG). These actors and their respective 
interests, organized into coalitions, pulled resources together and presented a united front to 1) 
ensure their voice is heard; 2) share resources and information with each other; 3) present a 
common front, giving them both credibility (amongst civil society, for example) and influence 
(when they lobby) (Interviewee 7). Industry associations, both large and small, came together 
and submitted a list of consensus items they had agreed to, making certain demands to the 
government and requiring attention to their concerns. Industry groups were organized and well-
prepared; they unified around common concerns, shared by large and small producers.  
Industry presented a homogenous picture of its interests by ignoring the differences amongst its 
members to focus on its common goal: preventing a royalty increase. The oil sector is a 
heterogeneous group with various—and sometimes opposite—interests (Stoddart et al., 202016). 
There are key differences, for example, between large and small producers. The former has both 
domestic and international players, while the latter is mostly comprised of domestic players.  
Major, larger companies are usually not so opportunistic and more consistent in their ideology; 
they are more risk-averse and focus on large scale, long-term projects. They are usually involved 
in multiple jurisdictions around the world, which provides them with an exit route if domestic 
circumstances worsen. Small producers, on the other hand, are usually small enterprises who are 
much more vocal, confrontational, and are willing to take more drastic actions to ensure their 
voice is heard and their interests respected. Usually located in more rural parts of the province, 
their well-being is tied with the oil sector’s, which explains why they are adamant to protect it. 
Occupying a strong place in Alberta’s public space, their position is highly volatile and fragile.   
As expected, the difference in size and scale between large and small producers also affect these 
players’ interests. The disparity of opinions within industry was known by high level officials in 
government. A high-level government official mentioned that CAPP could never come to an 
agreement because the big producers had different interests than the small producers (Interviewee 
15).  
Still, due to prohibitive costs and scale, oil sands are certainly a major producer’s affair. This 
begs the question: why look at small producers? Small producers are particularly important to 
the royalty story because they were used by major producers to support certain narratives. Major 
producers are usually very efficient with their costs and enterprises; they are part of a well-oiled 
machine that has successfully rode the waves of global price fluctuations for multiple decades, 
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sometimes half a century. Small producers, on the other hand, are more vulnerable and exposed 
than their distant cousins. More importantly, they often run with higher costs than major players, 
and employ people throughout the province. When oil prices fall, they hurt immediately.  
This divergence of interests between small and major producers afforded the latter with the 
ultimate advantage: by presenting a united front, they could associate themselves with the 
hardships and predicaments of small producers, all the while benefiting from their large-scale 
operations. When small producers are interviewed because they have to lay off half their staff, 
many of whom are paying their mortgage or raising families, it touches Albertans more than a 
larger enterprise who suffers losses in their third quarter. Whether they need to borrow money 
from the government (racking up their debt), sell equipment in graphic auctions (which are in 
reality quite common), or worse, close shop (especially when they represent a major source of 
employment in remote rural areas of Alberta), argue against bailing them out in the form of 
reduced royalties is difficult. Large industry players successfully tied their fate to that of 
hardworking, small producing Albertan companies. 
4.8.2. Framing 
As companies report to their shareholders, and not to Albertans, they have more reason to protect 
their shareholders by pushing back against attempts at increasing royalties than to defend 
Albertans’ interests. Indeed, the relationship between Albertans and the oil industry is not one of 
equal parties. As one long-time representative of a leading independent research institute 
summarized: “There is really a constant drum-beat of the industry as benefactor, or that we are 
at the industry’s bosom and we should be grateful” (Interviewee 12). Alberta’s general 
dependency on the oil sector as felt by the public were translated, through industry’s strategic 
use of fear tactics and threats, into fears about royalties, which were perceived as threatening the 
sector. Fear tactics were particularly successful in instilling and reinforcing the feeling that 
Albertans’ fate was directly tied to industry’s. Seeping fear into Albertans was simple: after 
having been conditioned for decades to be reliant on a sector that would provide jobs and money 
while feeding both their individual and collective pride, Albertans associated their fate with 
industry’s. A threat to one would be a threat to the other. Albertans’ loyalty to companies became 
a by-product of their dependency, pushing short-term gains such as jobs and economic activity 
to the forefront (Stevens and McCurdy, 2019). Still, although some Albertans fell for those 
narratives subconsciously, others knew they were “making a deal with the devil” (Interviewee 
6). 
A dominant narrative in the oil industry’s quest to ensure that royalties remained low was 








to the public, politicians, and in the media to rally public support, creating an omnipresent climate 
of fear throughout the review. In 2008, Petro-Canada announced it would delay approval of a 
$21-billion project and then Statoil Hydro Canada then President Geir Jossang stated “In line 
with several other players in the Canadian oil sands industry, Statoil Hydro has decided to 
discontinue the upgrader project at this time” (cited in AFL, 2009). Royalties were part of 
discussions on work sites, where executives would raise the issue to threaten employees and 
encourage them to become vocal against a royalty raise. An interview indicated executives would 
send letters to their employees telling them “half of you will be fired, call your MLAs, this is 
what you should say” (Interviewee 12). In the same vein, the Panel heard countless stories of 
regular working people in the oil sector explaining how their family members would lose their 
jobs if royalties were raised. Unfortunately, when the issue is emotional and close to people’s 
hearts, “it was all about fear, there was no room for dialogue to start talking about facts, 
international comparisons, lost opportunities” (Interviewee 12). Similarly to the graphic auctions 
of small producers common in the sector highlighted previously, threats of unemployment in Fort 
McMurray, empty towers downtown Calgary, or falling real estate prices seeped fear into the 
public.   
4.8.3. Discursive Power: Expert or Victim? 
Industry often positioned itself as an expert—a well-deserved title given the complexity of oil 
sands affairs. But whenever it felt threatened, it positioned itself as a victim. This is perhaps one 
of the most influential discourses industry created—and it was only possible due to its incredible 
agility and adaptability to various price environments and political moments.  
In royalty debates occurring during moments of high oil prices, industry positioned itself as an 
expert who should not be disturbed by government’s untimely attempts to extract more value 
from the resource. However, industry needed investment, so it could simultaneously demand 
R&D funding from government for the development of Alberta’s resources and advocate for the 
status quo in royalties to prevent disruption to a complex system. To establish itself as an expert 
working for the common good, industry highlighted the positive impacts it had in the province: 
how it turned an unknown, uncertain resource into a multi-billion dollar enterprise, how it 
contributed to an environmental fund, how it invested in land rehabilitation while competing with 
other oil-producing jurisdictions (Noga and Wolbring, 2014). Industry underlined how good 
corporate social responsibility led to the development of Fort McMurray, from a sleepy town in 
Alberta’s north to a renowned global oil capital, a “boomtown” (Stevens and McCurdy, 2019, p. 
4). On the other hand, at times of low prices, industry presented itself as a victim of government’s 
constant involvement—“beaten down”—despite industry’s efforts at creating economic certainty 








provoking the entire collapse of Alberta’s economy with a royalty increase. Industry also 
complained it received so little recognition and support for the work it performed in Alberta.  
Among industry players, oil sands producers were particularly adept at using the complexity of 
industry actors and their myriad of interests to their benefit.  As mentioned previously, industry 
as a whole could maintain an image of victim while reaping extraordinary profits by pointing to 
smaller producers who are frequently struggling. Following increasing taxes and costs, potential 
stricter climate change regulations, and labour shortages in 2008, Brian Maynard, then CAPP 
Vice-President, pleaded, “About a dozen of the smaller oil-sands players are coming to me saying 
we can’t make this work” (cited in Chazan, 2008). Similar strategies happened at regular 
intervals: images depicting employee layoffs, large-scale equipment auctions, and pathos-loaded 
narratives of keeping Alberta barely afloat had a powerful effect on many Albertans’ imagination. 
They were brought home to rural communities, towns, regions, and family members scattered 
throughout the province. And while this may have instilled in some a desire to help industry, for 
the many, it instilled a sense of duty to ensure industry would not be further “attacked.” 
Interviewees recall their motto was: “don’t kick industry while it’s down” (Interviewee 2; 
Interviewee 11). 
But while the dual expert vs. victim discourse speaks to industry’s incredible agility and 
adaptability to different price circumstances and political moments, it eluded public scrutiny due 
to an institutional reality: the complexity of the royalty framework which rendered it quasi 
impossible for the average Albertan to grasp entirely. This played to industry’s hand who could 
repetitively argue that meddling with a complex system could have far-reaching and 
unpredictable—read unintended—consequences for Alberta’s resources. By positioning itself as 
the sole holder of the key to oil sands, industry convinced Albertans it was a crucial ally in need 
of protection.  
4.8.4. Inter-Interest Influences: The Oil Industry’s Exploitation of Rural Interests  
That this manoeuvre was so convincing and powerful is due to Alberta’s rural context. Despite 
having two large cities—in 2006, Calgary had almost 1 million inhabitants and Edmonton more 
than 700,000—Alberta is a rural province, both in terms of population and in economic reliance 
on agriculture and natural resources. Therefore, unlike other provinces in Canada (e.g. Ontario) 
and due to the electoral map, the rural reality of Alberta provides the perfect stage for a culture 
built on a settler narrative of free “men”17 struggling to make their fortunes in a harsh, desolate 
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land, which lends itself to public deference to and admiration for leaders in resource industries 
to emerge. This culture is reflected both politically (with the rise and fall of Premiers) and 
economically (with companies exercising unrestricted, unchecked power onto local farmers and 
towns).  
As such, the rural caucus is very strong in Alberta. If an Albertan politician wishes to remain in 
their seat, they must ensure that the caucus is satisfied—or at the very least, feeling heard. As 
one interviewee describes it, “it is not macro, policy-, or data-driven; it is all about whether they 
know someone in Grand Prairie who might be hurt by a given policy” (Interviewee 12). And the 
rural caucus can be very influential: “they are going to be vocal, they will be tearing their head 
out and scratch the eyeballs of their MLAs, while the others don’t care as much, proportionally. 
It is the tyranny of the minority” (Interviewee 12).  Industry can maintain a climate of uncertainty 
to keep people on their toes with the use of fear tactics; these are particularly effective on rural 
communities dependent on oil activity. Because industry has the advantage of employing people 
from rural areas—and all the way to city centres—it constantly argues that it provides 
employment in a vacuum. Industry’s strong presence in rural Alberta provides it with allies in 
the rural caucus as soon as its interests are threatened—as was the case with the royalty review 
and ensuing policy. As a former civil servant recalls, industry representatives would instill fear 
and play on people’s dependency by making statements such as: “We don’t know if we will drill 
this year because of government policy” (Interviewee 10), shifting the blame from the province—
and people’s—unsustainable dependency on oil to the government.  
While rural vulnerabilities are often exploited by companies and lobbies to control politicians in 
power and ensure that oil interests remain protected, it would be unfair and inexact to consider 
all rural communities as homogenous. Indeed, some farmers famously protested the oil industry 
infiltration into rural communities. Former Premier Stelmach himself came from a rural 
community of farmers who were not particularly keen on industry’s push for permission to drill 
and abandoned wells. As one high level government official mentioned, regardless of the 
argument for employing people in remote communities, “all needs to go back to the owners” 
(Interviewee 10). In other words, employment was not a proxy for revenues.  
Nevertheless, industry successfully aligned dependent rural communities with its interests. 
Looking at the demographics of Alberta, there is a clear nexus between rural realities and oil-
related jobs. Industry’s power was too strong relative to farmers and the communities’ 
dependency on the oil sector (e.g. for local economic activity, jobs). The presence of the “Suncor 
Community Leisure Centre” and the “Syncrude Aquatic Centre” with its “Shell Place” in Fort 
McMurray are only a few examples that illustrates the community’s dependency on—and 








community’s and industry’s agenda manifested through the expression of rural political interests. 
While industry cannot vote, rural citizens can.   
4.9. Conclusion 
The royalty reviews did not significantly increase Albertans’ share of the pie; rather, it was a 
public exercise designed to make Albertans feel included, but which resulted in the government 
selecting only the Panel’s palatable recommendations. The 2007 royalty review started very 
promisingly: rising oil prices open a window of opportunity for the review to happen, the review 
had a stellar Panel, and the government and public were both supportive.  Albertans were 
determined to “think like owners” and “get their fair share” out of an oil industry who had free-
ridden for too long. However, the Panel’s report received mixed reviews: industry was 
displeased, the public relatively appeased, and government exposed. The report caught industry 
off guard because it did not expect the Panel—a government-mandated group—to make any 
significant recommendations; industry had been used to having an accommodating, pro-oil 
Conservative government. In contrast, the public received the Panel report generally well. The 
recommendations including royalty increases and many Albertans appreciated both the Panel’s 
expertise and the transparency of the review process which encouraged public participation from 
Albertans. On the other hand, anti-royalty-increase critics deplored the Panel’s attempt at 
comparing Alberta’s royalties to those of other jurisdictions. They argued that Alberta’s 
resources were too “unique” to be compared. On the government side, Stelmach was taken aback 
by some of the Panel’s recommendations, especially when the Panel blamed some civil servants 
for being captured by industry. Many in government felt that passing judgement on members of 
the civil service was outside the Panel’s mandate to review royalties. As for the Panel, it was 
disbanded immediately upon submitting its report to government; it was not given the chance to 
defend the report, nor explain the rationale behind its recommendations. 
When the Stelmach government released “The New Alberta Royalty Framework,” many of the 
Panel’s recommendations had been left out. This discrepancy—and the moderate Panel 
recommendations—can be explained by various institutional, interest-based, and ideational 
factors. Some institutions such as universities and the media played a central role in encouraging 
oil activity and creating a framework for supporting anti-royalty-increase discourses. As 
platforms of education and information, universities and the media are at the centre of public 
dialogue between industry, government, and Albertans. Zooming in oil sands costs in particular, 
the debate on whether oil sands costs had gone up or down impacted perceptions around whether 
royalties should be increased or not. Yet, oil sands producers were allowed to write off 100% of 
their capital investment in the form of an accelerated capital cost allowance, which effectively 








and embraced pioneer/frontier identity particularly hostile to government involvement in private 
sector regulation—including royalty collection. Some Albertans also subscribed to the ethical oil 
narrative which encouraged further oil sands production for ethical reasons and ensured the oil 
sector would be protected. Finally, the oil industry exercised its instrumental, structural, and 
discursive power and engaged in various strategies to ensure its interests would be protected, 
including lobbying and verbal threats, astro-turphing, group associations and alliances, and 
framing. Throughout the review, oil corporations continuously used their discursive power to 
present themselves as either expert or victim—depending on the circumstances. They also 
ensured that other interests, notably rural interests, would side with and support them.  
Some of the 2007 review outputs withstood the test of time; the spirit behind the 2007 
recommendations is still lingering in the framework. The government of Alberta advertised the 
changes encapsulated in the new royalty framework as “historic” (Stelmach, 2007) but in 
Urquhart’s words, “Historic it was, but only in the sense of confirming the historic relationship 
between the state and tar sands producers in Alberta” (2018, p. 193). Indeed, oil sands producers 
under the new royalty framework would actually be in a more advantageous position than under 
the 1997 framework (Urquhart, 2018). The power of the oil industry combined with Albertans’ 
ideas and falling oil prices all limited Stelmach’s political capital and the few Panel 
recommendations implemented were slowly dismantled in the years following the review. A 























The 2015-16 Royalty Review:  







In the decade following the 2007 review, the royalty landscape was not left unchanged. The 
governments of Alberta and Canada officially expressed their commitment to continuing 
extraction by releasing “Canada’s Fossil Energy Future: The Way Forward on Carbon Capture 
and Storage”, a report with recommendations on government-industry partnerships to develop 
the technology and framework necessary for carbon capture and storage. In March 2008, former 
Auditor General Peter Valentine submitted a report to the government of Alberta titled “Building 
Confidence: Improving Accountability and Transparency in Alberta’s Royalty System.” The 
report was a response to the royalty review Panel and then-auditor general Fred Dunn, both of 
whom had criticized the royalty framework for not keeping pace with price increases and not 
collecting enough for Albertans (Reuters, 2008). Valentine’s report analyzed three areas: 
oversight of the royalty system; a review and assessment of the government’s business processes 
and controls; and performance measurement and reporting (Valentine, 2008). Despite proposing 
13 recommendations—including the need for government to provide more transparency and 
concise information for Albertans to understand the complex royalty system—Valentine praised 
the Department of Energy for its “appropriate business processes and controls to support the goal 
of optimizing Alberta’s share of the resource revenue.” (Valentine, 2008, p.5).  
As for industry, it was anything but idle. Over the 2007-2015 period, it became more united 
around the goal of preventing a royalty increase and notably pushed the government to halt the 








researcher, the oil industry was “so infuriated that they had an independent review and they dared 
challenge this. The pressure they brought to bear is what led to royalty cut, after royalty cut, after 
royalty cut” (Interviewee 14). Indeed, barely a year the framework was implemented in 2009, 
industry started jointly organized sessions with the government to “discuss” resource revenues, 
especially royalties. “Energizing Investment Industry Royalty” sessions were organized and 
“Joint industry/Alberta Energy Crown royalty information exchange” events took place yearly 
from October 2010 until October 2012 included. These sessions were facilitated by Rhonda 
Wehrhahn, then Assistant Deputy Minister, Resource Revenue & Operations in partnership with 
executive members18 of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Production Accountants 
(CAPPA). Further, over the course of 2010, the Bitumen Royalty-in-Kind (BRIK) agreement 
entered in negotiation and was ultimately approved in 2011. The initiative offered oil sands 
producers with the same choice offered to conventional oil producers: to pay their royalties in 
kind instead of in cash. This would supposedly allow Alberta to “use its share of bitumen 
strategically to supply potential upgraders and refineries in Alberta” (Government of Alberta, 
n.d. (c)). In reality, Alberta having little refineries and oil sands producers having vast quantities 
of second grade oil trading at the discounted Western Canada Select (WCS) index, the BRIK 
effectively favoured oil sands producers by letting them keep their cash and dispose of their 
product.  
This chapter starts by looking at the surprise electoral victory of the NDP, which sent shockwaves 
across Alberta that had been under Progressive Conservative Party rule for more than forty years. 
With respect to royalties, the vacuum left by decades of Conservative rule and the NDP scramble 
to build bench strength affected the structure of the royalty review and composition of the Panel 
before its inception. Next, the chapter turns to examine the 2015-16 royalty review, especially 
institutional factors that discouraged royalty increases: the price context, the membership of the 
Panel, and Alberta Energy’s conflicting mandate. In terms of interest-based factors, due to its 
particularly evident role in the review, I pay special attention to the oil industry interests and their 
influence on the review process, especially how the industry exercised discursive power to rally 
many Albertans to its cause—similar to the strategies it had successfully implemented in 2007—
and to a small extent, responses from civil society despite its limited resources. Having examined 
Panel recommendations and policy reception—including institutional factors (e.g. flawed 
processes), ideational factors (e.g. some Albertans’ distrust in government), and interest-based 
factors (e.g. industry’s praising reaction to Panel recommendations)—I turn to the challenges 
faced by the NDP, especially governing challenges (e.g. the time constraint of the four-year 
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electoral cycle), intrinsic challenges (e.g. an ideational schism), and royalty challenges (e.g. the 
fall of oil prices curtailed government’s policy options).  
5.2. The Surprise NDP Victory 
On May 5, 2015, after more than four decades of Conservative rule, the New Democratic Party 
(NDP) won the provincial election with a strong majority of 54 out of 87 seats. NDP Leader 
Rachel Notley was sworn in as Premier on May 24, 2015, almost a decade after the first royalty 
review. During her electoral campaign, Notley had vowed to increase corporate taxes and review 
royalties. She was determined to help Albertans obtain as much value as possible from their oil. 
Many Albertans interpreted her promise to review royalties as a promise to increase royalties. 
However, reviewing royalties alone proved harder than expected. 
Back in 2007, the government only implemented a selection of the Panel’s moderate 
recommendations. Aggressive industry lobbying weakened many of these initiatives. With the 
memory of the previous 2007 review still fresh in their minds, Albertans saw oil prices increase 
exponentially to almost US$130/barrel, yet the province did not reap any additional benefits. 
From 2009 to 2014, global oil prices had steadily increased, remaining above US$80/barrel and 
even exceeding US$120/barrel in April 2011 (Macrotrends, n.d.). In this context, many Albertans 
became frustrated that the royalties were still “unfair” and perceived the NDP as an alternative, 
a fresh start, and a party that would finally help Albertans obtain their fair share.  
Indeed, many New Democrats had consistently criticized PC governments for their favoring the 
oil industry at the expense of Albertans and the environment. In 2007, then NDP leader Brian 
Mason had lamented that Stelmach’s framework meant Alberta would collect “less royalties than 
almost every other country in the world” (quoted in Urquhart, 2018, p. 272); Notley herself had 
denounced Stelmach’s “trivial royalty increase” in 2008 (Alberta Legislative Assembly, 2008) 
and consistently advocated for increased royalties in the following years. At the beginning of her 
political campaign, Notley had even proposed the creation of a Resource Owner’s Rights 
Commission (ROR Commission) to make recommendations on royalties within six months of 
the NDP accessing to power (Urquhart, 2018).  
However, despite the NDP’s promising initiatives, Alberta had been Conservative since 1971 
and had never had an NDP government. Even in the previous government, under the 28th Alberta 
Legislature, the NDP had only 4 seats out of 87. As such, when Notley’s NDP went from 4 to 54 
seats, it was an immense surprise. For many Albertans, the NDP platform was attractive because 
it promised banning corporate and union donations to political parties, more accountability for 
corporations, and an increase in corporate taxes (NDP, 2015). The NDP had also promised a 








until an internal polling a few days before the election—the party suddenly found itself in need 
of forming a government. It had to expand its search for cabinet members and high-level officials 
(outside of the civil service19) by looking into civil society’s most dedicated left-wing NGOs and 
labour union groups. People from the Parkland Institute, the Alberta Federation of Labour, 
Friends of Medicare, and Public Interest Alberta among others were invited and appointed to join 
NDP ranks. In the days following the election, the NDP quickly appointed people from Alberta’s 
progressive institutions and organizations to take on key positions within the new government. 
The NDP faced difficulties filling its government positions. Firstly, because the Conservatives 
had been in power for more than four decades (many of whom were “career” politicians), few 
NDP candidates had any long-standing government and/or cabinet experience. Secondly, the 
same year, the federal election was underway; this led many NDP-affiliated individuals to focus 
their attention and efforts on the national level. As for the royalty review, Notley had difficulties 
garnering participation from Alberta’s left since many were either already in the provincial 
government or had joined the federal government. Further complicating matters, Notley launched 
the climate change review prior to the royalty review, which recruited some of the last 
environmental resource experts of the province.  
5.3. Institutional Challenges during the 2015-16 Royalty Review 
5.3.1. The Price Context 
As the NDP was settling in and preparing for the launch of the royalty review, the international 
context changed drastically. Starting in the second half of 2014 and leading up to the NDP 
election, global oil prices fell consistently, affecting both WTI and WCS. From $105.15 per 
barrel in June 2014 at WTI, the price fell to US$59.83 in June 2015; in the same vein, the price 
of WCS fell from US$86.56 per barrel in June 2014 to US$51.29 the following year. Toward the 
end of the review process in February 2016, the prices had fallen to an all-time low of US$30.62 
and US$16.30 for WTI and WCS respectively (Urquhart, 2018). Therefore, while Notley had 
responded to Albertans’ demand for a royalty review prior to her election in the midst of 
increasing oil prices—very much like the circumstances of 2007—by the time the NDP was 
elected and the royalty review process launched in 2015, oil prices had fallen.  
The fall of oil prices combined with the NDP’s struggle to fill its ranks affected the structure of 
the royalty review and composition of the Panel before its inception. Faced by crumbling oil 
prices and lacking the bench strength necessary to ensure a balanced representation of interests 
                                                 








on the Panel, the NDP had narrower options when it came to appointing Panel members. Industry 
quickly and gleefully filled this vacuum.  
5.3.2. Panel Membership & Structure 
Unlike the 2007 royalty review, which consisted of a six-member Panel, the 2015-16 royalty 
review differed both in membership and structure. Headed by Dave Mowat, President and CEO 
of ATB Financial, the four-people Panel was composed of Peter Tertzakian, a Calgary-based 
Chief Energy Economist and Managing Director of ARC Financial Corp, Annette Trimbee, 
President and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Winnipeg, and Leona Hanson, Mayor of 
Beaverlodge, a town northwest of Grand Prairie. 
The membership mattered for multiple reasons. In particular, Panel members’ connections to the 
oil industry led to perceived conflicts of interest (Wood, 2015; Nikiforuk, 2016b). Starting with 
Dave Mowat, ATB Financial is government-owned and had assets of more than C$43 billion, at 
least 10% of which were loans to energy companies (Interviewee 2). ATB’s loan structure was 
most exposed to royalty changes: in its 2015 Annual Report, ATB disclosed that the Corporate 
Financial Services group (CFS), which ranked second among banks for number of energy deals, 
generated 23% of ATB’s revenues (ATB Financial, 2015; Urquhart, 2018). ATB had also been 
loaning to small Canadian companies that were at risk of defaulting if oil prices decreased or 
royalties increased. Finally, because ATB is government-owned, the government itself would be 
vulnerable to royalty changes, which strengthened the possibility of government interests 
aligning with corporate oil interests. 
Peter Tertzakian had an extensive career with Chevron Corporation and later moved to the 
financial sector, directing ARC’s economic research, especially focusing on energy issues. Well-
known in Calgary, he brought large amounts of data and expertise to the Panel, most of it derived 
from his own work at ARC. In the words of an Alberta-based academic, his charisma and 
“superstardom” status led him to write the report almost entirely (Interviewee 13). Leona Hanson, 
Mayor of Beaverlodge from 2007 until 2017, brought her business development experience and 
her leadership at the head of Beaverlodge, a 2500-people town heavily reliant on the oil industry. 
She knew firsthand the advantages and disadvantages of “oil towns.” Annette Trimbee was the 
only one with no connections to the oil industry. She did however have strong connections to the 
Alberta government, where she served as Deputy Minister under several Progressive-
Conservative ministers, including Finance and Treasury Board, Service Alberta, and Advanced 
Education and Technology before returning to her hometown and leading the University of 








The Panel was also different in format. Unlike the 2007 review, the 2015-16 review was 
conducted “behind closed doors” (Interviewee 4, 12). The government created “expert groups,” 
committees that were formed with panels of experts on various oil sources and who supported 
the Panel’s work with information, opinions, and deliberations. Comparatively, the 2015-16 
Panel had more resources than the 2007 Panel. According to industry, the 2015-16 Panel also 
pushed hard to ensure that they could communicate “with the average Albertan” and hear what 
everyone had to say (Interviewee 9).  
5.3.3. Alberta Energy’s Conflicting Mandate 
In 2015, the bitumen market had not changed much (unlike the light oil and natural gas). The 
2007 review had done most of the heavy lifting, with bitumen-based royalties, a standardized 
framework, and the cessation of special arrangements such as grandfathering for Suncor and 
Syncrude. However, oil sands royalties were still relatively low. But what proved problematic 
was the contradictory responsibilities of Alberta Energy whose role was both to promote energy 
investments and collect royalties. Therefore, Alberta Energy was responsible for encouraging the 
oil industry’s growth while simultaneously regulating it and collecting royalties. The 2007 Panel 
had highlighted the paradoxical responsibilities of Alberta Energy and recommended a separation 
of the powers of promotion and regulation: Alberta Energy would continue to promote energy 
investments and support the oil industry, while Treasury Board and Finance would deal with 
royalty collection. In 2015-16, this issue surfaced again, complicated by the opposing interests 
of Alberta Energy and Alberta Finance (instability of resource revenue, corporate income tax, 
and so forth.). Despite these circumstances, when the 2015-16 royalty review Panel handed its 
report, there were no changes to the oil sands royalty regime. What explains the Panel’s 
recommendations regarding oil sands royalties—or rather, lack thereof? 
5.4. When Industry Interests Exercise Discursive Power 
5.4.1. Industry Interests 
The political influence of industry, materialized through its organized interests, had a huge 
impact on defining possibilities in royalty policy. The oil industry always favoured low royalties. 
But by 2015-16, oil industry representatives had learned from the 2007 review and were more 
united than ever to ensure their interests would prevail. To prevent any surprises in 2015-16, 
industry prepared itself well and doubled-down on the 2015-16 review. Unlike the 2007 Panel 
where none of the panel members came from industry, the 2015-16 review had multiple Panel 
members who were connected—albeit indirectly—to the oil industry. Industry penetrated the 








Industry had perceived the 2015 NDP election as a potential threat to its expansion plan. With 
the announcement of a royalty review, industry found itself once again under the spotlight. In the 
words of an industry representative, “everyone was terrified because you never had an NDP 
government in Alberta” (Interviewee 9). This time around, industry knew it would need to build 
a partnership with the newly elected government, starting with the royalty review. Fortunately 
for industry, negotiating with the NDP proved easier than expected: in the words of an industry 
representative, the NDP was “willing to learn” because “their political state hung in the balance” 
(Interviewee 9). In other words, the power of the oil industry was so prominent that the NDP’s 
survival and chance at another election depended on establishing a trusting relationship with the 
oil industry. 
5.4.2. Industry’s Discursive Power 
While industry did not favour the NDP election, it exercised discursive power at home by using 
global circumstances to craft a convincing narrative in its favour. Oil prices tanked in the second 
half of 2015 and with the advent of shale oil/gas, industry was determined to keep royalties low. 
This context impacted the ideas and narratives that spread at the time, particularly enabling 
industry to sway the Panel members, work collaboratively with Wood Mackenzie (the consulting 
firm hired to provide data to the Panel), and influence public discourse by following the 2007 
strategy of emphasizing the vulnerability of the oil and gas sector. In 2007, the oil sector argued 
that industry had suffered because of the financial crisis, the drop in oil prices, and Stelmach’s 
Royalty Framework—all of which affected industry’s most strategic goals, including shareholder 
profits and the capacity to influence policy.  
5.4.2.1. Countering Misinformation 
From industry’s perspective, one of the most important initiatives it took was to counter 
perceived misinformation. As the voice of the oil and gas (upstream) industry in Alberta, CAPP 
provides updates on the state of the oil and gas industry in Alberta, writes pieces in major 
newspapers, and works actively to “counter misinformation” (Interviewee 9). This strategy was 
commonplace, as reflected by CAPP’s efforts a few years alter to counter misinformation on 
shale gas (Rusnell, 2011; Patterson, 2012). During the review, there was a war of information. 
CAPP focused on countering information to discredit opposing voices: for example, a CAPP 
representative mentioned that the Parkland Institute had published incorrect numbers and thus, 
that it was CAPP’s duty to correct those numbers to frame the narrative (Interviewee 9).  
Misinformation was both a domestic and international issue. Internationally, HIS Cambridge 








as big as previously thought. They defended the “decoupling GHG emissions growth from oil 
sands production growth,” (HIS CERA, 2010) which effectively gave the green light to further 
oil sands exploitation. Provincially, industry appealed to people’s concerns about their finances 
and connected them to the well-being of the oil industry. This echoes strongly with the 2007 
review example of joining industry’s fate with that of Albertans. For example, an interviewee 
remarked that industry often argued that “60% or 75% of the population have their pension in 
entities that are doing this work so it is ultimately good for the community or old age people” 
(Interviewee 12). However, the interviewee corrected, “if you are invested in companies based 
in Hong Kong and London, those are not moms and pops, they are the multibillion stack” 
(Interviewee 12). Indeed, the oil sector is not invested in local pensions but rather traded globally 
in the world’s largest financial hubs. 
5.4.2.2. Expert or Victim? 
Like in 2007, industry alternated between playing the victim and the expert. During the phase 
when industry was not satisfied with royalty rates, it insisted on playing victim and using fear 
tactics; but as soon as the Panel gave its report—one favourable to industry—it shifted its position 
and praised the recommended framework; as an industry representative highlighted, “for 
royalties, we are probably world-class” (Interviewee 9). For example, industry constantly shifted 
its discourse on projected growth scenarios, while ensuring that both positions would favour 
immediate increasing exploitation. When in need of additional investments, industry often 
displayed scenarios until 2050, all indicative of growth (Noga and Wolbring, 2014). However, 
when others argued that growth would be short-lived and might end by 2050, industry responded 
that exploitation must be increased immediately while it is still profitable. Industry thus had 
arguments both for projected 2050 scenarios and for a short-lived industry: it agreed that 
regardless of the future, investment must continue.  
To rally sympathetic feelings to its cause, industry demonstrated its fragility and used pathos-
based strategies. Whenever oil critics implied industry was benefiting from subsidies from 
government, industry defended itself by pointing to Canadian/North American enterprises such 
as Bombardier or GM, highlighting that the oil industry was not receiving anywhere near 
equivalent subsidies to the aviation or automotive sectors. Industry only asked “for a level 
playing field to compete,” (Interviewee 9) not for an advantage—the oil industry only wished to 
have the right to participate equally. In addition, regardless of how favourable the Panel 
recommendations were, industry presented itself as a victim. It saw any attempt at reviewing 
royalties as a threat, a step closer to increasing royalties, and thus, decreasing its revenues. An 
oil representative lamented that with all the royalty reviews, “we have shown we are indecisive 








of regret that Alberta had to go through the process of reviewing royalties. Ideas of “fairness” 
resurfaced, but with a different focus than in 2007. In 2007, Albertans demanded their fair share 
to increase their share of royalties as owners of the resource; they saw growing national and 
international capital flow to the province and demanded a fair royalty share. In 2015-16, the 
fairness narrative was deployed to encourage investment; in an industry executive’s words, “we 
have to be fair to continue to draw investment to the region.” (Interviewee 9) Industry had been 
hit by low global oil prices and a shale revolution; the main goal was protection, not further 
affliction. Using this idea to its advantage, industry morphed and adapted its message to 
circumstances, tapping into many Albertans’ mythologies, economic opportunities, and labour 
realities.  
5.4.2.5. “Keep Albertans Working” 
Industry attempted to rally the NDP to its cause by taking advantage of one of the NDP’s 
foundational values, that of protecting the labour force. The “keep Albertans working” narrative 
compelled the NDP to compromise with industry, as the latter argued it was a crucial provider of 
economic activity, jobs, and livelihoods in the province. The oil/ job nexus argument also tapped 
into the commitments of Rachel Notley’s party as well as her personal background (as daughter 
of a former provincial NDP MLS, Leader of the Opposition and married to a lawyer with close 
labour ties) and reflected increasing unemployment rates in Alberta rate. Concerns about 
investment and labour in the region following the oil price crisis rendered the “keep Albertans 
working” at all costs narrative and its implications ever more present. Like in 2007, the belief in 
free markets was powerful in 2015-16, and despite industry’s complaints and the decrease in oil 
sands’ attractiveness (they were not the planet’s last marginal resources anymore), oil sands 
remained profitable. The NDP understood that the only way it could maximize popular support 
would be to ensure that no job would be lost as part of the royalty review and ensuing policy. 
Indeed, jobs in the oil sector, whether directly or indirectly, would only remain if companies were 
attracted to staying in Alberta. 
In addition, the NDP was also cognisant of being viewed as having an anti-oil agenda. The party 
focused on crafting an image where it would be seen as “helping all people,” including supporting 
industry. But the oil/job nexus proved difficult to manage for the NDP: since the oil industry was 
a major source of income, both directly for workers and indirectly for the economy, the NDP 
could not simply stop supporting the oil industry—despite the party’s historic criticism of 
industry. For these reasons, Notley was reluctant to raise royalties. Her priorities were first to 








5.4.3. Civil Society Challenges Industry Narratives  
However, while industry would have Albertans believe that most jobs in the province are tied to 
the oil industry, certain civil society actors challenged the oil-dependency narratives. Leading 
research institutes such as the Pembina Institute and the Parkland Institute garnered public 
attention by leading the pro-royalty increase movement, and many Albertans weighted in. 
Unfortunately, they faced limitations related to scarce resources and timing: it was easier to 
spread a narrative than to counter one.  
Both members of the Pembina Institute and the Parkland Institute participated in the review’s 
consultation process, even trying to join the committee formed to review unconventional sources 
in particular—but without success. Their experience was mostly disappointing: the Institutes’ 
representatives faced strong opposition and “couldn’t even force” themselves on any issue 
(Interviewee 14) In addition, Pembina and others lacked capacity as a part of their budget and 
resources were allocated to cover and intervene in the climate change review Panel initiated by 
the provincial NDP. They felt their participation was limited. 
Strategically, timing was crucial: pro-industry voices had spread their ideas early, and these ideas 
had taken root easily, making it difficult for ensuing ideas to become entrenched. An interviewee 
remembers having realized the importance of timing to get people on board. He had endeavoured 
to guide entrepreneurs to write letters of support and provide data to complement the picture 
painted by government-mandated consultancies, which strengthened the facts put forth for rapid 
decision-making.  
Following the economic downturn in 2015, many Albertans felt the government was more 
supportive of private oil companies than struggling individuals and families. A former civil 
servant mentioned that the downturn revealed how much the provincial government was willing 
to “butt out for the average Joe” but not for a powerful corporation (Interviewee 10). However, 
government’s support to corporate oil was often hidden. Corporations’ dominant narrative was 
still to “get government out of the business of being in business,” but with the province’s 
economy remained reliant on oil, the government stayed discreet to continue supporting the 
sector without challenging its dominant narrative.  
At the same time, the province had continued to encourage risky financial decisions by helping 
banks provide loans to industry and maintaining minimum regulatory oversight—all of which 
fastened the pace of development. One interviewee compared it to the moral hazard argument of 
the 2008 financial crisis: does helping people who defaulted on their mortgage encourages risky 
behaviour? (Interviewee 10) In the case of Alberta, would it not be encouraging that same risky 








community, an interviewee recalls “good old common sense” from a rural couple who 
participated in a public consultation and asked: “Why are we developing so fast that we need to 
bring people in?” (Interviewee 10) The community of Fort McMurray—dubbed “Fort 
McMoney”—stands at the centre of this debate. Faced with difficulties in population, housing, 
infrastructure management, and even childcare, Fort McMurray is a “boomtown on steroids, of 
a place experiencing adolescent phase, and/or of a lack of time to catch up to the pace of 
development” (Dorow, 2013, p. 127; Dorow, 2015). Some Albertans were thus reluctant to “buy 
into” the oil rush in light of the economic downturn and the province’s difficulty to face the 
consequences of its investment in oil and gas infrastructure, to the point of provincial labour 
shortages.  
5.5. 2015-16 Royalty Review: Recommendations and Policy Reception 
The 2015-16 report was received with mixed reviews as there were many exemptions given to 
the oil industry and Notley, unlike Stelmach before her, stuck to Panel recommendations. The 
report’s goal to “reach the average Albertan” and potentially ease royalties’ complexity had not 
been reached: industry-led public relations clouded both the review and the report. According to 
an interviewee, the review often felt confusing for the general public and “it left a bad taste in 
people’s minds,” leading to more distrust of the system (Interviewee 10). As for actual 
recommendations, none of the changes concerned the oil sands; the remaining changes were 
complicated and very few could explain them (in particular the changes made to oil wells). The 
changes government thought would be popular were too difficult to understand. Interviews reveal 
that government even approached journalists to task them with explaining the changes proposed, 
increase media coverage, and obtain popular support—unsuccessfully.  
On the industry side, some dared complain that the oil sands royalties had not changed. They 
rejected the “status quo” and argued that policy-makers had truly “missed an opportunity to 
modernize” (Interviewee 7), i.e. to make royalties more amenable to industry.  Others, especially 
from the oil sands sector, which saw no changes, praised the review. For example, CAPP 
welcomed the report as a “a balanced report that sets the stage for more work between industry 
and government to ensure Alberta’s oil and gas sector is competitive in North America” (Oil & 
Gas Journal, 2016). 
For the NDP, the 2015-16 review was a relief. While many credit Notley for accepting Panel 
recommendations without trying to influence it, interviews reveal that she actively tried to protect 
the Panel—sometimes beyond her mandate. Knowing it was very critical of the Panel’s 
recommendations, Notley asked the Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL) to give its submission 








be taken into consideration in the decisions. It was an attempt from Notley to manage AFL’s 
dissatisfaction with the state of royalties and prevent AFL’s demands to be rendered public and 
discussed widely in the press (Interviewee 2). The AFL responded to Notley’s call and held back 
its submission, effectively bypassing its opportunity to intervene in that process. Nevertheless, 
upon Notley’s announcement of the new framework, then AFL President Gil McGowan, one of 
Notley’s long-time supporter, condemned Notley’s framework: “To say that we are 
disappointed…would be an understatement. Virtually none of the evidence that the NDP itself 
has relied upon over the years was considered by the panel” (quoted in Ibrahim, 2016). 
Unfortunately, McGowan was not the only one disappointed. 
Many Albertans felt their prospects as resource owners had not improved and the review had not 
been conducted well. Instead, industry had yet again gained the upper hand. In the words of a 
former civil servant, “2015 was a very flawed Panel and very flawed process” (Interviewee 4). 
For example, some wondered about review members and participants. An Alberta-based 
researcher revealed that it was a University of Calgary PhD student, Blake Shaffer, who was 
tasked with “double-checking all of Peter Tertzakian’s work” (Interviewee 2) that served as the 
basis for Panel deliberations. In his words, “It wasn’t the Department of Energy, it wasn't the 
regulator, it was as Dave called him, “Blake, the certifier” (…) who is a former energy trader in 
New York and in Canada” (Interviewee 2). 
The timing of the 2015-16 review was also problematic because Notley had multiple items on 
her agenda that could impact the review, particularly the climate change advisory panel review 
that happened prior to the royalty review. In 2015-16, the timing meant that not only were 
resources split between the two reviews, but the precedence of the climate change advisory panel 
would affect the work and reception of the royalty review. Notley had enough political capital 
only for one panel to be progressive. Critics also pointed to the irony of the two reviews, given 
that one was designed to evaluate climate change impacts and an environmental transition, while 
the other reviewed royalties on high emitting hydrocarbons. As for industry, it considered the 
NDP government to be less pragmatic on the climate side—confirming that the work done on the 
climate Panel was more progressive, ambitious and transformational than the royalty review. 
Finally, by preceding the royalty review, the climate change review forced royalties to adapt to 
new climate policies rather than vice versa. This made it harder for Panel members and policy-
makers alike as they worked through institutional uncertainty.  
Overall, for Notley, the report and policy were received with mixed reactions. Industry viewed 
them positively as Notley had reassured the oil industry she was not going to confront it. In the 
words of a former civil servant, Notley “has been captured too”, “it was a good thing, politically 
for Notley that the 2015-16 Panel didn’t do very much” (Interviewee 4). The review 








presence of a thriving oil industry. Yet others were disappointed with Notley: they had counted 
on her leadership and the NDP’s commitment to end the reign of the oil industry in Alberta—or 
at minimum, rebalance power and revenues for Albertans—and were left disillusioned.  
5.6. The Challenges of the NDP  
There were strong institutional, interest-based, and ideational limitations that prevented the NDP 
from conducting and implementing an ambitious royalty review and policy. Given the NDP’s 
limited bench strength, surprise election, fierce opponents, and captured institutions and review 
members, it is not surprising that the recommendations lacked ambition. The NDP encountered 
multiple challenges. First, with regards to governing, the Party faced a structural institutional 
limitation, the four-year electoral cycle, and an interest-based limitation, the governing of a 
powerful sector, the oil industry. Put simply, the NDP had to compromise with industry if it 
wanted to stand a chance at being re-elected for another four years. Second, the NDP faced 
intrinsic challenges within the Party: ideational divergences led to a schism. Third, the NDP faced 
a strong backlash with the royalty review and was blamed for destabilizing the economy—
similarly to the Conservatives being blamed in 2007—even though global oil prices tanked 
during that time. Alberta’s modest “New Royalty Framework” policy illustrates the review’s loss 
at giving Albertans their fair share. Taken together, these factors gave the NDP little room to 
revise royalties in 2015-16. 
5.6.1. NDP Challenges Governing the Province 
Four years is a short time for implementing an ambitious political agenda while preparing for the 
next election, especially when a party’s ambitions are to obtain more royalties from the 
province’s dominant industry. Strategically, one of the NDP’s main goals was to remain in 
power—like any political party—but in this case, this was rendered more urgent as the NDP won 
a historic and unique victory. The drastic change of power represented by the NDP victory also 
meant that traditional state and non-state institutions—like the civil service or the media—were 
not always supportive of the NDP from the outset. The Party faced difficulties in managing both 
the effort to ensure its re-election and implement ground-breaking policies, particularly on the 
economic front.  
Unfortunately, due to Notley’s limited political capital—i.e. the ‘currency’ she had available as 
the leader of a first-ever elected left-leaning party in a historically Conservative province 
dominated by oil interests—she had to prioritize certain policies. Inside the four-year cycle, in 








demonstrate its ambition: Notley’s key priorities were to introduce a carbon levy, launch a 
climate policy review, and raise corporate taxes. Only then could she focus on the royalty review.  
In parallel to implementing these agenda items, the NDP had to start preparing for the next 
election right away to keep the party in power. And while change cannot happen overnight, the 
NDP must have quickly realized that its path was dependent on the way Conservatives had set 
the political-economic agenda for four decades. The NDP thus had to stand in the face of various 
opponents: a hostile bureaucracy (dominated by Conservatives in its senior ranks), a hostile 
media (captured by industry), and a hostile industry (caught by surprise in the election). 
Indeed, the Conservatives certainly left a strong print on public institutions. Regarding taxes for 
example, a former civil servant with Alberta Energy highlights that Notley “inherited an 
unsustainable tax structure” (Interviewee 4); in other words, it was very difficult for Notley to 
implement innovative policies. Still, Notley decided to implement a carbon levy despite facing 
opposition. The reach of conservative-oriented interests is apparent in media representations of 
the carbon levy: while Notley framed it consistently as a “carbon levy,” (Caron et al., 2015) the 
conservative media was largely critical of it as the “carbon tax” (Epperson, forthcoming). Notley 
also raised personal taxes and corporate income taxes—both of which impacted her popularity. 
Many Albertans had developed a sense of entitlement and convincing them to suddenly pay more 
taxes was difficult. As for industry, it was hostile from the beginning. When Notley had suggested 
creating the ROR Commission at the beginning of her electoral campaign, she had faced sharp 
criticism from industry. For example, Cenovus CEO Brian Ferguson had indicated royalties 
could not be increased or else, Alberta would become uncompetitive and investment would suffer 
(Urquhart, 2018). Industry’s constant rebuttal of increasing royalties eventually led Notley to 
pledge to work closely with industry, leading her at the launch of the 2015-16 review to state 
“We can’t predetermine the outcome of that review—it may or may not determine an increase is 
necessary” (Wood, 2015). Notley had shifted her position entirely. 
Still, while the NDP compromised heavily with industry throughout its mandate, it achieved a 
significant victory towards the end of its mandate. The NDP had to deal with the thorny issue of 
well clean up as it threatened the NDP government with massive bankruptcies in the private 
sector (Orphan Well Association, OWA). Oil companies had left thousands of leaking, opened 
wells in Alberta and through various ownership mechanisms (including complicated selling 
schemes), refused to spend the funds necessary to close the leaking wells. Industry threatened 
the NDP multiple times with leaving and abandoning these wells, forcing the NDP to 
compromise with industry interests. Fortunately, a recent Supreme Court decision, the 
“Redwater” case, placed fiduciary responsibility to clean up the wells on the company, and not 








and banks would have had no responsibility for clean-up and the government would have been 
bankrupt in trying to close the wells.   
5.6.2. Intrinsic Challenges Within the NDP 
Driven by a desire to establish a foothold in Alberta politics within the limited time afforded by 
the electoral cycle, Notley needed to gain credibility as a Premier, particularly for the province’s 
most powerful group, the oil industry; she did not want to be seen as its “enemy.” But she also 
had to follow through on her campaign promise to review royalties—it was her “fiduciary 
responsibility” in Stelmach’s words—and had certain inescapable items on her agenda.  
This compromising behaviour with industry created a schism inside the NDP. Like the 
Conservative party during the previous royalty review, parts of the party wanted to progress away 
from oil, while others wanted to create alliances with the oil industry to strengthen the NDP’s 
hold onto power in Alberta and ultimately influence change for the longer term. The former 
lamented the fact that the party had shifted after the election and many NDP supporters felt the 
NDP was selling them out. Notley’s base eroded as she was simultaneously accused of being too 
soft with industry and not strong enough to stand for her principles. Many saw the royalty review 
simply as a public relations exercise designed to appease Albertans, follow through on a promise, 
and satisfy industry (Interviewee 2, 3, 12).The NDP had to consider both its short-term and long-
term goals and their associated trade-offs, even if it meant divisions within. 
From the outside, it might be surprising to see an ostensibly left-wing party such as the NDP try 
to accommodate a sector like the oil industry. However, there are striking ideological differences 
between provincial NDP parties in the prairies and in the rest of the country. Both analysis and 
interviews show that the NDP in Western Canada is socially progressive, but conservative 
fiscally and economically. In Alberta, the NDP may have developed that way to increase their 
chances of being elected in an attempt to avoid being seen as too radical compared to the 
traditional Conservatism that ruled in those provinces. 
5.6.3. Royalty-Related Challenges 
The NDP also faced royalty-related challenges. In particular, similar to that of Stelmach before 
her, Notley’s review was blamed for the economic downturn—although it was outside of her 
control—and her efforts at juggling both a progressive agenda and an attempt at appeasing the 
oil industry proved mildly successful. 
First, industry and some Albertans were upset at the carbon levy. Fieldwork revealed that many 
felt sorry for the NDP as it was being accused of “having killed the economy” with the carbon 








2007, occurred as oil prices plummeted. Nevertheless, the Notley government still believed it 
could get a larger royalty share for the province—and if the barrel had stayed at US$100, it might 
have worked. But while 2008 was a short collapse, 2014 was severe and oil prices never fully 
recovered. Unfortunately for Notley, collapsing oil prices outside her control strongly impacted 
her government domestically. In the words of a former civil servant, “Government are 
benefactors or victims of economic circumstances” (Interviewee 4). 
The NDP also had to consider potential impacts for other actors in the Alberta economy, given 
that its central providers were threatened. For example, for groups like ATB Financial who are 
at arm-in-arm with government, there was growing concerns that ATB had stopped reporting its 
sectoral loan exposure. More specifically, there was no way of knowing how much of ATB’s 
debt was connected to the oil industry. That meant if royalties increased and the oil industry 
crashed, the government—via ATB—could be severely exposed. 
Overall, multiple challenges prevented the NDP from implementing the progressive agenda it 
had promised. This seems to be the curse of Alberta politics when it comes to royalty reviews: 
both Stelmach and Notley had to back down in the face of their opponents and price context. The 
NDP had to make strategic decisions to favour its short-term interests although they impacted its 
ideology. For the NDP’s strongest critics, in the words of a former politician, “the New 
Democrats immediately—literally starting election night—became a party of the oil industry” 
(Interviewee 6). The Party faced incredible pressure due to systemic and institutional constraints, 
leaving very little room for meaningful and long-lasting change to take place. This type of change 
would require a radical institutional shift of the entire economy, a reshuffling of the province’s 
key interests, and an ideational transformation to protect Albertans’ interests separately from 
those of the oil industry. Meaningful change would require the dismantlement of oil’s deep state 
in the province.    
5.7. Two Royalty Reviews Compared 
The 2007 and 2015-16 reviews had important differences, but they had a similar outcome: little 
to no long-lasting change in oil sands royalty policy. In both cases, with global oil prices spiking, 
Albertans demanded a royalty review and elected the leaders they believed would more 
adequately deliver on this promise. In hindsight, the royalty reviews of 2007 and 2015-16 were 
laudable attempts at helping Albertans get their fair share of provincial oil resources. However, 
the challenges they faced prevented Albertans from getting their fair share of royalties.   
The 2007 review was the first of its kind and could have laid the foundations for the type of 
change Lougheed had envisioned: it could have given Albertans their fair share and placed the 








Panel, strong popular support throughout the province, and being the first of its kind, it was free 
of determinism. The transcripts from the fourteen days of public consultations were all published 
(Urquhart, 2018) and the public consultation process in both rural towns and urban centres won 
the 2007 Panel the trust of Albertans. It brought an opportunity to start anew and had the potential 
to lay the ground for a solid, fair, sustainable, and long-term oriented royalty framework.  
 2007 2015-16 
Panel Structure 6-person Panel 4-person Panel 
Panel Members 
William M. Hunter 









Consultancy Pedro Van Meurs Wood Mackenzie Ltd. 
Process 
Public consultation 
with the public 
Public engagement 
process + working 
groups with selected 
stakeholders only 
Transcripts Published online Not published 
Table 2: Comparing the Two Royalty Review Panels  
Yet, while the 2007 process of public consultation was certainly appreciated by the public, it 
proved difficult and relatively less effective than anticipated. As some Panel members reflected, 
public consultations were not always useful because participants self-selected, disproportionally 
highlighting the voices of people with strong opinions and/or self-entrenched interests. In 
addition, consultations were sometimes more emotional than informative: the Panel heard 
multiple “sob” stories from Albertans who believed increased royalties would have adverse 
effects on their economic well-being (Interviewee 3). Looking back, conducting public 
consultations may have been a political decision to appease the public, and it had mixed results.  
In 2015-16, the review process was entirely different: there were no public consultations—at 
least not in the same way as in 2007—and no transcripts were published from the meetings 
(Urquhart, 2018). The Panel’s work was supported by working groups, each specializing in one 
of Alberta’s key natural resources (conventional oil, natural gas, oil sands, and so forth), and by 
a consulting firm, Wood Mackenzie, hired to provide data and analysis to the Panel. However, 








indirectly: Wood Mackenzie was working hand in hand with CAPP and the working groups were 
mostly composed of industry experts, who certainly had vested interests in keeping oil sands 
royalties low.   
The 2007 Panel single-handedly handled all data regarding royalties, while simultaneously 
conducting public consultations and brainstorming on the royalty question. Interviews reveal that 
some 2007 Panel members would have liked more institutional support, whether structurally, or 
post-report, as some 2007 Panel members reported feeling overworked (Interviewee 3). For 
example, if the 2007 Panel had had working groups—like the 2015-16 Panel—it might have been 
easier to delegate some of the tasks assigned. In the same vein, the 2007 needed resources to 
defend the report after its publication; yet, the Panel was disbanded and lost the legitimacy it 
needed to explain the recommendations in the face of criticisms.  
Focusing in on the composition of the Panels, the 2015-16 Panel lacked the arm’s length expertise 
of the 2007 Panel. While the 2007 Panel had experts with knowledge from different facets of the 
royalty question, including academic economists, an entrepreneur, and an engineer, the 2015-16 
Panel had members with strong ties to the oil industry, including only one economist who built 
his career in the oil sector and a banker president of a financial institution responsible for loaning 
funds to oil sands companies. These differences in Panel membership influenced the tone of the 
2015-16 recommendations and signalled they would not be increasing royalties (Urquhart, 2018). 
Both Panels were expected to untangle the complexity of the royalty framework to make it 
accessible to the average citizen, in addition to ensuring Albertans were receiving their fair share 
of the resources. To do so, the 2007 Panel suggested an easier, more accessible formula to 
calculating royalties, and a general increase in royalties. The 2015-16 Panel on the other hand, 
kept the structure in place, and only recommended changes to non-oil sands royalty rates, 
excluding Alberta’s most profitable resources. Interviewed industry players mentioned there 
were small changes in oil sands royalties in 2015-16—but none are evident in the 2015-16 report. 
The changes proposed to oil sands royalties under a Conservative government were moderate, 
yet had a more lasting impact than the lack of changes under a New Democratic government. 
However, reflecting back, some 2007 Panelists regret not just ranking Alberta’s royalty rates in 
comparison to other jurisdictions on a graph and used it to show Alberta’s low royalties. Doing 
so might have simplified royalty recommendations and minimized criticism. As a former Panel 
member  explains, “The marketing effort, the messaging would have been very simple if we had 
just demonstrated the 187 countries or jurisdictions that have a royalty mechanism, and ranked 
them all things considered…Alberta is in the bottom 10%, or 25% for sure. We should have said 
nothing else” (Interviewee 12). This approach might have shifted public opinion in favour of 








understandable comparison may have been a more effective strategy of convincing the public to 
support the recommendations.  
But the complexity of the royalty framework persisted, enabling misinterpretations and 
misconceptions. For example, the 2015-16 Panel introduced various sensitivities: price 
sensitivity, productivity sensitivity, different vintage sensitivity, and so forth. These various 
sensitivities were complex for the average citizen to grasp. As a result, it proved easy for industry-
led narratives praising the lack of changes recommended to take hold. In addition, there were so 
many exemptions in the 2015-16 review report that the average reader could not understand the 
recommendations (Interviewee 10). As a Panel member notes, “people don’t like change; there 
is always going to be winners and losers and in this case, I don’t think they understood who they 
were in some cases” (Interviewee 3). Ironically, the changes in 2015-16 were so confusing, even 
some oil companies did not fully understand them despite the fact that the royalty framework 
worked in their favour. 
Some of the 2007 Panel members indicated in interviews that they regretted that there had been 
a Panel in the first place because the royalty review encouraged industry to prepare strategies to 
ensure its interests would prevail. A former Panel member mentioned: “In hindsight, I would say 
we were worse off after that review than we were before. Because it opened up the ‘permission’ 
for industry to push back hard in terms of this being egregious and uncalled for” (Interviewee 
12). As for politicians, the Panel member added: “when myself and the Panel members are talking 
about it, just lamenting because we were complicit in it, jokingly, we feel complicit. That review 
caused the politicians so much angst that they just caved… They became terrified for their 
political lives. That was the institutions that got to work there” (Interviewee 12). Indeed, despite 
the Panel’s and Stelmach’s best efforts, the challenges highlighted in Chapter 4 led to middle 
ground recommendations. These recommendations were not fully integrated in government 
policy and later dismantled by aggressive industry lobbying. The policy changes enacted by the 
Conservatives fell short of many Albertans’ expectations, leading to a disenchantment with 
Conservative leadership. When given the opportunity, Albertans chose the alternative. 
Choosing the alternative brought an indisputable victory to the newly elected NDP with high 
expectations on the part of Albertans that this time around, royalties would increase and industry 
power would be kept in check. Unfortunately, the 2015-16 Panel was bound to be more 
conservative than 2007, as industry was better prepared to exert its influence. While the 2007 
Panel attempted to improve the royalty framework, for industry, it served as a testing ground for 
opposing royalty increases, a practice industry honed in the second review in 2015-16. As for the 
2015 government, it had limited political capital to counteract industry’s influence. Notley’s 








the royalties, she compromised long term change for short term capacity to maximize her newly 
elected party’s chances to remain in power.  
Looking back, the changes proposed by the 2007 Panel were ambitious relative to the ones 
proposed in 2015-16. In the words of a journalist from the Edmonton Journal who covered both 
reviews, “2015 was a disappointment. 2007 seemed more like an even-handed, opened breath of 
fresh air document. 2015 was more of a closed-door, stale, let’s not-touch-anything. 2007 was 
idealistic and aspirational; 2015 was more pragmatic and very much don’t rock the boat, status 
quo. 2007 was bold, 2015 was fearful” (Interviewee 8). Both of Alberta’s attempts at reviewing 
royalties faced challenges—many of which posed by industry—and ultimately prevented 
Albertans from obtaining their fair share.  
5.8. Conclusion 
After more than four decades of Progressive-Conservative governments, pro-conservative 
interests were well-entrenched in the province at the time of the NDP surprise election. Yet, the 
election showed promise for many Albertans whose hopes with regards to royalties laid in 
increasing corporate accountability and public revenues. However, the vacuum left by decades 
of Conservative rule and the NDP’s scramble to build bench strength affected the structure of the 
royalty review and composition of the Panel before its inception. In this second royalty review, 
industry implemented strategies that proved successful in 2007 to ensure that the outcome of the 
review aligned with its interests, notably influencing the review process by arguing against a race 
to the bottom, countering “misinformation,” equivocating the victim vs. expert narrative, and 
twisting  the “keep Albertans working” narrative to its advantage.   
Although industry would have Albertans believe that most jobs in the province are tied to the oil 
sector, many are not, and certain civil society actors challenged these narratives. According to 
data from the Government of Alberta Economic Multipliers and compiled by the Parkland 
Institute, the sectors of oil and gas extraction and their support activities for mining employ less 
than twelve person-years employment per dollar million invested20 and the oil and natural gas 
industry “produces the fewest jobs per dollar invested of any sector of the provincial economy” 
(Boychuk, 2010). Leading research institutes such as the Pembina Institute and the Parkland 
Institute garnered public attention by leading a pro-royalty increase movement. However, they 
faced limitations in terms of resources and timing—it is easier to spread a powerful narrative that 
resonates with the public than to counteract one after it has been deployed. Similarly, there are 
institutional and interest-based limitations that prevented the NDP from driving an ambitious 
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royalty review and ensuing policy, particularly the bounds of time created by the four-year 
electoral cycle. Given the NDP’s limited bench strengths, surprise election, fierce opponents, 
captured institutions and royalty review members,21 it is not surprising that the Panel 
recommendations lacked ambition.  
Whether it was institutional factors like flawed processes, ideational factors like Albertans’ 
distrust in their government, or interest-based factors like industry’s praising of Panel 
recommendations, Alberta’s modest “New Royalty Framework” policy illustrates the review’s 
inability to give Albertans their fair share. The NDP had intrinsic challenges of its own, especially 
institutional decisions such as having the climate change review take place before the royalty 
review and ideational divergences that led to a “schism” inside the Party. Taken together, these 
factors demonstrate that the NDP’s battle was decided before it begun—its range of policy 
possibilities were truncated. Once again, a failed royalty review had contributed to toppling a 
government. Seen from an international perspective, the government of Alberta could have 
adapted its royalty share to world oil price fluctuations, taking smaller royalties in low price 
environments, and higher royalties in high price environments. Yet, industry’s organized 
interests in the province did not allow it.  
Indeed, during and after the 2015-16 review process, there were mounting concerns that 
democracy in Alberta was not healthy (Smith, 2015; Shrivastava, 2015; Adkin, 2016; Taft, 2017).  
Yet, this is neither new, nor unique to the Alberta case. Institutionally, this is one of the roots of 
the problem, and it runs deep in Alberta’s democratic institutions. One only needs to look at the 
NDP’s recent process to propose changes to the Alberta education curriculum on climate change 
to see how deep the oil industry has penetrated various ministries—not only Energy and 
Environment—and is shaping future generations. Then Education Minister David Eggen and 
then Energy Minister Margaret McCuaig-Boyd consulted with representatives of energy 
companies and environmental groups to “get input on the government’s C$64-million review” 
of the education curriculum (McClure, 2018). Upon this consultation, Eggen added that the 
curriculum “will also ensure students (…) understand the merits of energy megaprojects…” 
(McClure, 2018). Oil interests permeated even the institutions that educate the new generations 
of Albertans.  
Taken together, these two reviews demonstrate that there is never a “good” time to review 
royalties. When oil prices rise and industry profits exponentially from oil sands production, one 
expects a royalty review to allow government—and Albertans—to increase their share of these 
profits. However, rising prices allowed industry to play the expert arguing that government 
involvement might topple Alberta’s good fortunes. On the other hand, falling oil prices and 
                                                 








negative publicity allowed industry to play the victim, defending that it took all the risks, and 
invested all its capital and efforts for the wellbeing of Albertans and their economy. These 
narratives provide industry with the ability to convince government not to further increase its 
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By 2016, Alberta had been through two major royalty reviews and neither had significantly 
increased oil sands royalties to give Albertans a fairer share of the value of oil extracted from 
their province. The 2007 review suggested changes, but they were only partially implemented by 
the government and subsequently dismantled by aggressive industry lobbying. The 2015-16 
review suggested no change to oil sands royalties and industry celebrated the review. What 
explains the decisions of the Alberta government not to significantly increase oil sands royalties 
in these province-wide reviews in 2007 and 2015-16?  
This chapter answers the main research question by weaving together empirical findings that 
consider institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors from the 2007 and 2015-16 case 
studies to explain royalty review stasis in Alberta. It includes a summary of individual “I” factors, 
then collections of “I”s highlighted through the resource curse and petrostate theories, and then 
sheds light on 3Is factors that interacted. Next, I turn to the contributions of this study, including 
empirical, analytical, and theoretical contributions. Like all research, this study had certain 
limitations, which can point us in the direction of future research. Finally, I end with policy 
alternatives to improve royalties in Alberta and provide concluding thoughts.  
6.2. Explaining Royalty Review Stasis: 3Is Trends & Interrelationship across Cases  
As highlighted in chapters 4 and 5, there are distinctive and direct institutional, interest-based, 








However, at the outset of this research, and based on the literature, I expected to find that 
corporate interests were the main reason behind oil sands royalties’ stasis in Alberta. Specifically, 
corporate power literature led me to expect that oil corporations were preventing royalties from 
being raised by exerting traditional political pressure mechanisms (e.g. lobbying) on government. 
However, after completing fieldwork and interviewing actors, I found that a variety of factors 
played a role in pushing for or against royalty increase, leading to stasis. In particular, I found 
that institutional circumstances (e.g. fluctuating oil prices) both opened and closed opportunities 
to review royalties in a province where the government seemed to have no real interest in 
increasing Albertans’ share. I also discovered that many Albertans resist royalty changes in part 
due to their understanding of resource “ownership” and the shared myths they have about 
themselves. These ideational factors formed the bedrock of a political culture built on oil 
dependency. As a result, Alberta’s general political culture left little place for the profound, 
radical systematic change necessary for Albertans to truly obtain their share of oil sands 
development. These factors are summarized below, followed by specific collections of “I”s 
uncovered using the resource curse and petrostate theories, and interconnected institutional, 
interest-based, and ideational factors in direct relation to royalty stasis.  
6.2.1. Institutions, Interests, and Ideas 
For institutions, the first factor that defined royalty possibilities in oil-dependent Alberta was the 
drop in oil prices both in 2007 and 2015-16. At both times, the promise of launching a review 
was made during high oil prices. At the time, Albertans saw increasing wealth flowing into the 
province, primarily benefiting oil corporations. However, when the Conservative and New 
Democratic governments were elected in 2007 and 2015-16 respectively, global oil prices fell, 
impacting corporate profits in Alberta. This price bust triggered corporations to argue in favour 
of the status quo in royalty policy, despite Albertans demanding change. The fall of oil prices 
notably allowed corporate interests to galvanize parts of public opinion and government in their 
favour. Second, the institutionalization of corporate influence in government decision-making 
also played an important role in defining royalty possibilities. Corporations’ use of revolving 
doors, their engagement in royalty review panels, and the funding of political parties are all 
examples of the general acceptance of corporate influence in Alberta’s institutions. Third, 
Alberta’s economic dependency left it vulnerable to the power of these same corporations; with 
most of its economy dependent on oil, it proved ill-equipped to face the constant demands of the 
oil industry. Fourth, rules and regulations around oil sands costs, which were debated during both 
reviews, but particularly in 2007, left little room for increasing royalties given the debate around 
extraction costs, allowable costs, and the industry’s general capacity for absorbing increased 








of support from universities and the media. Both of them played a central role in encouraging oil 
activity and creating a framework for supporting anti-royalty-increase discourses. On the other 
hand, the 2015 review faced various institutional challenges, including the shale revolution, 
which affected oil sands’ market share by changing the behaviour of Canada’s largest buyer, the 
U.S.; the NDP’s weaker institutional capacity because of its lack of experience, the surprise 
nature of its electoral victory, and the lack of institutional memory transfer from the PC to the 
NDP governments; the greater hostility of the media and civil service in 2015-16; and the 
limitation of the four-year electoral cycle given that the NDP government had never been elected 
before. Indeed, for example, the four-year electoral cycle limited the NDP’s political capital 
given that the Party had been elected for the first time in the province’s history. Unlike the 
Conservatives who had been in power for more than four decades, the NDP had to make a fresh 
start and begin implementing its campaign promises. However, industry was on its guard from 
the NDP election victory and the campaign promise of reviewing royalties. Therefore, to ensure 
that, at minimum, it would have a chance of being re-elected at the end of its mandate, the NDP 
decided not to provoke the oil industry further, and appointed a Panel with obvious ties to 
the sector. Had the NDP been in power before, or had it had more time in its mandate, it might 
have considered its promises to Albertans above its need for survival.  
For interest-based factors, it is important to understand the impact of specific interest groups on 
royalty policy, namely, corporate oil actors, rural communities, and civil society actors. First, 
industry successfully showed a united front both in 2007 and 2015-16. Oil corporations had 
various needs, interests, and demands depending on their sector of activity (upstream, mid-
stream, downstream), size (small producers vs large producers), and scale of operations 
(domestic vs. international). Yet, through various strategies and alliances, the oil industry 
organized to ensure it would send one message, namely: reviewing royalties was dangerous and 
undesirable for all. Whether through CAPP or other alliances, this heterogeneous group of 
corporate oil actors successfully battled against an increase in royalties. Second, rural 
communities—especially in 2007—proved staunch defenders of the oil industry. Their advocacy 
work was rooted in their dependency on oil activity and the absence of an alternative economy 
in remote areas. Alberta’s rural caucus is famous for making or breaking political careers, 
especially those of leaders who might suggest oil policies unfavourable to the oil industry. Last, 
certain civil society actors challenged the oil industry: research institutes such as the Pembina 
Institute and the Parkland Institute garnered public attention by leading the pro-royalty increase 
movement, and many Albertans weighted in. Unfortunately, they faced limitations related to 
scarce resources and timing, in part due to the NDP’s taking experts from Alberta’s left-leaning 
institutions, which weakened these organizations and their ability to run successful public 








Finally, for ideas, Albertans’ political culture and political ideologies influenced royalty 
possibilities both in 2007 and 2015-16. Royalty outcomes were partly a product of the industry’s 
framing of the issue in ways that resonated with broader “shared myths” that some Albertans 
have about themselves (specifically, the “frontier” identity and popularity of free market 
economics) and their perception of what ownership entailed. For example, these myths, built on 
self-reliance, rejected government involvement both in 2007 and 2015-16 often led pro-oil 
Albertans, owners, to demand government align its policy with the oil industry’s demands. They 
saw royalty policy as the oil industry’s prerogative and believed that increasing royalties could 
cause the industry harm.  Other ideational factors include some Albertans’ dedication to 
extracting “ethical oil” (in 2007) as well as ideological divisions amongst NDP (in 2015-16). 
Indeed, differences around the need—or not—to compromise with the oil industry led to a schism 
inside the party, further eroding its ability to garner support for potential royalty changes. These 
ideas informed the policy choices both of individuals and groups and therefore participated in 
influencing royalty outcomes. 
6.2.2. Resource Curse and Petrostate Collections of Institutions, Interests, and Ideas 
Let us turn to examine the ways the 3Is function in relation to resource curse and petrostate 
theories. Alberta’s scramble to find new markets and its vulnerability to international events such 
as global oil price fluctuations and the shale revolution all illustrate the province’s economic 
dependency on the oil sector. This dependency weakens Alberta’s institutions and prevents the 
province from breaking away from the power of industry interests. Resource curse and petrostate 
theories also highlight specific ways corporations exercised power in 2007 and 2015-16. 
One dominant characteristic of resource cursed jurisdictions is their tendency towards rentier 
behaviour (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). The absence of a sales tax in the 
province means that government relies directly on oil and gas royalties, and thus, on industry, 
which ensures that the few taxes that exist will not be raised (e.g. through the Canadian Tax 
Payers Federation’s aggressive lobbying). Rentier state theory tells us this model is unsustainable 
and undesirable when building a healthy economy. In a healthy economy, governments rely on 
citizens’ taxes, and thus remain accountable to them—not to corporations (Carter and Zalik, 
2016). With more tax payers’ funds at its disposal, Alberta could have easily invested in a trust 
fund like Norway’s to benefit tax payers. In addition, the gap left by the absence of a sales tax 
strengthens the province’s dependency on its successful sectors, especially oil, agriculture, and 
banking. 
In addition, during oil booms, Alberta consistently drove inflation locally by reinjecting large 








during the oil booms, it could have avoided large inflation. Alberta is caught in a boom and bust 
cycle: when money comes in, there is no impetus to change; when money does not come in, there 
are no funds to change. Regardless of whether the oil sands are extraordinarily profitable, they 
cannot be touched. 
Worse, the power of lobbies ensured that Alberta’s economy is dependent on a unique buyer. 
The influence of lobbies runs deep. As one interviewee pointed out, despite the shale revolution, 
the province’s longstanding reliance on the U.S. illustrates the influence of American interests in 
Calgary in general and Big Oil and the U.S.’ Energy Department in particular. These American 
influences ensure that Albertan oil continues to flow to the U.S.. This reliance on one product—
oil—and one market—the U.S.—puts Alberta at a disadvantage when oil prices tank or 
technological breakthroughs like the shale revolution threaten Canada’s relationship with its 
largest buyer. This influence infiltrated Alberta Department of Energy: in the words of a former 
senior civil servant now academic, when selecting a new Minister of Energy, the Premier needs 
to ensure they appoint someone “acceptable to industry” (Interviewee 11). In short, “Energy 
Ministers are cheerleaders for the energy industry” (Interviewee 11) who reinforce the province’s 
dependency instead of prioritizing diversification to be more resilient. In a resource-cursed 
petrostate, the oil industry has disproportionately more power than other actors intervening in the 
policy-making process. 
Resource curse and petrostate theories bring to light various ways corporations exercised their 
power. In 2007, corporations deployed instrumental power by maintaining a climate of 
uncertainty in rural communities highly dependent on oil activity and generously funded 
institutions like universities and the media to gain their favour and support. It exercised discursive 
power by spreading ethical oil narratives that encouraged bigger and faster oil sands exploitation 
and by shifting its expert vs. victim discourse, putting pressure on the review Panel and 
government, and making use of critical political moments. Finally, it exercised structural power 
by threatening to hamper Alberta’s economy by leaving the province and/or stop investing, and 
in the aftermath of 2007. 
However, industry changed its strategy in 2015-16. As the analysis of the 2015-16 case study has 
made clear, corporate power manifested directly in the review and was illustrated by the absence 
of recommendations pertaining to the oil sands. Industry exercised instrumental power by 
continuously lobbying against royalty increase. It exercised structural power by ensuring that key 
actors in the review process would be favourable to its interests, from the working groups and 
consulting firm, to the Panel members. Pro-industry voices had the advantage of being well-
prepared and well-resourced. It exercised discursive power, spreading its ideas early, making it 
difficult for ensuing ideas to become entrenched. It also framed royalty issues discussed on the 








working” to its favour—positioning itself as a provider of jobs and wealth—and equivocating 
the dual victim vs. expert narrative. The oil industry found creative ways to pressure governing 
actors to keep royalties low. 
In Alberta, the economic players became political players. Based on observations and analyses 
of the various strategies used, the oil industry exhibited many characteristics typical of a political 
player: it had funding and resources to lobby government; conduct and fund research; analyze 
data; organize protests; fund initiatives at the local level (e.g. scholarships, renovations, and so 
forth); send opinion pieces in the media; and spread narratives to galvanize voters. In a petrostate 
plagued by the resource curse, ideational landscapes were mostly pro-oil, institutions tipped in 
favour of the oil sector, and interest group interactions were terribly uneven. In particular, 
economic players (e.g. the oil industry) influenced political players (e.g. government, citizens). 
During the 2007 and 2015-16 royalty reviews, oil industry lobbies exerted their influence both 
on governed (i.e. citizens) and governing (i.e. government) to ensure that royalties would remain 
low. 
6.2.3. Interactions 
Beyond looking at the 3Is as siloed causal factors in light of resource curse and petrostate 
theories, I suggest that various institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors were 
intertwined and interrelated, often reinforcing one another. Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997, 154-
156) remind us that an interest-based approach can integrate ideas by acknowledging that: (1) 
cultural understandings are often mobilized by strategic agents choosing cultural frames; (2) 
costs and benefits are perceived and interpreted; (3) the type of contention depends on the cultural 
context; and (4) collective interests depend on communities, which are culturally informed.  
In the case of Alberta, oil corporations were strategic agents who chose specific cultural frames 
in favour of the oil industry to ensure that stakeholders would refuse a royalty increase and favour 
the status quo. In the same vein, the NDP had to decide on royalty policy based on its perceived 
and interpreted costs and benefits analysis. While the NDP had an ambitious strategic plan at the 
beginning of its mandate, it quickly realized the costs of continuing on its long-standing crusade 
against the oil industry. One of the fundamental values the NDP needed to protect was the labour 
force; after all, the NDP was created by labour for labour, to ensure that labour interests were 
appropriately translated into government policy. Unfortunately, with the oil industry offering 
numerous jobs in the province, both directly and indirectly, and paying its labour force higher 
wages than any other industry, the NDP faced a backlash from labour interests. Ideally, the NDP 
would have been able to offer oil workers alternative jobs in renewables or wells cleanup. This 








resilient domestically. But the NDP had limited political capital and it had to choose wisely how 
to spend it. The ideological schism within the NDP illustrates Lichbach and Zuckerman’s third 
interest-idea integration and demonstrates the importance of the cultural context on the type of 
contentions that happened inside the Party. These contentions—especially the divergences 
between staunch anti-oil supporters and realistic middle-grounders who saw NDP compromises 
to the oil industry as inevitable—stem from the heated cultural context around Alberta’s oil 
royalties and its dependency on the oil economy. Finally, the formation of a pro-oil rural caucus 
is a good example of how collective interests (e.g. the need for economic activity and jobs) 
depend on communities (e.g. rural communities) who are culturally informed (e.g. in this case, 
often influenced by oil corporations’ framings around these communities’ needs).  
In the same vein, Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997) also argue that an institutional approach can 
integrate ideas by accepting that (1) the opportunities allowing change in an institutional 
framework must first be perceived and considered useful to be acted upon; (2) culture is diffused 
through structure; (3) and therefore that creating cultural understandings often happens through 
structural networks, themselves created by institutions. In the case of Alberta, the drop in oil 
prices triggered Albertans to imagine an opportunity to change an institution—the royalty 
framework—and in the case of 2015-16, successfully elect a government that campaigned on 
promising that change. Similarly, the province’s civil service and conservative legacy are good 
examples of how culture—in this case, political culture—can be diffused through structure. The 
civil service, despite being supposedly neutral, is necessarily influenced by the conservative 
culture under which it developed; at the time of the 2015-16 reviews, many civil servants had 
only served under a Conservative government. Therefore, in addition to remaining constant, the 
civil service has evident influence on the functioning of the highest institution in the province, 
the government. Finally, cultural understandings of what was considered an appropriate policy 
recommendation on oil sands royalties proved very different in 2007 and 2015-16. The 
understanding that oil sands royalties did not need to be changed in 2015-16 stemmed from a 
structural network of individuals, i.e. Panel members, who had close ties to the oil industry and 
were appointed by government, an institution with structural dependency on the oil sector. 
The oil industry’s successful association in the battle against increased royalties illustrates 
Lichbach and Zuckerman’s (1997) conclusion that idea-based approaches also lend themselves 
well to being combined with other approaches. It also validates Bradford’s hypothesis (1999, 
cited in Purdon, 2015, 15) that ideas can progress if they “‘work’ on interests to realign the policy 
goals of collective actors,” and “‘work through’ organizations to transform policy-making 
routines and state capacities.” By successfully corralling multiple corporate players, the oil 
industry capitalized on shared understandings and fears of increased royalties to realign these 








share as owners of the resource and expressing their preference via electoral voting is a good 
example of working “through” institutions to transform policy-making routines and state 
capacities, in this case, the election of a government and the launch of a province-wide royalty 
review. 
The connections between the 3Is that the Alberta case has revealed make it clear that other 
combinations exist, beyond those identified by Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997). Combining 
institutional and interest-based approaches reveals causal explanations for royalty review stasis. 
For example, while both the Conservative and New Democratic governments initiated the royalty 
review as promised during their electoral campaigns, the NDP had limited political capital at its 
disposal; this limitation made it particularly vulnerable to be influenced by Alberta’s structural 
and economic dependency on oil when it appointed a Panel with ties to the oil industry. In the 
same vein, certain institutional limitations bounded the Conservative and New Democratic 
governments' influence and favoured corporate actors. Indeed, despite being united in the goal to 
review royalties, the Conservatives of 2007 and the New Democrats of 2015-16 were two distinct 
governments representing Albertans at two different points in time. Because they stood on 
opposite ends of the political spectrum, there was little overlap between the two governments. 
This institutional limitation played to industry’s advantage. Unlike the provincial government 
that had no learning curve or institutional memory to tap into, industry could present a united 
front both in 2007 and 2015-16, sharing in the experience of its conglomerate of companies under 
the CAPP banner. Finally, the obligation to pursue the multiple policy initiatives announced 
during the NDP’s campaign divided the Party’s attention: it had to decide how to split its political 
capital between the carbon levy, the climate change review, and the royalty review. After its 
surprise electoral victory, the NDP started with the carbon levy, which was one of Notley’s top 
agenda items, quickly followed by the climate change review. However, by launching the climate 
change review before the royalty review, the NDP lacked time to prepare to reform Alberta’s 
royalty structure in its entirety. The party also faced backlash from some Albertans who had not 
fully accepted that the oil industry had experienced irreparable damage. With the carbon levy 
and the climate change review taking up the majority of the party’s resources, combined with 
industry pressure to keep royalties unchanged, the NDP could not meet the expectations of 
Albertans who had hoped for increased royalties with the party’s rise to power. 
Finally, combining institutions, interests, and ideas also contributes to explaining royalty stasis. 
Albertans’ demands for a fair share failed in part because they were influenced by powerful 
corporate actors who ensured Alberta’s royalty framework would remain in their favour. 
Albertans tried to get their fair share of their resources, both vocally by demanding a royalty 
review and politically, by electing leaders they believed would be game-changers. They asked 








adequate compensation for the extraction and exploitation of their provincial treasure. The 
revenue from the royalties was to flow through government and provide social benefits to society 
as a whole. However, consistently low royalties across two reviews and governments show that 
both Albertans and government were captured by industry’s influence; for example, they were 
convinced to favour short-terms gains over long-term benefits. The reviews were supposed to 
ensure that Albertans maximize their revenues; instead, industry maximized its revenue—two 
opposite goals. In the words of a Panel member, “what is civic, what is governance or 
government, what is capitalism and free enterprise" in all three of these cases, it "sure as hell 
isn’t corporate welfare” (Interviewee 12). Digging further, this policy failure might also in part 
be explained by individuals who benefited personally from keeping royalties low and industry 
happy. The same Panel member lamented that revolving door practices were “nakedly or 
simplistically short term, on something that is so dramatically large and long–term in its 
implications” (Interviewee 12). Whether individuals benefited through revolving doors, personal 
investment and banking, or social perks, the few might have robbed the many—a key 
characteristic of a petrostate where an oligarchic minority, in this case, a petro-elite built upon 
corporate interests, benefits from oil revenue and resists change. 
Despite their self-perceived pioneer/frontier identity and free market beliefs, many Albertans 
accepted low oil sands royalties, undervaluing their most profitable resource. This led to a 
historical trade-off which many Albertans have only begun to realize: they traded growing 
sustainable funding for immediate economic activity. In the words of a Panel member, “We gave 
up the possibility of a trillion dollar renewable growing financially resource that could meet our 
expenses forever, to have activity in the meantime… We gave up the long term in favour of the 
activity, because the activity gets politicians elected. They are feeling better because neighbors 
and relatives have jobs” (Interviewee 12). As a whole, Albertans demanded a royalty increase; 
individually, the powerful, organized few (the oil sector) profited from the status quo and shaped 
the institutions that govern Alberta’s resources. 
6.2.4. Concluding Thoughts on Alberta’s Royalty Stasis 
The three “I”s analysis, both as individual and intertwined factors, combined with the petrostate 
and resource curse theories, provide an on-the-ground explanation of oil sands royalty stasis in 
Alberta. We saw that ideas are wielded by powerful interest groups who have preferential access 
to policy making through institutional structures that develop over time. This analysis provides 
a micro-level view of a resource-cursed petrostate: unpacking and seeing more clearly the 
nuanced workings and dynamics at play in an oil-dependent province reveal that we require more 
than corporate interests to explain royalty stasis. Ideas and institutions are equally important. 








way of thinking about institutional and political resource curses. Taken together, these theories 
combined with the empirical findings presented here, allow for macro-level conclusions 
regarding the significance of all three Is in the case. The 2007 and 2015-16 royalty reviews 
confirm that in a petrostate plagued by the resource curse, the oil industry, as a hybrid economic 
and governance player, can control policy. However, throughout the study, I make the argument 
that both international circumstances (e.g. fluctuations in global oil prices, the shale revolution), 
together with domestic ideas Albertans embrace (e.g. pioneer/frontier identity, free market 
beliefs) defined policy possibilities at home. Performing this analysis at the provincial level 
shows that a multitude of institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors—operating 
sometimes in silo, sometimes in connection with others—participate in explaining stasis. 
Surprisingly, although one might expect Conservative governments to favour low royalties, oil 
sands royalties were actually increased more significantly in 2007 than in 2015-16. The long-
standing Conservative presence in Alberta might explain why the Conservative government and 
the 2007 royalty review fared better than the NDP government and 2015-16 Panel. Conservative 
interests were well-entrenched in the province and with oil prices skyrocketing, many expected 
a review. In particular, industry “trusted” the Conservatives to constrain opportunities to increase 
royalties because the Conservatives had historically been favouring industry. In addition, the 
Panel appointed by the Conservative government was well-balanced with various expertise on 
energy and tax structures. In contrast to 2007, industry was better prepared in 2015-16. The 
NDP’s surprise election left it scrambling to put together a government while launching the 
ambitious initiatives it had promised during its campaign, thus affording industry the strategic 
advantage of preparedness.  Like the Conservatives, the New Democrats also faced a price bust 
upon being elected and Notley submitted to industry's interests. However, despite this 
concession, industry did not support the NDP in the 2019 election. The NDP compromised, but 
industry’s interests ultimately decided they would be better served by a Conservative-oriented 
government. 
That being said, while the NDP had the aforementioned factors playing against it from the 
beginning, this study shows that no political party in Alberta’s recent history succeeded in 
implementing significant royalty policy changes, not even the Conservative party. This limitation 
illustrates in part the power of the oil industry in Alberta. Even when there was a radical change 
of government, the NDP, who placed royalty reviews at the core of its electoral campaign, proved 
unable to enact meaningful changes. Further, industry was so involved during the reviews that 
when asked during interviews if there was anything they would have changed in handling the 
reviews, industry representatives replied they would have liked to give people the benefit of the 
doubt more often instead of assuming that all Albertans were determined to raise royalties. 








thus felt it may have taken royalty changes more seriously than necessary, or perhaps, could have 
been more willing to work with other groups, including government. 
We see industry’s power even post-reviews: while the oil sector had consistently vocally opposed 
government involvement, oil sands players asked Notley’s government directly to mandate 
production cuts to protect the industry (Seskus, 2018). Nevertheless, corporate power alone 
cannot explain royalty stasis; additional institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors played 
a critical role in royalty policy. The government of Alberta proved unable to manage the resource 
per its constitutional duty to ensure that Albertans obtain their fair share of the resource; rather, 
it operated like a business, giving the oil industry almost free rein in influencing policy. Ideas, 
especially pro-royalty increase ideas, were equally powerful, although the agents who yielded 
them were not always invited at the policy-making table. They found themselves limited to 
keeping the status quo rather than influencing royalty outcomes. Institutions provided structure, 
rules, and processes, often shifting between enabling powerful interest groups and ceding to 
Albertans’ demands. Overall, reflecting on the 2007 and 2015-16 reviews, this thesis goes 
beyond traditional understandings that corporate power alone explains policy outcomes and 
argues that it is a myriad of institutional, interest-based, and ideational conditions that shaped oil 
sands royalty policy.    
6.3. Empirical, Analytical, and Theoretical Contributions 
6.3.1. Empirical Contributions 
These findings contribute to the literature in several ways. Empirically, they provide in-depth 
comparative case studies of oil sands royalty policy and review processes in 2007 and 2015-16 
in Alberta. The case studies contribute to understandings of how royalty policy is decided and its 
reviews conducted. For example, through my analysis, I find that the influence of fluctuating 
global oil prices, Albertans’ perceptions of their rights and responsibilities as owners, and the 
influence of corporate interests are all factors that played a significant role in influencing royalty 
policy. Furthermore, this is the first comprehensive study comparing the two royalty review 
processes of 2007 and 2015-16, which are unique in Alberta’s history. 22 By doing this 
comparative work, this study tracks similarities and differences between the two reviews and 
analyzes how some of the differences impacted the review outcomes.  
The dissertation’s main empirical contribution comes from fieldwork which provided new 
insights to explain royalty policy and stasis. Indeed, conducting interviews on the ground with 
key actors is the centrepiece of this research project and its most significant contribution, given 
                                                 








that many of the interviewed actors who intervened in one or both royalty review processes had 
not yet shared their assessments and reflections on those reviews. It contributes to the literature 
by revealing new empirical date through interviews with Panel members, government officials, 
and industry executives. Fieldwork in Alberta was conducted with the specific goals of building 
a strong understanding of oil sands royalty policy in 2007 and 2015-16 given Alberta’s long 
history of oil development; understanding power dynamics between stakeholders; examining 
institutional structures that limited or allowed policy change; and shedding light on narratives 
and ideas behind entrenched opinions—all of which defined royalty possibilities. 
Fieldwork also illuminated factors that were presumed to be influential, yet proved remarkably 
not. For example, before fieldwork, I expected to find that the idea of “Canada as an energy 
superpower” would certainly have impact on the development of royalty policy: it could easily 
be used as a show of discursive power by oil corporations hoping to dominate public discourse 
in favour of low royalties. In addition, the concept of Canada as an energy superpower played an 
important role in the contemporary economic strategy of former Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper—who was in office during the 2007 royalty review—as he used the term to brand 
Canada’s vast energy resources on the global energy market (Way, 2011). The term then 
reverberated through scholarly and policy circles and I expected it would make its way into the 
debate around royalties in Alberta, as an idea that would support increasing development at low 
costs. However, upon conducting interviews with actors on the ground, it quickly became clear 
that many Albertans refused to subscribe to the idea that Alberta had a role to play in Canada's 
energy superpower status. Indeed, the energy superpower narrative implied national 
collaboration and cooperation with the federal government. The phrase proved better suited to 
support the construction of pipelines across the country--a federal jurisdiction given its 
interprovincial nature--than to be used by the independently-minded Alberta government and oil 
corporations to encourage investment and activity in Alberta. 
The dissertation contributes an analysis of the extent to which Albertans can manage their 
resources and the various institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors that influence policy. 
Further, it analyzes the implications of ownership for royalty policy that can be applied to natural 
resource governance in other provinces and subnational entities that give specific rights and 
responsibilities to citizens while considering the government as proxy.  
6.3.2. Analytical and Theoretical Contributions 
My findings draw upon four theoretical bodies of literature: the 3Is, resource curse theory, 








of Alberta’s unwillingness to increase royalties in 2007 and 2015-16 in any significant way. First, 
my analysis makes several analytical contributions to the literature, including: 
- An understanding of how the 3Is can be applied in the Alberta oil sands policy context to 
recognize, map, and categorize institutional, interest-based, and ideational factors at play in 
influencing royalty policy. In testing the value and usefulness of the 3Is, my conclusion is that 
all 3Is played an important role in influencing royalty policy; they are intertwined. The 3Is 
framework is particularly useful because it is comprehensive, yet flexible enough to be applied to 
different policy contexts (e.g. oil-related), cases (e.g. subnational), and factors (e.g. international 
or national).  
    - A confirmation that resource curse and petrostate theories can be applied to subnational 
entity—as opposed to the more common applications on national states. Both resource curse and 
petrostate theories are useful to explain the royalty situation in Alberta. In particular, the value 
of petrostate theory is that it predicts accurately the dependent nature of the government of 
Alberta and its economy on the oil sector. In the same vein, resource curse theory sheds light on 
the impact on policy conditions and culture of the province’s oil dependency.  
    - An application of Fuchs’ theory of corporate power to frame the significant power and 
influence of one specific interest group, oil corporations, on royalty policy. This application 
shows that corporations promoted their legitimacy as governance actors by drawing upon 
instrumental, structural, and discursive power.  
Further, in doing the aforementioned, this study makes several theoretical contributions. More 
specifically, it provides a framework for using the 3Is in combination with: 
(1) Specific oil theories, namely the resource curse and petrostate theories, to illuminate specific 
constellations (or “collections”) of institutional, interest-based and ideational factors to be 
found in analyses of energy policy development. Resource curse and petrostate theories are 
especially useful to explain “how the Alberta world works” but they are leaning on a more 
deterministic side, which sidelines dynamics around royalty policy—hence the necessity to 
combine them with the 3Is.  
(2) Fuchs’ corporate power framework to understand the tools available to corporations exerting 
influence and transforming into governance actors. However, as mentioned above, while this 
study acknowledges the dominant role played by corporate actors—evident in the use of a 
specific typology of power—it also demonstrates that the story of oil sands royalty policy 








Nevertheless, Fuchs’ corporate power framework lends itself well with the 3Is because it allows 
for a more nuanced, fined grain understanding of interests specifically. It also works especially 
well in this study because oil corporations are a very powerful and influential type of corporation. 
In conclusion, this study reinforces that the 3Is framework can successfully explain influences 
on public policy developments at the subnational level, and not only at the more traditional level 
of the national state. Fieldwork and empirical data reinforced the value and usefulness of resource 
curse, petrostate, and corporate power theories as they unfolded in the Alberta case. Taken 
together, this study demonstrates that the 3Is lends itself well to oil contexts, confirming its 
flexibility. Indeed, this study draws from the resource curse and petrostate literatures to analyze 
the ways in which oil policy develops specifically and from the global governance literature on 
the different dimensions of power corporate actors can exercise to influence policy. The 
analytical framework used thus provides a more complete picture by combining a public policy 
theory with two oil-context theories, and digging further, one to map the power exercised by the 
dominant actors in the case. Through case studies on Alberta’s oil sands royalty policy and 
reviews, this dissertation demonstrates that the 3Is combined with resource curse, petrostate, and 
corporate power theories work to explain policy stasis. Ensuing empirical, analytical, and 
theoretical contributions support the development of policy-making practice, processes, and 
mechanisms that preserve the public’s interest in managing its natural resources. 
6.4. Limitations and Future Research Avenues 
In answering the question “What explains the decisions of the Alberta government not to 
significantly increase oil sands royalties in the 2007 and 2015-16 reviews?”, this study examines 
causal factors mapped through the 3Is, with a focus on specific collections of “I”s predicted by 
resource curse and petrostate theories. The study goes further, using Fuchs’ corporate power 
framework to examine the power exercised by the dominant interests at play, namely, oil 
corporations. It traces two landmark royalty review moments in Alberta’s history in 2007 and 
2015-16, but also offers a historical overview of royalty events leading up to 2007. Yet, despite 
this comprehensive approach, the study has limitations. 
Alberta has the largest oil resources in the country, far ahead any other provinces, which is why 
this study proposes to learn from the Alberta case first. Singling out one province allowed for the 
development, application, and testing of an analytical framework combining multiple theories to 
explain royalty policy outcomes during the 2007 and 2015-16 reviews. However, Alberta is not 
the only province with oil. Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador, British Columbia, and 
to a very small extent, Manitoba, as well as other regions, such as Northern Canada and Eastern 








one would need to study royalty policy in other Canadian provinces, as the Constitutional Act of 
1867 and its subsequent 1982 amendments explicitly recognize that the Canadian provinces have 
constitutional rights to manage their own non-renewable resources, including the power to levy 
taxes and royalties. To map all potential factors behind a provincial government’s decision to 
change royalties, further research might examine royalty policymaking in other provinces for 
insights into potentially missing causal factors, ones that might not be immediately apparent in a 
single case study like Alberta. This would take the form of an inter-provincial comparative 
studies to cross-reference royalty policies and their review processes in other oil-producing 
Canadian provinces. 
Second, and in the same vein, this study concentrates on corporate power only in one province 
and in one sector. The dissertation nuances the various corporate oil actors active in Alberta 
generally, and in royalty policy specifically, by distinguishing between large multinationals and 
smaller local producers. It also highlights how the needs, concerns, and objectives of these 
corporate actors often differ; yet, in the case of royalty policy, they often tried to focus on their 
similarities and overlapping goals rather than differences. This strategy proved particularly 
effective in swaying public discourse in favour of low royalties. However, these findings do not 
indicate whether the influence of oil corporations is common for economies dominated by a 
specific sector, or whether this influence of oil corporations is unique to that sector. To further 
examine this issue, further research might apply Fuchs’ corporate power framework to other 
influential and dominant industries and compare it to the power of the oil industry in Alberta. For 
example, this new research might uncover that the power enjoyed by oil corporations in Alberta 
is relatively typical for a dominant industry—regardless of the sector. On the other hand, by 
looking at other provincial economies where there is a dominant sector, the research might bring 
to light the unusually dominant power of corporate oil actors compared to other corporate actors. 
The latter research avenue might contribute to oil-related literature on the unique power of 
corporate oil actors. 
Third, the study looks at two moments in history, 2007 and 2015-16, but fieldwork was conducted 
in 2018, at a time where the NDP administration responsible for launching the second royalty 
review and determining the new royalty framework, was still in power. Therefore, while 
interviews were conducted with key stakeholders on royalty policy—including royalty review 
Panel members; formerly elected government officials, members of opposition parties, and long-
standing civil servants; industry actors, particularly corporate executives of major companies 
involved specifically in the oil sands and industry associations; and civil society actors, university 
academics, researchers at institutes, and journalists—the establishment of the NDP at the time 
limited interview possibilities. At the time, public servants and elected officials were often 








might unlock critical findings with regards to the NDP, now that a different government leads 
Alberta. 
Building on the aforementioned limitations and subsequent future research avenues, it would be 
particularly interesting to apply the same analytical framework used here—a combination of 3Is, 
resource curse, petrostate, and corporate power theories—to look at other subnational cases, 
especially across countries. An example that comes to mind is to look south of the border, to the 
U.S.. With significant oil production activity, the states of Texas, North Dakota, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Colorado could all provide a backdrop against which to study the Canadian 
provinces. While there are major differences between Canadian provinces and American states 
(e.g. resource ownership arrangements), at their core, both provinces and states are coping with 
similar patterns of fossil fuel dependence and hard lobbying from fossil fuel interests. In addition, 
both are trying to strike a balance between gaining from resource extraction while not deterring 
said extraction. Future research might thus offer an understanding of how these dynamics play 
out and compare the role and behaviour of corporate oil actors in the two cases: are oil 
corporations more or less involved in policy-making south of the border? What might have large 
oil multinationals involved in both countries “learned” from their experience in the U.S.? This 
approach would not only illuminates the role of corporate oil actors and how they exercise their 
instrumental, structural, and discursive powers, but also shed light on factors that influence their 
behavior (e.g. the relative authority of subnational governments, the support of the population, 
the power of pro- and anti-oil lobbies, etc.). 
6.5. Policy Alternatives & Conclusion 
This study is a critical analysis of royalty policy in Alberta during landmark royalty reviews in 
2007 and 2015-16. Therefore, after careful examination of institutional, interest-based, and 
ideational factors at play in influencing royalties in this subnational, resource cursed petrostate, 
this section discusses potential policy alternatives, first at the micro-level—including review 
timing, royalty review Panel process, and royalty rates—and second, at the macro-level—
accounting for broad institutional, interest-based, and ideational changes.  
The 2007 and 2015-16 royalty reviews demonstrate there is never a “good” time to review 
royalties; rather, domestic and international institutions, interests, and ideas change so fast, the 
only way Albertans can ensure their “fair share” of the resource is by reviewing royalties more 
frequently. History shows that Alberta’s royalties are reviewed every ten years or so. A former 
high level Alberta civil servant proposed a solution that would ensure a flexible royalty 
framework, more adaptable to political and economic circumstances: annual reviews. Annual 








domestically (e.g. a newly elected political party) and abroad (e.g. the shale revolution in the 
U.S.).  
In terms of process, the reviews would still be conducted by a Panel, as it is a format that 
concentrates high level expertise. I suggest a format following that of a standing commission, 
composed of academics and independent experts, to be in charge of reviewing royalties on 4-
year terms—similar to government—and who can decide on an individual basis to cancel or 
renew their affiliation with the Panel. This would ensure that as influential domestic and 
international circumstances change, the Panel retains a continuous expertise in royalties, rather 
than start from scratch at every review. In addition, the Panel would be supported by a Secretariat, 
who would provide logistical and basic research support to Panel members, freeing them from 
the minutiae of everyday tasks to focus on the complexities royalty analysis and policy 
possibilities.  
Similar to the current system, the Panel would need to be selected by the provincial government. 
However, in contrast to the current system, the central requirement, beyond being well-versed in 
royalties and oil research, would be for all members to have neither direct nor indirect ties to the 
oil industry. This is particularly crucial to ensure that royalties are fairly assessed and reviewed. 
While it is necessary to ensure that the oil industry, as the royalty payee, is offered an opportunity 
to express its views, it is precisely because it is a payee, one with the strongest interest in keeping 
royalties low, that it cannot be allowed influence on the Panel. Alberta’s resources belong to 
Albertans and they alone must make decisions regarding their resources’ royalties. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to ensure that the oil industry, and all other key stakeholders 
are provided an opportunity to express their views. To that end, I suggest a format that builds on 
the strengths of the 2007 and 2015-16 reviews, respectively, public involvement and expert 
groups. In 2007, the Panel visited dozens of communities throughout the province to ensure that 
everyone would have their voice heard. In 2015-16, the process was conducted mostly behind 
doors with expert groups formed to support Panel work—but many of these groups were industry 
executives, not regular citizens. The new format proposed here would create room for all 
stakeholders by offering them the opportunity to submit and present their position to the Panel. 
These submissions and presentations would complement the primary data at the Panel’s disposal 
and support the Panel’s research and analysis. This process would take place over a limited time 
window shorter than the 2007 Panel’s to keep the work of the Panel manageable.  The challenge 
here would be to ensure that this window allows for a wide variety of voices to be heard given 
that stakeholders in Alberta’s royalties are many and of disparate financial means. This is where 
the Secretariat would play a key role in filtering and organizing the submissions and presentations 








of presentations allocated to different interest groups, including industry, researchers, NGOs, 
citizen groups, unions, and Indigenous people. 
The new Panel format would also prevent the dismantling of the Panel upon the release of its 
report to ensure members have the opportunity to defend recommendations on the public scene. 
In 2007 especially, dismantling the Panel proved disastrous both for the recommendations given 
and for Panel members themselves. Given that the Panel was dissolved upon submitting its report 
to government, it was left without resources and authority to defend its recommendations. For 
example, this allowed opponents supporting the status quo in royalties to vehemently criticize 
Panel recommendations in an attempt to sway public opinion against these recommendations. 
This created a one-sided conversation where the experts tasked to review royalties abruptly fell 
silent. 
Finally, deciding on the ideal royalty rate is not for the researcher, but rather for policy-makers 
and Albertans. It remains necessary, however, that the royalty rates be tiered to global oil prices—
as was proposed by the 2007 Panel—in a simple, understandable, and straightforward manner. 
As global oil prices increase, the royalty rate should increase as well. Indeed, Albertans, as 
owners of the oil sands, should have priority in receiving a larger share from their extraction, not 
corporations. As mentioned previously, the 2015-16 Panel did propose various sensitivities 
(including price sensitivity, productivity sensitivity, and different vintages sensitivity), but the 
calculations proposed were so complex, very few of the experts interviewed during fieldwork 
understood the changes proposed. While other sensitivities could remain “obscure” if necessary, 
price sensitivity is the most evident, impactful, and sensible of all sensitivities and should thus 
be clear and straightforward. Global oil prices should be directly tied to royalty rates in Alberta. 
As for macro-level changes, the 3Is framework illuminates potential policy alternatives that go 
beyond royalty reviews and suggest large scale change in Alberta. After conducting this study, it 
is clear that one of the reasons behind the controversial nature of the royalty review process stems 
from the fact that, institutionally, structurally, Alberta’s economy is heavily reliant on oil. The 
importance of economic diversification to prevent over-reliance on one sector—and thus the 
potential disproportionate power of corporate players from said sector—has been extensively 
reviewed in the energy literature on Dutch disease. Dutch disease theory posits that resource 
booms sharply increase exports, inflows of foreign currency, and therefore appreciation of the 
exchange rate. This in turns negatively affect other sectors of the industry who, forced to raise 
their production costs, become less competitive (Ross, 1999). The phrase itself was coined in 
1977 by The Economist to describe the adverse effects on Dutch manufacturing following three 
events: great natural gas discoveries in the Netherlands in the 1960s, the appreciation of Dutch 
real exchange rate, and the distress of the Dutch economy as a whole (Coerden, 1984). Some 








reinvesting capital in non-resources sectors. However, due to the expensive nature of extracting 
oil in Alberta, it is high oil prices and economic dependent on the U.S. rather than oil discovery 
that negatively affected other industries. For example, (Beine, Bos, and Coulombe, 2012) studied 
Alberta and Saskatchewan's oil booms and found that some of Dutch disease’s attributed effects 
were actually derived from the entangling of Canadian and U.S. currency. Thus, Alberta might 
have to confront the bleak reality that its economy—as it currently stands—is unsustainable and 
requires economic diversification if it is to avoid collapsing due to falling oil prices and 
diminished oil sands extraction. 
For interests, the power of corporate oil actors has been extensively studied in this thesis; yet, it 
remains that as corporate actors gain increasing legitimacy as governance actors, government 
needs to redefine the framework articulating their field of action. This framework and its 
mechanisms need to be put in place and controlled by a democratically-elected government since 
it is the proxy for Albertans in the management of their resources. As mentioned in the earlier 
part of the thesis, in the post-2000s, there has been a push for corporations to voluntary self-
regulate (Pearson and Seyfang, 2001). Unfortunately, as companies’ main fiduciary 
responsibility remains to their shareholders, it is unreasonable to expect their voluntary self-
regulation to be in favour of the public when their interests collide. The trend against government 
regulation of this powerful industry needs to change if corporate actors are indeed to remain 
legitimate governance actors.  
However, the trend aforementioned can only be reversed if there is a profound cultural shift away 
from government disengagement and toward increasing involvement. Government could lead 
this shift from the top-down by creating a taskforce to engage with Albertans. This taskforce 
would have two primary goals. First, it would open up a province-wide discussion on the meaning 
and associated powers of Albertans’ ownership, as citizens responsible for one of the largest and 
most lucrative resources on earth. Second, the taskforce would launch a PR campaign to help 
Albertans realize that the government of Alberta acts as their proxy; as a partner, not as an 
opponent. Citizen-owners need to be engaged, informed, and in a position to decide the fate of 
their resource, of their province. While there have been laudable attempts at shifting the 
conversation away from a confrontation with the oil industry, these attempts have been mostly 
coming from the grassroots level and isolated to a few ENGOs and research institutes dedicated 
to helping Albertans regain their legitimacy as owners. 
To conclude, there are various micro- and macro-level policy alternatives that would help 
improve royalty review processes and the province’s approach to resource extraction. Timing, 
Panel process, and royalty rates are all initiatives that remain accessible to policymakers. Policy 
alternatives at the macro-level such as economic diversification, regulation of corporate actors, 








reinvent itself in an age of climate change and resource transition. Nevertheless, the policy 
alternatives highlighted above can only be implemented if there is a province-wide appetite to do 
so, at all levels of society, from citizens to elected government officials. Indeed, pessimists 
studying Alberta might argue that if government is captured by industry from the top-down, 
perhaps the only way for citizens to break the resource-cursed petrostate cycle is by mobilizing 
large segments of society, refusing further oil exploitation, and demanding better accountability.  
One particularly important avenue to do so could be to support “keep it in the ground” (KIIG) 
initiatives that restrict fossil fuel extraction and the infrastructure that would transport that 
production. This policy effort would help counter the influence of the oil industry and move 
toward achieving the emissions reductions necessary to ensure climate stability. Costa Rica was 
the first national government to implement a moratorium on oil exploration and extraction in 
2011. Following, and in rapid succession in late 2017, France, Belize, Denmark, Ireland, New 
Zealand, Spain, and Germany announced bans on oil, gas, or coal exploration or extraction 
(Carter and McKenzie 2020). In Canada, subnational governments are already experimenting 
with bans on fossil fuels, notably in Québec. KIIG initiatives illustrate how citizen mobilization 
can be an instrument to keep industry in check when a government is captured. For KIIG, 
bringing the battle to the grassroots level forced industry to explain, compromise, and ultimately 
face the power of citizens from the ground up. Pressures will only continue to mount on Alberta’s 





















Acuña, R. (2016, February 01). “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Alberta's New Royalty 
Framework.” Parkland Institute 
http://www.parklandinstitute.ca/the_good_the_bad_and_the_ugly  
Adkin, L. E. (2016). First World Petro-Politics: The Political Ecology and Governance of 
Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Alberta Energy Regulator. n.d. “Our Mandate.” https://www.aer.ca/providing-
information/about-the-aer/who-we-are.html  
Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL). (2009, March). “Lost Down the Pipeline: In These 
Difficult Economic Times, Is the Alberta Government Doing Enough to Keep Value-
Added Oil-Sands Jobs in Canada?” 1-66. 
Alberta Legislative Assembly. (2008, November 20). Alberta Hansard, 27th Legislature, 1st 
Session (2008-2009). 
Anielski, M. (2015). “Historical Analysis of Alberta’s Oil and Gas Royalties.” Genuine Wealth, 
1-15. 
ATB Financial (2015). “ATB 2015 Annual Report.” 
http://www.atb.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/About/annual_reports/atb_2015_annual_
report.pdf  
Avant, D. D., Finnemore, M., & Sell, S. K. (Eds.). (2010). Who Governs the Globe? (1st 
edition). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). “Two Faces of Power.” The American Political Science 
Review 56(4), 947-952. https://doi.org/10.2307/1952796  
Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1970). Power and poverty: Theory and practice. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bakx, K. (2016, January 29). “Alberta Royalty Review Recommends Few Changes for Oil and 
Gas Industry.” CBC News. 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-royalty-review-changes-1.3424556  
Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 









Beblawi, H., & Luciani, G. (Eds.). (1987, 1st edition). The Rentier Sate. New York: Routledge. 
Beine, M., Bos, C., & Coulombe, S. (2012). “Does the Canadian Economy Suffer from Dutch 
Disease?” Resource and Energy Economics 34(4), 468-492.  
Beland, D., & Cox, R. H. (Eds.). (2010). Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
Bell, E. (1993). “The Rise of the Lougheed Conservatives and the Demise of Social Credit in 
Alberta: A Reconsideration.” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne 
de science politique 26(3), 455-475. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229046  
Bell, R. (2016, January, 30th). “Alberta Labour Leader Gil McGowan Pushes Back Against 
Premier Rachel Notley’s Royalty U-turn.” The Calgary Sun. 
http://www.calgarysun.com/2016/01/30/alberta-labour-leader-gil-mcgowan-pushes-
back-against-premier-rachel-notleys-royalty-u-turn  
Bercuson, D. J. (1980). “Regionalism and “Unlimited Identity” in Western Canada.” Journal of 
Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes 15(2), 121-126. 
Blanes I Vidal, J., Draca, M. & Fons-Rosen, C. (2012). “Revolving Door Lobbyists.” American 
Economic Review 102 (7), 3731-3748. 
Boychuk, R. (2015, September 22). “Learning the Lessons of Past Royalty Reviews.” Parkland 
Institute Blog. 
http://www.parklandinstitute.ca/learning_the_lessons_of_past_royalty_reviews  
Boychuk, R. (2010). “Misplaced Generosity: Extraordinary Profits in Alberta’s Oil and Gas 
Industry.” Parkland Institute: Edmonton, Alberta. 
http://www.parklandinstitute.ca/misplaced_generosity  
Bradford, N. (1999). “The Policy Influence of Economic Ideas: Interests, Institutions and 
Innovation in Canada.” Studies in Political Economy 59, 17–60. 
Bradford, N. (1999). “The Policy Influence of Economic Ideas: Interests, Institutions and 
Innovation in Canada.” Studies in Political Economy 59, 17–60. 
Brown, M. (2019, October 08). “U of A among Canada’s Top 5 Universities in Latest 
Maclean’s Ranking.” University of Alberta. https://www.ualberta.ca/about/university-
rankings-in-canada/news/2019/october/u-of-a-among-canadas-top-5-universities-in-
latest-macleans-ranking.html  
Brownsey, K. (2007). “The New Oil Order: The Post Staples Paradigm and the Canadian 








Busby, C., Dachis, B., & Dahlby, B. (2011). “Rethinking Royalty Rates: Why There Is a Better 
Way to Tax Oil and Gas Development.” C.D. Howe Institute 333, 1-36. 
Calgary Herald. (2008, February 28). “Red's my Colour!” 
https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/editorials/reds-my-colour  
Calgary Herald. (2012, April 5). “Stelmach’s Royalty Review and the Rise of the Wildrose.” 
Calgary Herald. https://calgaryherald.com/news/politics/stelmachs-royalty-review-and-
the-rise-of-wildrose  
Callahan, S. (2012, September 23). “My Yard, My Candidate: The Social Psychology of Lawn 
Signs.” https://theconversation.com/my-yard-my-candidate-the-social-psychology-of-
lawn-signs-8976  
Campbell, B. (2013). “The Petro-Path Not Taken: Comparing Norway with Canada and 
Alberta’s Management of Petroleum Wealth.” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
1-80. 
Campbell, J. (2002). “Ideas, Politics and Public Policy.” Annual Review of Sociology 28, 21-38. 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). (2015, January 21). “Increased Access 
to Markets Remains Critical Despite Recent Oil Price Decline.” News Release. 
Carroll, W. K. (2004). Corporate Power in a Globalizing World: A Study in Elite Social 
Organization. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Carroll, W. K., & Sapinski, J.P. (2018). Organizing the 1%: How Corporate Power Works. 
Winnipeg, MB: Fernwood Publishing.  
Carroll, W. L. (2017). “Canada’s Carbon-Capital Elite: A Tangled Web of Corporate Power.” 
The Canadian Journal of Sociology 42(3), 225-260.   
Carson, L., Ignasiak, M., Saric, D., Oleniuk, T-L., & Barretto, J. (2015, November 23). 
“Alberta’s New Climate Change Leadership Plan.” Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP. 
https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2015/alberta-s-new-climate-change-
leadership-plan  
Carter, A. V. (2016). “The Petro-Politics of Environmental Regulation in the Tar Sands.” In 
First World Petro-Politics: The Political Ecology and Governance of Alberta. Edited by 
Adkin, L. E. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 152-189. 
Carter, A. V. (2020). Fossilized: Environmental Policy in Canada’s Petro-Provinces. 








Carter A. V. & McKenzie, J. (2020). “Amplifying ‘Keep It in the Ground’ First-Movers: 
Toward a Comparative Framework.” Society and Natural Resources 33(11), 1339-58. 
Carter, A.V., & Zalik, A. (2016). “Fossil Capitalism and the Rentier State: Towards a Political 
Ecology of Alberta’s Oil Economy.” In First World Petro-Politics: The Political 
Ecology and Governance of Alberta. Edited by Adkin, L. E. Toronto, ON: University of 
Toronto Press, 51-77. 
Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Cattaneo, C. (2009, June 25). “Stelmach Readies Gas Incentives.” National Post. 
https://www.pressreader.com/canada/national-post-latest-
edition/20090624/282441345071196  
Cayley-Daoust, D., & Girard, R. (2012). “Big Oil's Oily Grasp: The Making of Canada as a 
PetroState and How Oil Money Is Corrupting Canadian Politics.” Ottawa, ON: Polaris 
Institute. 
CBC News. (2004, May 19). “Academic Integrity Debate Continues.” CBC News. 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/academic-integrity-debate-continues-
1.486101  
CBC News. (2015, February 19). “NDP Platform Promises to Reverse Cuts, Raise Corporate 
Taxes.” CBC News. http://www.cbc.ca/news/elections/alberta-votes/ndp-platform-
promises-to-reverse-cuts-raise-corporate-taxes-1.3039816  
CBC News. (2019, May 26). “Professor Fights University Of Regina in Court to Unveil 
Sources Of Oil And Gas Research Money.” CBC News. 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/professor-foip-oil-and-gas-resource-
research-1.5150593  
Chazan, G. (2008, February 5). “Oil Sands Are Shifting in Alberta. Costs, Regulation Are 
Slowing Boom; Game for Big Players.” The Wall Street Journal. 
Clancy, P. (2014). “Business Interests and Civil Society in Canada.” In Group Politics and 
Social Movements in Canada. Edited by Smith, M. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Clapp, J., & Fuchs, D. (Eds.). (2009b). Corporate Power in Global Agrifood Governance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Clarke, T. (1997). Silent Coup: Confronting the Big Business Takeover of Canada. Toronto, 








Clarke, T. (2009). Tar Sands Showdown: Canada and the New Politics of Oil in an Age of 
Climate Change. Toronto, ON: James Lorimer & Company Ltd. 
Clarke, T., Gibson, D., Haley, B., & Stanford, J. (2013). “The Bitumen Cliff. Lessons and 
Challenges of Bitumen Mega-Developments for Canada's Economy in an Age of 
Climate Change.” Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1-102.   
Clement, W. (1975). The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power. Ottawa, 
ON: Carleton University Press. 
Corden, W. M. (1984). “Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and 
Consolidation.” Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 36, 359-380. 
Coll, S. (2012). Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power. London, UK: Penguin 
Books. 
Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can 
Be Done about It. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Collier, P., & Venables, T. (Eds). (2011) Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in 
Natural Resource Extraction. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Collins, E. (2015, December 17). “Alberta’s Dirty Little Progressive Secret.” CBC News.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-conservative-politics-reputation-
1.3359242  
Conservation and Utilization Committee. (1972). “Fort McMurray Athabasca Tar Sands 
Development Strategy.” Conservation and Utilization Committee, Government of 
Alberta: Edmonton, Alberta. 
Cooley, A., & Ron, J. (2002). “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political 
Economy of Transnational Action.” International Security 27(1), 5–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/01622880232023121  
Cournoyer, D. (2007, October 03). “Who’s Behind ‘getitrightalberta.ca?’”Daveberta. 
http://daveberta.ca/2007/10/whos-behind-getitrightalberta-ca/ 
Cotter, J. (2015, December 4). “AER ‘Is Working Well’: Minister; Industry Praises Decision 
Not to Review Agency’s Regulatory Mandate.” Edmonton Journal.  
Cox, R. W. (1987). Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of 








Crisan, D., & Mintz, J. (2016). “Alberta’s New Royalty Regime Is a Step Towards 
Competitiveness: A 2016 Update.” The School of Public Policy, SPP Research Papers 
9 (35), 1-21. 
Crowe, S., Cresswell, K., Robertson, A., Huby, G., Avery, A., & Sheikh, A. (2011). “The Case 
Study Approach.” BMC Medical Research Methodology 11(100).  
Crystal, J. (1990). Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Crystal, J. (1994). “The Politics of Capital Flight: Exit and Exchange Rates in Latin America.” 
Review of International Studies 20(2), 131-147.  
Cutler, A. C. (2002). “Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation.” In The 
Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance. Edited by Bruce, R. H., & 
Biersteker, T. J. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Dabrowski, M. (2017). Fiscal Sustainability Challenges. Lambert Academic Publishing 
Dahl, R. A. (1957). “The Concept of Power.” Behavioral Science 2(3), 201–215. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303  
Dembicki, G. (2012, March 12). “Former Top AB Oil Sands Salesman Subject of Ethics 
Probe.” The Tyee. https://thetyee.ca/Blogs/TheHook/Labour-Industry/2012/03/12/gary-
mar-ethics-probe/  
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994, 1st edition). The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. Sage Publications.  
Detomasi, D. A. (2007). “The Multinational Corporation and Global Governance: Modelling 
Global Public Policy Networks.” Journal of Business Ethics 71(3), 321–334. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9141-2  
Diamanti, J. (2016). “Transition in a Petro Province? The Alberta NDP in Office.” Socialism 
and Democracy 30(2), 187-202. 
Dobbin, M. (2003). The Myth of the Good Corporate Citizen: Canada and Democracy in the 
Age of Globalization. Toronto, ON: James Lorimer & Company Ltd. 
Dobson, S. (2015). “Peering in Alberta's Darkening Future: How Oil Prices Impact Alberta's 
Royalty Revenues.” The School of Public Policy, SPP Research Papers, 8 (14). 
Dorow, S. (2015). “Gendering energy extraction in Fort McMurray.” In Alberta Oil and the 
Decline of Democracy in Canada. Edited by Barnetson, B., Dorow, S., Evans, J., 








Wall, K., & Acuna, R. Athabasca, Edmonton, AB: Athabasca University Press, p. 275-
292. 
Dorow, S., & O’Shaughnessy, S. (2013). “Fort McMurray, Wood Buffalo, and the Oil/Tar 
Sands: Revisiting the Sociology of ‘Community’ - Introduction to the Special Issue.” 
Canadian Journal of Sociology 38(2), p.121-140. 
Downie, C. (2017). “Business Actors, Political Resistance, and Strategies for Policymakers.” 
Energy Policy 108, 583-592. 
Doz, Y., & Prahalad, C. K. (1980). “How MNCs Cope with Host Government Intervention.” 
Harvard Business Review 58 (2), 149-157. 
Drache, D. (Eds.) (2001). The Market or the Public Domain? Global Governance and the 
Asymmetry of Power. London, New York: Routledge. 
Dunn, M. E. (2017). “Natural Resource Wealth: A Blessing or a Curse for Democracy?” 
Newcastle Business School Student Journal 1(1), 2-9. 
Eden, L., Lenway, S., & Schuler, D. (2008). “From the Obsolescing Bargaining to the Political 
Bargaining Model.” In International Business-Government Relations in the 21st 
Century. Edited by Grosse, R. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 251-272. 
Elections Alberta, n.d.(a). “Contributions.” 
https://www.elections.ab.ca/finance/contributions/#who  
Elections Alberta. n.d. (c). “Overall Summary of Ballots Cast and Voter Turnout 1975-2019.” 
Historical Results. https://www.elections.ab.ca/elections/election-results/historical-
results/ 
Elections, Alberta, n.d.(b). “Election Third Party Advertisers.” 
https://www.elections.ab.ca/political-participants/third-party-advertisers/third-party-
advertisers/  
Ellis, J., Amjad, A., & Deng, J. (2011). “Using Pre-interview Activities to Support Participants’ 
Recall and Analysis of Past Events.” In Education 17(2). 
Emery, J.C. H., & Kneebone, R. D. (2008). “Socialists, Populists, Resources, and the Divergent 
Development of Alberta and Saskatchewan.” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de 
Politiques 34 (4), 419-440. 
Epperson, B. Forthcoming. “La  Révolte Contre la Taxe Carbone : Représentations 
Médiatiques en Alberta (2015-2019).” Edited by Boily, F. Québec, QC: Presses de 








Fagre, N., & Wells, L. T. (1982) “Bargaining Power of Multinationals and Host Governments.” 
Journal of International Business Studies 13(2), 9-24. 
Falkner, R. (2008). Business Power and Conflict in International Environmental Politics. 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Fekete, J., & D’Aliesio, R. (2006, December 14). “Oilsands Royalties Put Under Review: 
Industry Welcomes Move.” Calgary Herald. 
Finch, D. (2008, March 1). “The Great Royalty Debate.” Alberta Views 11(2). 
https://albertaviews.ca/great-royalty-debate/  
Finn, E. (2000). Who Do We Try to Rescue Today? Ottawa, ON: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives. 
Fletcher, R. (2016, February 25). “Alberta's Deficit History: A Look at Past and Future 
Numbers.” CBC News. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-budget-context-
history-other-provinces-1.3464084  
Fossum, J. E. (1997). Oil, the State, and Federalism: The Rise and Demise of Petro-Canada as 
a Statist Impulse. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. 
Foster, P. (1979). The Blue-Eyed Sheiks: The Canadian Oil Establishment. Don Mills, ON: 
Collins. 
Frank, A. G. (1978). World Accumulation, 1492-1789. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 
Publishers Limited.  
Friedman, M. (1978). “A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is To 
Increase Its Profits.” New York Times Magazine, 122–126. 
Fuchs, D. (2005). “Commanding Heights? The Strength and Fragility of Business Power in 
Global Politics.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33(3), 771–801. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330030501  
Fuchs, D. (2007). Business Power in Global Governance. Lynne Reinner Publishing.  
Fuchs, D., & Lederer, M. M.-L. (2017). “The Power of Business.” Business & Politics 9(3), 1-
17. https://doi:10.2202/1469-3569.1214    
Gibson, D. (2007). “Selling Albertans Short: Alberta’s Royalty Review Panel Fails the Public 
Interest.” Parkland Institute, 1-26. 
Gillies, J. (1981). Where Business Fails: Business Government Relations at the Federal Level 








Gillies, J. (1981). Where Business Fails: Business Government Relations at the Federal Level 
in Canada. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
Gilson, J. (2011). “Transnational Advocacy: New Spaces, New Voices.” Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political 36(4), 288–306. https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375411430622  
Gladwin, T. N., & Walter, I. (1980). “How Multinationals Can Manage Social and Political 
Forces.” Journal of Business Strategy 1 (1), 54-68. 
Glasner, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago, IL: Aldine.  
Goldberg, E., Wibbels, E., & Mvukiyehe, E. (2008). “Lessons from Strange Cases: Democracy, 
Development, and the Resource Curse in the U.S. States.” Comparative Political 
Studies 41(4/5), 477–514. 
Goldstein, J., & R. Keohane. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and 
Political Change. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Gordon, J. (2018, December 5). “Explainer: Why is Canada's Alberta Forcing Oil Production 
Cuts?” Reuters.  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-crude-alberta-explainer-idUSKBN1O41Z4  
Gough, I. (2016). “Welfare States and Environmental States: A Comparative Analysis.” 
Environmental Politics 25(1), 1-24. 
Government of Alberta. (2006, March 22). “Budget 2006 Balances Immediate and Long-Term 
Priorities of Albertans.” https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=1960923054F2A-
B263-6777-99AFE71FA7BBEC59.  








Government of Alberta. (2021). “How Alberta’s Royalty System Works.” 
https://www.alberta.ca/royalty-how--system-works.aspx  








Government of Alberta. (n.d. (b) ) “Unemployment Rate.” 
https://economicdashboard.alberta.ca/Unemployment#:~:text=PUBLISHED%20%2D%
20Jun%205%2C%202020,the%20same%20period%20in%202019.  






Government of Alberta. (n.d. (d)). “Heritage Trust Fund: Historical Timeline.” 
https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/80ee4142-17f2-4bc7-b30b-
18afd3dfe5c8/resource/1c95d123-fa1d-49e3-ad25-98599aba2fb4/download/heritage-
fund-historical-timeline.pdf   
Government of Canada. (n.d.). “Canadian Energy Pricing Trends 2000-2010 – Energy Facts.” 




Green, K. P. (2015). “Fallout from the 2007 Alberta Royalty Review Panel.” Fraser Institute, 
Research Bulletin, 1-9. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/fallout-from-
the-2007-alberta-royalty-review-panel.pdf  
Gunster, S., & Saurette, P. (2014). “Storylines in the Sands: News, Narrative, and Ideology in 
the Calgary Herald.” Canadian Journal of Communication 39, 333–359. 
Gunton, T., & Richards, J. (1987). Resource Rents and Public Policy in Western Canada. 
Ottawa, ON; South Halifax, NS: Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
Haas, P. M. (1992). “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination.” International Organization 46(1,), 1–35. 
Hall, Peter A. (1997). “The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative 
Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations.” In Comparative Politics: Rationality, 
Culture, and Structure. Edited by Lichbach, M. I., & Zuckerman, A. S. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 174-207. 
Harrison, T. (2015). “Petroleum, Politics, and the Limits of Left Progressivism in Alberta.” In 
Alberta Oil and the Decline of Democracy in Canada. Edited by Shrivastava, M., & 








Hay C. (2002). “What’s ‘Political’ About Political Science?” In Political Analysis. Political 
Analysis. Red Globe Press, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-62911-0_2  
Heclo, H. (1994). “Ideas, Interests and Institutions.” In The Dynamics of American Politics. 
Approaches and Interpretations. Edited by Dodd, L. C., & Jillson, C. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 366-92. 
Helliwell, J. F., MacGregor, M. E., McRae, R. N., & Plourde, A. (1989). Oil and Gas in 
Canada: The Effects of Domestic Policies and World Events. Toronto, ON: Canadian 
Tax Foundation.  




Henton, D. (2015, September 21). “End of Year Deadline for Review of Alberta Energy 
Regulator, Says Minister.” Calgary Herald. 
https://calgaryherald.com/news/politics/end-of-year-deadline-for-review-of-alberta-
energy-regulator-says-minister      
Hester, A., & Lawrence, L. (2010). “A Sub-National Public-Private Strategic Alliance For 
Innovation And Export Development: The Case Of The Canadian Province Of 
Alberta’s Oil Sands.” Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean. 
Santiago, Chile: United Nations: 
Hettne, B. (2005). “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism.” New Political Economy 10(4), 543–571. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460500344484  
Hoberg, G., & Phillips, J. (2011). “Playing Defence: Early Responses to Conflict Expansion in 
the Oil Sands Policy Subsystem.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 44(3), 507-
527. 
Hudson, A. (2001). “NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks: From ‘Legitimacy’ to 
‘Political Responsibility’?” Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs 1(4), 
331–352. 
Hunter, W. M., Chrapko, E., Dwarkin, J., McKenzie, K., Plourde, A., & Spanglet, S. (2007). 











HIS Cambridge Energy Research Associates (HIS CERA). (2010). “Oil sands GHG Emissions 
Lower than Perceived.” Oil & Gas Journal. 
https://www.ogj.com/home/article/17209196/ihs-cera-oil-sands-ghg-emissions-lower-
than-perceived  
Ibrahim, M. (2016, February 1). ““Alberta NDP ‘Got It Wrong on Royalties,’ Labour Leader 
Gil McGowan Says.” Edmonton Journal. 
Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN). (2021.) “What Are the Tar Sands.” 
https://www.ienearth.org/what-are-the-tar-sands/  
Janson, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2004). “Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa.” 
Comparative Political Studies 37(7), 816-841. 
Jensen, H. J., Thomas, M., & Young, L. (2012). “Who Donates to Canada’s Political Parties?” 
Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association 
Edmonton, Alberta, June 12-15, 2012. 
Johnson, J. (1994). “Symbolic Dimensions of Social order.” Paper presented to a conference on 
“What Is Institutionalism Now?” University of Maryland. 
Jordison, S.S., & Hojjati N. (2021) “Non-Renewable Resource Revenue Savings and 
Distribution in Canada: Alberta.” In Sovereign Wealth Funds, Local Content Policies 
and CSR: CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance. Edited by Pereira E.G., Spencer 
R., & Moses J.W. Springer, Cham. 
Karl, T. L. (1997). The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Oakland, CA: 
University of California Press 
Karl, T. L. (1999). “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty.” 
Journal of International Affairs 53(1), 31-48.  
Keck, M. E., Keck, P. of P. S. M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: 
Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Köhler, N. (2009, April 29). “Alberta's Economic Woes Felt Across the Country?” The 
Canadian Encyclopedia.  
Koppell, J. G. (2010). World Rule: Accountability, Legitimacy, and the Design of Global 
Governance. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Kumar, V. (1999). “Funding of Elections: Case for Institutionalised Financing.” Economic and 








Lake, D. A. (2010). “Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global 
Governance: Rightful Rules.” International Studies Quarterly 54(3), 587–613. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00601.x  
Lancaster, K. (2017). “Confidentiality, Anonymity and Power Relations in Elite Interviewing: 
Conducting Qualitative Policy Research in a Politicised Domain.” International Journal 
of Social Research Methodology 20(1), 93-103.  
Laxer, G. (2015). After the Sands: Energy and Ecological Security for Canadians. Vancouver, 
BC: Douglas & McIntyre. 
Le Billon, P., & Carter, A. (2012). “Securing Alberta’s Tar Sands: Resistance and 
Criminalization on a New Energy Frontier.” In Natural Resources and Social Conflict: 
Towards Critical Environmental Security. Edited by Schnurr, M. A., & Swatuk, L. A. 
Palgrave Mcmillan, 170-192. 
Lee, K. (2010). “Civil Society Organizations and the Functions of Global Health Governance: 
What Role within Intergovernmental Organizations?” Global Health Governance 3(2), 
1–20. 
Leech, B. L. (2002). “Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructred Interviews.” PS: 
Political Science and Politics 35(4), 665-668.  
Leite, C., & Weidmann, J. (1999). “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, 
Corruption, and Economic Growth.” IMF Working Paper 99(85), 1-34. 
Levant, E. (2010). Ethical Oil: The Case for Canada’s Oil Sands. McClelland & Stewart. 
Levy, D., & Egan, D. (2000). “Corporate Political Action in the Global Polity.” In Non-State 
Actors and Authority in the Global System. Edited By Bieler, A., Higgott, R., & 
Underhill, G. London, UK: Routledge. https://dare.uva.nl/search?arno.record.id=90498  
Lewis, J. (2016, December 29). “CAPP Reserves judgement on Alberta’s Carbon Cap.” The 
Globe and Mail-Online. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-
news/energy-and-resources/capp-president-refuses-to-endorse-alberta-ndps-emissions-
limits/article27953596/  
Lichbach, M. I., & Zuckerman, A. S. (Eds). (1997). Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, 
and Structure. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 









Litvak, I. A. (1982). “National Trade Associations: Business-Government Intermediaries: 
Introduction.” Business Quarterly 47(3), 34-43. 
Lizée, E. (2010). “Rhetoric and Reality: Albertans and their Oil Industry under Peter 
Lougheed.” University of Alberta, Department of History and Classics, MA thesis. 
Lockwood, M., Kuzemko, C., Mitchell, C., & Hoggett, R. (2016). “Historical Institutionalism 
and the Politics of Sustainable Energy Transitions: A Research Agenda.” Environment 
and Planning C Government and Policy 35(2).  
Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A Radical View. Palgrave MacMillan. 
Lukes, S. (2004). Power: A Radical View (2nd Edition). Palgrave Macmillan. 
Macdonald, J. (2004, May 20). “Universities Entangled in Flap over Klein Essay.” The Globe 
and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/universities-entangled-in-
flap-over-klein-essay/article999098/  
MacNichol, V. (2007, June 30). “Oil Sands Consultations: Multistakeholder Committee Final 
Report.” Government of Alberta.  
Macrotrends. (n.d.). “Crude Oil Prices, 70 Year Historical Chart.” 
https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart  
Mahdavy, H. (1970). “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: 
The Case of Iran.” In Studies in the Economic History of the Middle-East. Edited by 
Cook, M.A. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 428-467. 
Majone, G. (1998). “'Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and Institutions.” In A 
New Handbook of Political Science. Edited by Goodin, R. E., & Klingemann, H.-D. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 610-27. 
Maki, A. (2015, May 5). “NDP wins Majority Government in Alberta, Ending PC Dynasty.” 
The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/alberta/alberta-votes-
2015/article24269623/   
Mansell, L. R., & Schlenker, R. (2006). “Energy and the Alberta Economy: Past and Future 
Impacts and Implications.” University of Calgary: Institute for Sustainable Energy, 
Environment and Economy. 
Marriott, J., Stockman, L., & Kronick, C. (2008). “BP And Shell: Rising Risks in Tar Sands 









McClure, M. (2018, August 23). “Notley Government Comforts Oilpatch during School 
Curriculum Makeover.” National Observer. 
https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/08/23/news/notley-government-comforts-
oilpatch-during-school-curriculum-makeover  
McConnell, R. (2017, January 10). “Jane Fonda in Fort McMurray: ‘Listen, I'm Not Against 
You,’ Actress Tells Resident During Parking Lot Squabble.” CBC News. 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/jane-fonda-in-fort-mcmurray-listen-i-m-
not-against-you-actress-tells-resident-during-parking-lot-squabble-1.3929813  
McCurdy, P. (2017). “Bearing Witness and the Logic of Celebrity in the Struggle over 
Canada’s Oil/Tar Sands.” In Carbon Capitalism and Communication: Confronting 
Climate Change. Edited by Brevini, B., & Murdock, G. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave 
Macmillan, p.131-145. 
McCurdy, P. (2018). “From the Natural to the Manmade Environment: The Shifting 
Advertising Practices of Canada's Oil Sands Industry.” Canadian Journal of 
Communication 43(1), p.33-52. 
McKenzie, R. B., & Dwight, R. L. (1991). Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of 
Wealth Has Changed the World. New York, NY: Free Press. 
McKeon, N. (2016). “Transforming Global Governance in the Post-2015 Era: Towards an 
Equitable and Sustainable World.” Globalizations 0(0), 1–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2016.1244757  
Mcmenamin, I. (2012). “If Money Talks, What Does It Say?: Varieties of Capitalism and 
Business Financing of Parties.” World Politics 64 (1), 1-38. 
McQuaig, L. (2019). The Sport and Prey of Capitalists: How the Rich Are Stealing Canada’s 
Public Wealth.  
Mcrae, R. G., & Hussey, I. (2017, November 02). “Cuts and Privatization Aren’t the Answer 
for Alberta.” Parkland Institute. 
https://www.parklandinstitute.ca/media_cuts_and_privatization_arent_the_answer_for_
alberta  
Miliband, R. (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York, NY: Basic Books.  
Moloney, K., & Stone, D. (2019). “Beyond the State: Global Policy and Transnational 









Moran, T. H. (1998). Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Policy Agenda for 
Developing Countries and Economies in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics. 
Morgan, G. (2015, April 29). “Cenovus Energy Inc. Warns of 'Negative' Fallout if NDP 
Changes Royalty Structure.” Financial Post. 
http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/cenovus-energy-inc-warns-of-
negative-fallout-if-ndp-changes-royalty-structure  
Morse, J. M. (1998). “The Contracted Relationship: Ensuring Protection of Anonymity and 
Confidentiality.” 301-303.  
Mowat, D., Hanson, L., Tertzakian, P., & Trimbee, A. (2016). Alberta at a Crossroads: Royalty 
Review Advisory Panel Report. https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/01b3af57-350c-43ec-
8c73-d70fe74523cb/resource/94fca310-354d-4604-bccb-
d897c2f68b91/download/2016-royalty-framework-report.pdf  
Mulkern, A. C. (2010, February 2). “Oil and Gas Interests Set Spending Record for Lobbying 
in 2009.” The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/02/02greenwire-oil-and-gas-interests-set-
spending-record-for-l-1504.html?pagewanted=all  
Mulvale J.P., & Vanderborght Y. (2012). “Canada: A Guaranteed Income Framework to 
Address Poverty and Inequality?” In Basic Income Guarantee and Politics: Exploring 
the Basic Income Guarantee. Edited by Caputo R.K. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Myers, G. (1914). A History of Canadian Wealth. Chicago, IL: C. H. Kerr & Company. 
Natural Resources Canada. (2000). “Selected Crude Oil Prices Monthly—2000.” 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071116044435/http://www2.nrcan.g
c.ca/es/erb/prb/english/view.asp?x=476&oid=523  
Natural Resources Canada. (2005). “Selected Crude Oil Prices Monthly—2005.” 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071120173540/http://www2.nrcan.g
c.ca/es/erb/prb/english/view.asp?x=476&oid=1008  
NDP. (2015). “Leadership for What Matters.” Election Platform. http://daveberta.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/NDP_AlbertaPlatformBook_2015_WebDownload_FINAL.pd
f  








Nielsen, A. (2012). We Gambled Everything: The Life and Times of an Oilman. Edmonton, 
AB: University of Alberta Press. 
Nikiforuk, A. (2007, September 24). “Who Will Deliver Albertans’ Fair Share?” The Globe 
and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/who-will-deliver-albertans-fair-
share/article725510/  
Nikiforuk, A. (2010). Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent. Vancouver: 
Greystone Books. 
Nikiforuk, A. (2012, September 17). “Peter Lougheed’s Radical Legacy.” The Tyee. 
https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2012/09/17/Radical-Peter-Lougheed/  
Nikiforuk, A. (2016, February 2 (a)). “Critics Slam Alberta's New Royalty Review as Policy 
Disaster.” The Tyee. Retrieved From: https://thetyee.ca/News/2016/02/02/Alberta-
Royalty-Review-Disaster/  
Nikiforuk, A. (2016, February 3 (b)). “Alberta Keeps Low Oil and Gas Royalties, Committing 
‘Profound Political Mistake,’ Critics Say.” The Narwhal. https://thenarwhal.ca/alberta-
keeps-low-oil-and-gas-royalties-committing-profound-political-mistake-critics-say/ 
Nikiforuk, A. (2019, December 16). “Crazy Days in Alberta: The Poison Wells File.” The Tyee. 
https://thetyee.ca/Analysis/2019/12/16/Alberta-Poison-Wells-File/  
Noga, J., & Wolbring, G. (2014). “The Oil and Gas Discourse from the Perspective of the 
Canadian and Albertan Governments, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Oil and 
Gas Industry.” Energies 7(1), 314-333. 
Oil & Gas Journal. (2016, February 1). “Alberta Royalty Report Eases Industry Worry.” Oil & 
Gas Journal.  




Oil Sands Magazine. (2018, December 2018). “Differentials Explained: Why Alberta Crude 
Sells at a Deep Discount.” Oil Sands Magazine. 
https://www.oilsandsmagazine.com/market-insights/crude-oil-pricing-differentials-why-
alberta-crude-sells-at-deep-discount-to-wti  
Ollila, E. (2003). “Global Health-Related Public-Private Partnerships and the United Nations.” 










Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Onifade, T. T. (2017). “Alberta, Canada, Royalty Review and its Lessons for Resource 
Economies.” Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 35(2), 171-196. 
Palmer, H. T. (1982). “The Alberta Experience.” Journal of Canadian Studies 17(3), 20-34. 
Park, F., & Park, L. (1973). Anatomy of Big Business. Toronto, ON: Lorimer.   
Pastor Jr, M. (1990). “Capital Flight from Latin America.” World Development 18(1), 1-18. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90099-J.    
Patterson, B. (2012). “Alberta, CAPP Discuss Joint Campaign to Counter Fracking 
‘Misinformation’.” The Council of Canadians. https://canadians.org/analysis/news-
alberta-capp-discuss-joint-campaign-counter-fracking-misinformation  
Pearson, R., & Seyfang, G. (2001). “Voluntary Codes of Conduct, Labour Regulation and 
Social Policy in a Globalizing World.” Global Social Policy 1(1), 49–78. 
Pembina Institute. n.d. “Thinking Like an Owner: Overhauling The Royalty and Tax Treatment 
of Alberta’s Oil Sands.” Fact Sheet. Pembina Institute. 
https://www.pembina.org/reports/Owner_Factsheet.pdf  
Pepinsky, T. B. (2014). “The Politics of Capital Flight in the Global Economic Crisis.” 
Economics & Politics 26(3), 431-456. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12042  
Petersen, H. G. (2004). “Globalization, Capital Flight, and Capital Income Taxation: A 
European Perspective.” Tax Notes International, 887-897. 
Plourde, A. (2009). “Oil Sands Royalties and Taxes in Alberta: An Assessment of Key 
Developments since the Mid-1990s.” The Energy Journal 30 (1), 111-139. 
Porter, J. (1965). Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Portugal, A., & Bugarin, M. (2007). “Electoral Campaign Financing: The Role of Public 
Contributions and Party Ideology.” Economia 8 (1), 143-171. 
Poulantzas, N. (1978). State, Power, Socialism. London and New York: Verso Books.  
Poynter, T. A. (1982). “Government Intervention in Less Developed Countries: The Experience 








Pratt, L. (1976). The Tar Sands: Syncrude and the Politics of Oil. Edmonton, AB: Hurtig.  
Pratt, L. (1982). “Energy: The Roots of National Policy.” Studies in Political Economy 7(1), 
27-59. 
Preston, J.  (2013). “Neoliberal Settler Colonialism, Canada and The Tar Sands.” Race & Class 
55(2), 42-59. 
Price, R. (2003). “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics.” World Politics 
55(4), 579–606. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0024  
Province of Alberta, Mines and Minerals Act, Bitumen Valuation Methodology (Ministerial) 
Regulation, Alberta Regulation 232/2008. 
https://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Regs/2008_232.pdf  
Province of Alberta. (2008). Mines and Minerals Act, “Oil Sands Allowed Costs (Ministerial) 
Regulation,” Alberta Regulation 231/2008. 
https://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Regs/2008_231.pdf  
Przeworski, A., & Wallerstein, M. (1988). “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital.” 
American Political Science Review 82(1), 11–29. 
Purdon, M. (2015). “Advancing Comparative Climate Change Politics: Theory and Method.” 
Global Environmental Politics 15(3), 1-26. 
Rein, M., & Schön, D. (1996). “Frame-Critical Policy Analysis and Frame-Reflective Policy 
Practice.” Knowledge and Policy 9, 85-104.  
Reuters. (2008, April 07). “Alberta Report Disputes Missing Royalty Billions.” Reuters. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/canada-energy-canada-alberta-col-
idCAN0724944820080407?edition-redirect=in  
Reynolds, D. B. (2005). “The Economics of Oil Definitions: The Case of Canada's Oil Sands.” 
OPEC Review 29(1), 51-73. 
Richards, J., & Pratt, L. (1979). Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. 
Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart. 
Riley, S. J. (2019, January 31). “What the Redwater Ruling Means For Alberta’s Thousands of 
Inactive Oil And Gas Wells.” The Narwhal. https://thenarwhal.ca/what-the-redwater-
ruling-means-for-albertas-thousands-of-inactive-oil-and-gas-wells/  










Rodgers, B. (2016). “Assessment of Alberta’s New Royalty Policy.” Rogers Consulting, 1-5. 
Ross, M. (1999). “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.” World Politics 51(2), 297-
322.  
Ross, M. (2001). “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53(3), 325-361. 
Ross, M. (2015). “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?” Annual Review of 
Political Science 18, 239-259. 
Rowell, A., Marriott, J., & Stockman, L. (2005). The Next Gulf: London, Washington and Oil 
Conflict in Nigeria. 
Ruggie, J. G. (2004). “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and Practices.” 
European Journal of International Relations 10(4), 499–531. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066104047847  
Rundall, P., & Brady, M. (2011). “Governments Should Govern, and Corporations Should 
Follow the Rules.” SCN News 39, 51–56. 
Rusnell, C. (2011, November 29). “Alberta Worked With Industry on Fracking PR Strategy.” 
CBC News. 
Salameh, M. G. (2003). “The New Frontiers for the United States Energy Security in the 21st 
Century.” Applied Energy 76, 135–144. 
Sampson, A. (1975). The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped. 
New York, NY: Viking Press. 
Scholte, J. A. (2005). Globalization: A Critical Introduction (2nd edition). Palgrave Macmillan. 
Seskus, T. (2018, November 13). “Canadian Oil Sands Player Calls for Government to 
Mandate Production Cuts.” CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/cenovus-
oilsands-cuts-1.4903385 
Shaffer, B. (2016). “Lifting the Hood on Alberta's Royalty Review.” School of Public Policy, 
SPP Briefing Papers 9 (7), 1-24. 
Shaxson, N. (2007). “Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse.” International Affairs 83(6), 
1123-1140. 
Shrivastava, M., & Stefanick, L. (Eds). (2015). Alberta Oil and the Decline of Democracy in 








Shrivastava, M. (2015). “Of Democracy and Its Deficits: Surviving Neoliberalism in Oil-
Exporting Countries.” In Alberta Oil and The Decline of Democracy in Canada. Edited 
by Shrivastava, M., & Stefanick, L. Athabasca University Press. 391-410. 
Simons, P. (2007, June 28). “Klein’s Machine Undermined Civil Service.” Canada.com  
Slaughter, A.-M. (2004). A New World Order (1st edition). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Smith, P. J. (2015). “Petro-politics in Alberta and Canada: A New Spatiality of Political 
Contestation?” In Alberta Oil and The Decline of Democracy in Canada. Edited by 
Shrivastava, M., & Stefanick, L. Athabasca University Press. 89-112. 
Smith, W. R. (2010). “Field Lessons: The Whys and Hows of Interview-Based Fieldwork.” 
French Politics 8(1), 101-108.  
Snow, D., & Benford, R. D. (1992). “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.” In Frontiers in 
Social Movement Theory. Edited by Morris, A. & Mueller, C.M. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Stake, R. E. (1995). The Art of Case Study Research. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Statistics Canada, Government of Canada. (2018, April 6). “Government Expenditures in 
Alberta.” https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-631-x/11-631-x2018003-eng.htm  
Stefanick, L. (2015). “Blurring the Boundaries of Private, Partisan, and Public Interests: 
Accountability in an Oil Economy.” In Alberta Oil and the Decline of Democracy in 
Canada. Edited by Shrivastava, M. & Stefanick, L., 363-390. 
Stelmach, E. (2007, October 25). “Premier Stelmach Delivers Historic, New Royalty Regime 
for Alberta.” Government of Alberta’s News Release. 
http://alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=22384D8D0CC20-9549-7D32-
2CF5FDADC70214D2.  
Stevens, M., & McCurdy, P. (2019). “Fort McMurray, Climate Change and ‘The Beast’: A 
Critical Discourse Analysis of Canadian News Editorials and Opinions.” 
Communicative Figurations, Working Paper no. 28, p. 1-29.  
Steves, F., & Teytelboym, A. (2013). “Political Economy of Climate Change Policy.” SSEE 
Working Paper 13(2). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2456538  
Steward, G. (2017). “Betting on Bitumen: Alberta’s Energy Policies from Lougheed to Klein.” 








Stoddart, M. C. J., McCurdy, P. Slawinski, N., & Collins, C. G. (2020). “Envisioning Energy 
Futures in the North Atlantic oil industry: Avoidance, Persistence, and Transformation 
as Responses to Climate Change.” Energy Research & Social Science 69, p. 1-10.  
Strange, S. (1996). The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Streeten, P. (1976). “Bargaining with Multinationals.” World Development 4 (3), 225-229. 
Szeman, I. (2013). “How to Know About Oil: Energy Epistemologies and Political Futures.” 
Journal of Canadian Studies 47(3), p. 145-168.  
Szeman, I., & Petrocultures Research Group. (2016). After Oil. Morgantown: West Virginia 
University Press.  
Szeman, I. (2017). “On the Politics of Extraction.” Cultural Studies 31(2-3), p. 440-447.  
Taft, K. (2017). Oil’s Deep State: How the Petroleum Industry Undermines Democracy and 
Stops Action on Global Warming. James Lorimer & Company Ltd.  
Takach, Geo. (2010). Will the Real Alberta Please Stand Up? Edmonton, AB: The University 
of Alberta Press.  
Taylor, A., & Reynolds, M. (2006). “Thinking like an Owner – Overhauling the Royalty and 
Tax Treatment of Alberta’s Oil Sands.” The Pembina Institute, Oil Sands Paper 3, 1-29. 
Taylor-Vaisey, N. (2008). “Dropping Out for Oil.” McLean’s 
https://www.macleans.ca/education/uniandcollege/dropping-out-for-the-oil-rig/ 
The Oil Sands Community Alliance (OSCA). (n.d.). “History of OSCA: The Evolution of 
AOSDFC to OSCA.” http://www.oscaalberta.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/OSCA-
History-Timeline.png  
Thirft, G. (2016). “‘The Blue-Eyed Sheik of Saudi Alberta’: Peter Lougheed, Oil Shocks, and 
the National Energy Policy of 1980.” Alberta History 64(4). Historical Society of 
Alberta. 
Thomson, G. (2008). “Highlights from the 2008 Global Petroleum Survey.” Fraser Forum, 25-
27. 
Timmons, L. (2012, March 23). “Political Donations from 2004 to 2010 or Man People Love 
Giving Money to the Tories.” Edmonton Journal. 
Tupper, A. (2004). “Peter Lougheed – 1971-1985.” In Alberta’s Premiers of the Twentieth 
Century. Edited by Rennie, B.J. Regina, SK: Canadian Plains Research Centre. 








University of Alberta. Faculty of Engineering, Institute for Oil Sands Innovation (IOSI). 
https://www.ualberta.ca/engineering/research/groups/oil-sands-innovation/index.html  
University of Calgary. The School of Public Policy, Extractive Resource Governance Program 
(ERGP). https://ergp2.policyschool.ca/  
University of Calgary. The School of Public Policy. https://www.policyschool.ca/  
Urquhart, I. (2018). Costly Fix: Power, Politics, and Nature in the Tar Sands. Toronto, ON: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Valentine, P. (2008). “Building Confidence: Improving Accountability and Transparency in 
Alberta’s Royalty System.” https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/3ce4de02-1ef2-4f45-bc62-
db92fffdc0ee/resource/c5ab8eec-ef8f-488a-a493-65596c3b65e4/download/4122889-
2008-building-confidence-albertas-royalty-system-valentine-report.pdf  
Verba, S., Lehman Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Vernon, R. (1971). Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
Vidal, J. (2008, July 12). “Canadians Ponder Cost Of Rush for Dirty Oil.” The Guardian. 
Vivoda, V. (2008). The Return of the Obsolescing Bargain and the Decline of Big Oil: A Study 
of Bargaining in the Contemporary Oil Industry. E-Book.  
Vivoda, V. (2009). “Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International Oil Companies: 
Challenges and Change in the New Millennium.” New Political Economy 14 (4), 517-
534. 
Vivoda, V. (2011). “Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry.” Business and 
Politics 13(4), 1-36. 
Wallerstein, I. (1979). The Capitalist World-Economy. New York and London: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Way, L. (2011). “An Energy Superpower or a Super Sales Pitch? Building the Case through an 
Examination of Canadian Newspapers’ Coverage of Oil Sands.” Canadian Political 
Science Review 5(1), p. 74–98. http://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/cpsr/issue/view/25  
Wilson, S., Carlson, A., & Szeman, I. (Eds.). (2017). Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture. 








Wilt, J. (2015, September 21). “Celebrities and the Oil Sands: Help or Hindrance?” The 
Narwhal. https://thenarwhal.ca/celebrities-and-oilsands-help-or-hindrance  
Wilt, J. (2017, June 15). “How Two Very Different Alberta Premiers Shaped the Oil Sands.” 
The Tyee. https://thetyee.ca/News/2017/06/15/How-Alberta-Premiers-Shapes-Oil-
Sands/  
Wilt, J. (2018, May 16). “A Brief History of the Public Money Propping Up the Alberta Oil 
Sands.” The Narwhal. https://thenarwhal.ca/brief-history-public-money-propping-
alberta-oilsands/  
Wood, J. (2015, April 29). “NDP’s Call for Royalty Review Heats Up as Alberta Election 
Issues.” Calgary Herald.  
Wood, J. (2015, August 29). “Who's on the Alberta Government Royalty Review Panel.” 
Calgary Herald. https://calgaryherald.com/business/energy/whos-on-the-alberta-
government-royalty-review-panel  
Woynillowicz, D., Severson-Baker, C., & Raynolds, M. (2005). Oil Sands Fever: The 
Environmental Implications of Canada’s Oil Sands Rush. The Pembina Institute, 1-86. 
Yager, D. (2008). “Time to Move On.” Oilweek, Calgary 59(10). 
Yedlin, D. (2015, October 27). “Conference Suggests Views Differ on Future of Oil Sands.” 
Calgary Herald. 
Young, J. (2013, March 23). “The Best Quotes from Ralph Klein’s Colourful Public Life.” The 
Globe and Mail https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/the-best-quotes-from-
ralph-kleins-colourful-public-life/article10577310/  
Young, K. A., Banerjee, T., & Schwartz, M. (2018). “Capital Strikes as a Corporate Political 
Strategy: The Structural Power of Business in the Obama Era.” Politics & Society 
46(1), 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218755751  
Zalik, A. (2016). “Duty to Consult or License to Operate? Corporate Social Practice and 
Industrial Conflict in the Alberta Tar sands and the Nigerian Niger Delta.” In First 
World Petro-Politics: The Political Ecology and Governance of Alberta. Edited by 

















Primary constituency Location Date Length (min) 
1  Research Institute Edmonton, AB December 2018 68 
2  Research Institute Edmonton, AB December 2018 100 
3  
Former Royalty Review 
Panel Member 
Calgary, AB December 2018 125 
4  Former Civil Servant Edmonton, AB December 2018 106 
5  Research Institute Edmonton, AB December 2018 60 
6  Former Elected Official Edmonton, AB December 2018 95 
7  Industry Representative Phone December 2018 59 
8  Journalist Edmonton, AB December 2018 84 
9  Industry Representative Phone December 2018 47 
10  Former Civil Servant Edmonton, AB December 2018 150 
11  
Former Civil Servant, 
now Academic 
Edmonton, AB December 2018 76 
12  
Former Royalty Review 
Panel Member 
Calgary, AB December 2018 113 
13 Academic Edmonton, AB December 2018 62 
14  Research Institute  Calgary, AB December 2018 31 
15  Former Elected Official Edmonton, AB December 2018 59 
16  
Former Royalty Review 
Panel Member 








Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
 
Question 1:  
Could you start by telling me about the position you held during the royalty reviews, how you 
participated, and why? 
Follow up: Did you have any expectations prior to the reviews?   
Question 2:  
If you had to summarize the main contributions or outcomes of the Panel in [2007 or 2015-16], 
what would they be? 
Question 3:  
What were the greatest challenges faced by the Panel in [2007 or 2015-16]?  
Follow up: Do you think oil price fluctuations on the global scene impacted the reviews? 
Question 4:  
What are the most important ideas and narratives around oil sands royalties? Do you think they 
had an impact during the reviews? Why or why not? 
Question 5:  
Who were the most influential groups of people during the debate? Why? Where did their 
influence come from? How about opposing groups? How did they ensured their voice was 
heard? 
Question 6: 
Are there institutional structures that may influence how oil sands royalties are set in Alberta? 
(I provided a list of examples to help define what I meant by “institutional structures.”) 
Question 7:  
Do you have a model jurisdiction in mind when thinking about oil sands royalties?  
Question 8:  
Knowing what you know now, is there anything you would change about the review process? 
 
